Cristian Ciocan

The purpose of this article is to analyze the significance of the absence of the problem of living body in Heidegger's analytic of Dasein. In order to evaluate the occurrences of the problem of the body in Being and Time, I also refer to the context of some of Heidegger's later work where there is to be found a sketch of an ontological investigation of the living body. I analyze then in detail the scarce occurrences of body in the fundamental ontology, showing finally that the lack of a proper phenomenological examination of living body generates a series of conceptual difficulties for the problem of Dasein's death, precisely when the issue of dead body is at stake.

This study intends to provide some benchmarks for a full analysis of the evolution of the problem of death in Heidegger ’s thought developed after Sein und Zeit. The question that guides our investigation is how the phenomenology of death is still the center of Heidegger ’s philosophical interest, after the analytic of Dasein. Our discussion focuses on the period 1931–1935, following a chronological order, in order to call attention to some of the distinct stages of the thought on death after Sein und Zeit. We begin by analyzing the reactions of Heidegger himself on the reception of the problem of death in the first period after the publication of Sein und Zeit. After that, we analyze the emergence of the subject of death in three courses: the course of the winter semester 1931–1932, the lecture from 1934/1935 on Hölderlin, and the lecture in the summer of 1935 – An Introduction to Metaphysics.

In this article, I focus on the problem of body as it is developed in Heidegger’s Zollikon Seminars, in contrast with its enigmatic concealment in Being and Time. In the first part, I emphasize the implicit connection of Heidegger’s approach of body with Husserl’s problematic of Leib and Körper, and with his phenomenological analyses of tactility. In the second part, I focus on Heidegger’s distinction between the limits of the lived body and the limits of the corresponding corporeal thing, opening to an ontological understanding of the ecstatic bodying forth of the body. In the third part, I analyse this ecstatic bodiliness in relation to the problem of spatiality, exploring the tension between the here and the over there in the experience of the embodiment. Heidegger not only refuses to understand the space starting from the here of the body, but he also refuses to understand the body starting from the here of the space. Thus, there are two interconnected inversions that Heidegger operates in relation to Husserl: In the topic of spatiality, he rejects the pre-eminence of the here; in relation to the body, he contests the primacy of tactility. Finally, the conclusion stresses that, even if the bodying forth penetrates almost all behaviour of Dasein in the world, there is however a limit of embodiment, an unreachable frontier beyond any possibility of the bodying forth, namely the understanding of being. This also implies that the problem of body needs be understood in the context of the ontological difference.

Dans cet article, nous allons analyser le surgissement et l’évolution du problème de la corporéité dans les écrits de jeunesse d’Emmanuel Levinas, notamment de 1935 à 1947. Dans ces textes, le moi se constitue comme cohésion avec soi et comme enchaînement à son propre corps. L’altérité brise cette adhésion charnelle à soi et rompt la cohérence du moi. Mais cette rupture a elle aussi une dimension charnelle : l’altérité est comprise ici non seulement sous le paradigme de la nudité, comme ce qui se soustrait aux formes, mais aussi comme visage (chair expressive), féminité (chair vulnérable) et éros (chair voluptueuse et tendre).