•  12
    Liar sentences and Soames's rejection of bivalence
    In Henrique Jales Ribeiro (ed.), 1º Encontro Nacional de Filosofia Analítica, Universidade De Coimbra. 2003.
    Scott Soames proposes in his book Understanding Truth (1999) a motivation to reject bivalence. It is his claim that if bivalence is assumed to apply to liar sentences, contradictions will follow. However, contradictions will equally follow if bivalence is denied of liar sentences (in fact, of any truth-bearers). Soames avoids contradictions by treating truth as a partially defined predicate: for certain sentences, truth is not defined to apply or not to apply. Liar sentences are some of such cas…Read more
  •  33
    Introduction to Normativity and Rationality
    Disputatio 2 (23): 153-160. 2007.
    This is a special issue of Disputatio on normativity and rationality. The idea for this volume originated after the fifth European Congress of Analytic Philosophy, ECAP5, which took place in Lisbon in August of 2005. This volume collects the contributions of John Broome, Pascal Engel, Kevin Mulligan, Josep Prades and John Skoruspki, who were speakers on that occasion. The common thread in the diverse talks suggested that a volume on the topic would be of general interest. This common thread, whi…Read more
  •  459
    Truth and The Ambiguity of Negation
    In Erich Rast & Luiz Carlos Baptista (eds.), Meaning and Context, Peter Lang. pp. 2--235. 2010.
    This article has one aim, to reject the claim that negation is semantically ambiguous. The first section presents the putative incompatibility between truth-value gaps and the truth-schema; the second section presents the motivation for the ambiguity thesis; the third section summarizes arguments against the claim that natural language negation is semantically ambiguous; and the fourth section indicates the problems of an introduction of two distinct negation operators in natural language.
  •  184
    Doxastic Disagreement
    Erkenntnis 79 (S1): 121-142. 2014.
    This paper explores some alternative accounts of doxastic disagreement, and shows what problems each faces. It offers an account of doxastic disagreement that results from the incompatibility of the content of doxastic attitudes, even when that content’s truth is relativized. On the best definition possible, it is argued, neither non-indexical contextualism nor assessment-relativism have an advantage over contextualism. The conclusion is that conflicts that arise from the incompatibility (at the…Read more
  •  64
    The square of opposition and the paradoxes
    Logica Universalis 2 (1): 87-105. 2008.
    Can an appeal to the difference between contrary and contradictory statements, generated by a non-uniform behaviour of negation, deal adequately with paradoxical cases like the sorites or the liar? This paper offers a negative answer to the question. This is done by considering alternative ways of trying to construe and justify in a useful way (in this context) the distinction between contraries and contradictories by appealing to the behaviour of negation only. There are mainly two ways to try …Read more
  •  208
    Disagreements
    Erkenntnis 79 (S1): 1-10. 2014.
    This special issue of Erkenntnis is devoted to the varieties of disagreement that arise in different areas of discourse, and the consequences we should draw from these disagreements, either concerning the subject matter and its objectivity, or concerning our own views about this subject matter if we learn, for example, that an epistemic peer disagrees with our view. In this introduction we sketch the background to the recent philosophical discussions of these questions, and the location occupied…Read more