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92Jonathan Bennett on 'even if'Linguistics and Philosophy 8 (3): 353-357. 1985.I show that given Jonathan Bennett's theory of 'even if,' the following statement is logically true iff the principle of conditional excluded is valid: (SE) If Q and if P wouldn't rule out Q, then Q even if P. Hence whatever intuitions support the validity of (SE) support the validity of Conditional Excluded Middle, too. Finally I show that Bennett's objection to John Bigelow's theory of the conditional can be turned into a (perhaps) more telling one, viz. that on Bigelow's theory 'if P then Q' …Read more
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111Conditional excluded middleErkenntnis 70 (2): 173-188. 2009.In this essay I renew the case for Conditional Excluded Middle (CXM) in light of recent developments in the semantics of the subjunctive conditional. I argue that Michael Tooley’s recent backward causation counterexample to the Stalnaker-Lewis comparative world similarity semantics undermines the strongest argument against CXM, and I offer a new, principled argument for the validity of CXM that is in no way undermined by Tooley’s counterexample. Finally, I formulate a simple semantics for the su…Read more
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101A Logical Transmission Principle for Conclusive ReasonsAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2): 353-370. 2015.Dretske's conclusive reasons account of knowledge is designed to explain how epistemic closure can fail when the evidence for a belief does not transmit to some of that belief's logical consequences. Critics of Dretske dispute the argument against closure while joining Dretske in writing off transmission. This paper shows that, in the most widely accepted system for counterfactual logic , conclusive reasons are governed by an informative, non-trivial, logical transmission principle. If r is a co…Read more
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111The paradox of the knower without epistemic closureMind 110 (438): 319-333. 2001.In this essay I present a new version of the Paradox of the Knower and show that this new paradox vitiates a certain argument against epistemic closure. I then prove a theorem that relates the new paradox to epistemological scepticism. I conclude by assessing the use of the Knower in arguments against syntactical treatments of knowledge.
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61Nute Donald. Conditional logic. Handbook of philosophical logic, Volume II, Extensions of classical logic, edited by Gabbay D. and Guenthner F., Synthese library, vol. 165, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Boston, and Lancaster, 1984, pp. 387–439 (review)Journal of Symbolic Logic 54 (4): 1477-1479. 1989.
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176Explanation and the theory of questionsErkenntnis 34 (2). 1991.In The Scientific Image B. C. van Fraassen argues that a theory of explanation ought to take the form of a theory of why-questions, and a theory of this form is what he provides. Van Fraassen's account of explanation is good, as far as it goes. In particular, van Fraassen's theory of why-questions adds considerable illumination to the problem of alternative explanations in psychodynamics. But van Fraassen's theory is incomplete because it ignores those classes of explanations that are answers no…Read more
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71Counterfactuals and event causationAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (3). 1992.I compare the failure of counterfactual dependence as a criterion of event causation to the failure of stochastic dependence as a criterion of causal law. Counterexamples to the stochastic analysis arise from cases of Simpson's Paradox, and Nancy Cartwright has suggested a way of transforming the stochastic analysis into something that avoids these counterexample. There is an analogical relationship between cases of Simpson's Paradox and cases of causal overdetermination. I exploit this analogi…Read more
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65Armstrong And The Problem Of Converse RelationsErkenntnis 56 (2): 215-227. 2002.In A World of States of Affairs(Cambridge University Press, 1997) David Armstrong offers acomprehensive metaphysics based on the thesis that the world consistsof states of affairs. Among the entities postulated by Armstrong's theory are relations, including non-symmetrical relations, and whileArmstrong does not agree with Russell that all relations have adirection or definite order among their places, he does explicitlyacknowledge that the slots of a non-symmetrical relation have adefinite order…Read more
APA Eastern Division
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Probability |
PhilPapers Editorships
Monty Hall Problem |