Alan Millar

Perceptual-recognitional abilities are abilities to recognize things that are some way as being that way from the way they appear to some sense-modality. These abilities have a key role in accounting for perceptual knowledge. Under the conception adopted, general abilities are exercised only in doing the thing that the ability is an ability to do. Accordingly, recognitional abilities are exercised only in recognizing a thing as being some way, and in that way coming to know that it is that way. A contrasting picture is considered and rejected. Particular kinds of self-knowledge are then explored—our knowledge as to what one sees or sees to be thus and so. These kinds of self-knowledge are crucial for understanding how visual perception yields justified beliefs. They are explicated in terms of the exercise of abilities knowledgeably to apply certain relational concepts in first-person, non-inferential applications to visually perceived things and oneself.

It is plausible that some perceptual knowledge has rich content—content that goes beyond the superficial appearance of the objects perceived. This poses a problem: how can the way something appears reveal to us that it is of some rich kind, for instance a telephone, given the possibility that something could appear in the same way and not be of that kind? Objections are raised to accounts that treat such perceptual knowledge as covertly inferential. A theory of perceptual-recognitional abilities that deals with the initial problem is outlined and then extended to cover some knowledge from indicators, for instance, smoke and skid-marks. Recognitional abilities can be informed by belief in generalizations relating appearances to, for instance, membership of kinds. The status of such beliefs is argued to be problematic. A constructive suggestion is made.

Perceptual knowledge is the outcome of the exercise of perceptual-recognitional abilities. An account of those abilities is set in the context of an account of abilities in general. A success thesis is expounded according to which an ability is exercised only if the agent does what the ability is an ability to do. There is discussion of the connection between having an ability and being reliably successful. It is argued that hard performances (e.g. throwing a dart into the bullseye) present no obstacle to the success thesis because the underlying abilities are success-rate abilities that comply with that thesis. The emerging picture is applied to perceptual-recognitional abilities, which turn out not to be success-rate abilities. The treatment of fallibility is contrasted with that in recent remarks of John McDowell. The treatment of abilities is contrasted with Ernest Sosa’s recent thinking on competences.

This chapter argues that the goal of enquiry is reflective knowledge. Reflective knowledge is knowledge along with knowledge of how we know, or at least knowledge that we know. Recently discussed puzzlement about the value of knowledge is circumvented. The social transmission of knowledge is explored via a discussion of straightforward cases of testimony. An account of those cases is developed, drawing on the account of knowledge from indicators in the previous chapter but also invoking the idea that there is a practice of informing others by telling them things. A practice is taken to be a cluster of essentially rule-governed activities. It is argued that the account of practices does not suffice to explain the straightforward cases. We need to make sense of how we can recognize trustworthiness on the matter in hand.

This chapter develops an account of clinching evidence in relation to knowledge from indicators, such as knowing that it has rained recently from the wetness of outdoor surfaces. A standard way of understanding such cases, in terms of reliance on a covering generalization, is resisted. An alternative view is presented in terms of abilities to recognize the significance of the indicator phenomenon in question. These abilities are found to be closely analogous to perceptual-recognitional abilities as discussed in the previous chapter. An account is given of detached standing knowledge — standing knowledge of, e.g., geographical facts, on the part of subjects who have lost touch with the source of information from which they acquired the knowledge. It is argued that our recognitional abilities are informed by understandings but that not all the elements of these understandings have the status of knowledge; this is not taken to be problematic.

This chapter gives an account of perceptual knowledge in which perceptual-recognitional abilities are central. These abilities are nothing less than knowledge-acquisition abilities. They include abilities to tell of certain things from their appearances to some sensory modality that they are of some kind or have some property. Emphasis is placed on the following ideas: that perceptual-recognitional abilities are abilities with respect to favourable environments — ones in which the things in question have distinctive appearances; and that the notion of the exercise of such an ability is a success notion. Against this background a perspective on barn examples is given and the incorporated conception of abilities is contrasted with that which figures in the virtue-theoretic approach developed by Ernest Sosa. It is argued that reductive accounts of cognitive abilities do not reflect the order of our ordinary understanding of knowledge. Issues concerning justified belief, closure, and doxastic responsibility are explored.

This chapter argues that there is a tension — the central tension — between the assumption that _knowledge_ admits of reductive conceptual analysis along traditional lines and the roles that knowledge and thinking about knowledge plays in our lives. While an analysis of knowledge should reflect the logical role of the concept, the prospects for providing a reductive analysis that meets this desideratum are dim. The chapter explores two further clusters of problems for the traditional ways of theorising about knowledge: the problem of making sense of how strong evidence must be for justification that satisfies the justification requirement for knowledge; and the problem of making sense of a justification requirement for some modes of knowledge. It explains why the discussion has placed such emphasis on concepts and conceptual enquiry. It indicates the way forward is indicated and outlines the construction of an epistemology that avoids the problems.

This chapter's discussion focuses on the transmission of knowledge through testimony in straightforward cases. These are cases in which subjects gain knowledge from the say so of a speaker without in any obvious way engaging in reasoning over the trustworthiness of the speaker. The account here accords a central role to the practice of informing through telling, but while practice-theoretic considerations explain how it is that people who rely on testimony will so often acquire true beliefs, they do not explain how testimony can yield knowledge. For that we need to show that testimony that something is so can settle that it is so. The suggested account treats knowledge from testimony as a special case of knowledge through recognition of the significance of an indicator, for instance, a reading on a fuel gauge, or the presence of tracks on a path. To account for such knowledge we need to bring into play the notion of an ability to recognize the significance of an indicator—an ability that is honed by experience. These considerations are applied to the case of recognizing a person to be trustworthy in respect of an act of telling.

This volume comprises three distinct investigations into the relationship between the nature and the value of knowledge. Each is written by one of the authors in consultation with the other two. 'Knowledge and Understanding' (by Duncan Pritchard) critically examines virtue-theoretic responses to the problem of the value of knowledge, and argues that the finally valuable cognitive state is not knowledge but understanding. 'Knowledge and Recognition' (by Alan Millar) develops an account of knowledge in which the idea of a recognitional ability plays a prominent role, and argues that this account enables us better to understand knowledge and its value. 'Knowledge and Action' (by Adrian Haddock) argues for an account of knowledge and justification which explains why knowledge is valuable, and enables us to make sense of the knowledge we have of our intentional actions.

According tothe rationality thesis, the possession of propositional attitudes is inextricably tied to rationality. How in this context should we conceive of rationality? In one sense, being rational is contrasted with being non-rational, as when human beings are described as rational animals. In another sense, being rational is contrasted with being irrational. I shall call rationality in this latter senseevaluative rationality. Whatever else it might involve, evaluative rationality surely has to do with satisfying requirements of rationality such as, presumably, the following:(1) That one avoid inconsistency in beliefs.(2) That one not adopt new beliefs unless what one knows entails or is evidence for the truth of those beliefs.(3) That one not have φing as a goal yet do nothing necessary for one to φ. (Means/end requirement.)

The article presents an analysis of Quine's critique of mentalism in semantics. Quine is right to demand that theories of meaning show how the meanings of linguistic expressions are grounded in verbal dispositions. His own account of verbal dispositions is inadequate to the task. It is argued that the dispositions in which meanings are grounded (i) are dispositions to accept and reject sentences, (ii) essentially involve beliefs, (iii) link sentences with one another, as well as with experience, and (iv) are conventional. The importance of the distinction between disposition-based relations between sentences and logical relations between sentences is stressed.