David J. Stump

I defend nine elements of pragmatic philosophy and show how they apply to scientific inquiry. Pragmatism provides a focus on inquiry that adopts fallibilism, denies all foundations, and looks for practical or concrete effects of our theories and actions. Pragmatists hold that universal and fixed principles are not necessary for objective knowledge, maintaining an everyday realism while rejecting metaphysical realism and the dualism that it entails. In the empirical sciences we must interact with things in the world to see whether or not our theories are correct, therefore recovering a pragmatic notion of experience from James and Dewey is central to understanding physical science. Pragmatists also deny the existence of simple dichotomies, arguing instead that opposing concepts lie along a continuum. Notably, facts and values are both objects of unified inquiry. Finally, I consider the pragmatists’ various theories of truth and argue that it would be be er to avoid defining truth by adopting a deflationary account. Rather than taking the definition of truth to be central to pragmatism, I argue that should be left aside given that classical pragmatists disagree about it. Classical pragmatists could then be said to agree on a basic set of principles while leaving truth undefined. Philosophers of science should follow the common core of principles that define pragmatic philosophy as they try to understand scientific practice; indeed, these teachings of pragmatism have already been accepted widely by philosophers of science.

In a response to my recent article in this journal, Shahram Shahryari argues that I fail to present a third position between absolutism and relativism. He makes two points: first, that fallibilism is insufficient as an alternative, because it is compatible with both relativism and absolutism. The second point is that my argument that experience can lead to objective judgment without being a new absolute fails. I discuss these in turn, showing that both critiques fail and that pragmatism is a genuine alternative between absolutism and relativism.

Je présente deux exemples d’interprétations influentes (et incorrectes) de Poincaré, en mettant en évidence leurs erreurs et en documentant certaines de leurs diffusions. Le premier exemple, qui semble avoir été initié par Moritz Schlick, est l’interprétation erronée de l’argument de Poincaré en faveur du conventionnalisme géométrique qui prend appui sur la sous-détermination des théories en science. Le deuxième exemple, qui concerne l’affirmation de Poincaré selon laquelle les géométries euclidienne et non-euclidienne sont inter-traduisibles, provient de Louis Rougier et a été diffusé dans la littérature anglophone par Max Black. Je me demanderai ensuite s’il est possible d’éviter la fragmentation dans l’interprétation de Poincaré, en prenant pour exemple l’admirable tentative d’exhaustivité de Jeremy Gray dans sa biographie intellectuelle de Poincaré. Enfin, je proposerai une nouvelle direction possible pour l’étude de Poincaré, qui pourrait enrichir considérablement notre vision de son œuvre tout en atteignant un niveau de détail qui a fait défaut jusqu’à présent.

In response to a recent argument by David Bloor, I argue that denying absolutes does not necessarily lead to relativism, that one can be a fallibilist without being a relativist. At issue are the empirical natural sciences and what might be called “framework relativism”, that is, the idea that there is always a conceptual scheme or set of practices in use, and all observations are theory-laden relative to the framework. My strategy is to look at the elements that define a relativist stance and show where the pragmatic fallibilist disagrees. Defending the pragmatic notion of experience will be central, given that relativists reject the idea that experience can play a role in objectively justifying belief. We can reject all absolutes and start from the premise that everything is historical, contingent, and situated. One of the lessons of pragmatism is that universal and fixed principles are not necessary for objective knowledge.

Standard histories of mathematics and of analytic philosophy contend that work on the foundations of mathematics was motivated by a crisis such as the discovery of paradoxes in set theory or the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries. Recent scholarship, however, casts doubt on the standard histories, opening the way for consideration of an alternative motive for the study of the foundations of mathematics—unification. Work on foundations has shown that diverse mathematical practices could be integrated into a single framework of axiomatic systems and that much of mathematics could be expressed in a single language. The new framework was the product of an interdisciplinary coalition whose ideas resemble those later adopted by the Vienna Circle and logical empiricists.

Arthur Pap worked in analytic philosophy while maintaining a strong Kantian or neo-Kantian element throughout his career, stemming from his studying with Ernst Cassirer. I present these elements in the different periods of Pap’s works, showing him to be a consistent critic of logical empiricism, which Pap shows to be incapable of superseding the Kantian framework. Nevertheless, Pap’s work is definitely analytic philosophy, both in terms of the content and the style. According to Pap, the central topics of analytic philosophy concern meaning, modality, and analysis. Pap was also influenced by pragmatism, especially in his dissertation, although he does not fully embrace it in either its classical or its Quinean form.

State‐of‐the‐art surveys such as John H. Zammito has produced are usually read prior to engaging seriously upon some course of study. Yet his book will be even more helpful, perhaps, to those who can look retrospectively upon the field of science studies in order to consider how the field has changed and whether postmodernism remains the threat that Zammito thinks it. By explicitly including the history of the development of the philosophy of language in a history of science studies, he makes an original, provocative claim that goes beyond the wealth of information on Quine and Kuhn’s supposed refutation of the Vienna Circle’s positivism, the creation of the Edinburgh School’s sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK), and the debates that followed in the wake of each. Analytic philosophers from Quine to Rorty and Continental philosophers from Derrida to the postmoderns thus play a central role in the development of science studies, despite the fact that they focus on language in general rather than on science.

In response to a recent argument by David Bloor, I argue that denying absolutes does not necessarily lead to relativism, that one can be a fallibilist without being a relativist. At issue are the empirical natural sciences and what might be called “framework relativism”, that is, the idea that there is always a conceptual scheme or set of practices in use, and all observations are theory-laden relative to the framework. My strategy is to look at the elements that define a relativist stance and show where the pragmatic fallibilist disagrees. Defending the pragmatic notion of experience will be central, given that relativists reject the idea that experience can play a role in objectively justifying belief. We can reject all absolutes and start from the premise that everything is historical, contingent, and situated. One of the lessons of pragmatism is that universal and fixed principles are not necessary for objective knowledge.

New perspectives on Pierre Duhem’s The aim and structure of physical theory Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11016-010-9467-3 Authors Anastasios Brenner, Department of Philosophy, Paul Valéry University-Montpellier III, Route De Mende, 34199 Montpellier cedex 5, France Paul Needham, Department of Philosophy, University of Stockholm, 10691 Stockholm, Sweden David J. Stump, Department of Philosophy, University of San Francisco, 2130 Fulton Street, San Francisco, CA 94117, USA Robert Deltete, Department of Philosophy, Seattle University, 901 12th Avenue, Seattle, WA 98122-1090, USA Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796 Journal Volume Volume 20 Journal Issue Volume 20, Number 1.

Much like contemporary philosophers of science, Poincare attempts to develop a philosophy of science that is able to account for genuine historical change in science but also allows science to be seen as progressive. Poincare is famous for his thesis that there is no true metric of space. He claims that we may choose either Euclidean or non-Euclidean geometry in mechanics and the choice is not objectively right or wrong. However, his conventionalism is not total, as some have charged. He holds that only geometry is conventional and he argues that science does discover truth, despite a conventional element in our theories. I review Poincare's general philosophy of science, clarify the burden of proof required to establish his thesis of the conventionality of metric, and provide an interpretation of his arguments for the conventionality of metric which is consistent with his general views. Poincare does not accept physical geometry in the ordinary sense, because he holds the purely relationalist view that space is a mere abstraction that we use to describe the world. Even inertial effects are to be described solely in terms of the relations of physical objects. Were such relationalism true, Poincare could defend his thesis of conventionality of metric without the introduction of ad hoc "universal forces" in physics. Relationalism is disconfirmed by currently accepted scientific theories of space, so we must admit that Poincare's defense of his conventionalist thesis is inadequate. ;The debate over conventionalism has often taken place with global arguments that purport to show that everything is conventional or that all conventions reduce to a trivial change in notation, or charges that conventionalism is a form of relativism. Both global support for conventionalism and global refutations of conventionalism are inadequate. Discussion of conventionalism should center on specific elements of physical theory rather than a priori objections that the view is inconsistent or trivial. I argue that Poincare does not depend on global arguments to defend his conventionalist thesis and that in this regard his philosophical method is quite correct

Recent defenses of a priori knowledge can be applied to the idea of conventions in science in order to indicate one important sense in which conventionalism is correctsome elements of physical theory have a unique epistemological status as a functionally a priori part of our physical theory. I will argue that the former a priori should be treated as empirical in a very abstract sense, but still conventional. Though actually coming closer to the Quinean position than recent defenses of a priori knowledge, the picture of science developed here is very different from that developed in Quinean holism in that categories of knowledge can be differentiated.

The main innovation in Questioning Technology is Feenberg's use of the results of various social constructivist accounts of science and technology to rethink the philosophy of technology. I agree with Feenberg that the social constructivist studies developed by historians and sociologists refute the essentialist account of technology that has been the mainstream position of philosophers of technology. The autonomy of technology seems to be nothing but a myth from the point of view of social construction, since social and political factors always influence decisions made in technology and science. However, there is a tension in Feenberg's position, in that he seems to want to keep the general analytical framework that the essentialist account of technology makes available, while at the same time rejecting essentialism and, indeed, showing forcefully how it gets in the way of the positive program he develops for democratizing technology. I argue that Feenberg should clarify what kind of social constructive account of technology he will adopt, and that the general categories for understanding technology that Feenberg retains are problematic. I conclude by arguing that a thoroughgoing antiessentialist philosophy of technology can still provide a general analysis of modernity and develop normative claims including those regarding social justice, without relying on general categories.

Duhem’s concept of “good sense” is central to his philosophy of science, given that it is what allows scientist to decide between competing theories. Scientists must use good sense and have intellectual and moral virtues in order to be neutral arbiters of scientific theories, especially when choosing between empirically adequate theories. I discuss the parallels in Duhem’s views to those of virtue epistemologists, who understand justified belief as that arrived at by a cognitive agent with intellectual and moral virtues, showing how consideration of Duhem as a virtue epistemologist offers insights into his views, as well as providing possible answers to some puzzles about virtue epistemology. The extent to which Duhem holds that the intellectual and moral virtues of the scientist determine scientific knowledge has not been generally noticed.

In april 1872, with the caisson at a depth of seventy-odd feet and still no bedrock, two men died. The strain for Roebling was nearly unbearable, as his wife later said. On May 18, a third man died, and that same day Roebling made the most difficult and courageous decision of the project. Staking everything — the success of the bridge, his reputation, his career - he ordered a halt. The New York tower, he had concluded, could stand where it was, at a depth of 78 feet 6 inches, not on bedrock, but on “hardpack” sand. From examinations of the strata he had determined to his own satisfaction that no movement had occured at the level since the time of deposit millions of years in the geologic past; so, he said, it was “good enough to found upon”