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Bernard Berofsky

Columbia University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    70
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 More details
  • Columbia University
    Department of Philosophy
    Unknown
New York City, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics
Philosophy of Action
Theories of Free Will
Topics in Free Will
Moral Responsibility
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Physical Science
Theories of Free Will
Topics in Free Will
Moral Responsibility
  • All publications (70)
  •  168
    In memoriam: James J. Walsh
    with Arthur C. Danto, Isaac Levi, and Charles D. Parsons
    Journal of Philosophy 100 (5): 272. 2003.
  •  111
    Classical Compatibilism: Not Dead Yet
    In Michael S. McKenna & David Widerker (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities, Ashgate. pp. 107. 2003.
    Moral Responsibility, MiscFree Will and ResponsibilityCompatibilism
  •  33
    VI. The Regularity Theory: Translatability
    In Determinism, Princeton University Press. pp. 179-220. 1971.
  •  36
    The Irrelevance of Morality to Freedom
    Bowling Green Studies in Applied Philosophy 2 38-47. 1980.
    Ethics
  •  155
    Liberation From Self: A Theory of Personal Autonomy
    Cambridge University Press. 1995.
    This is a detailed, sophisticated and comprehensive treatment of autonomy. Moreover it argues for a quite different conception of autonomy from that found in the philosophical literature. Professor Berofsky claims that the idea of autonomy originating in the self is a seductive but ultimately illusory one. The only serious way of approaching the subject is to pay due attention to psychology, and to view autonomy as the liberation from the disabling effects of physiological and psychological affl…Read more
    This is a detailed, sophisticated and comprehensive treatment of autonomy. Moreover it argues for a quite different conception of autonomy from that found in the philosophical literature. Professor Berofsky claims that the idea of autonomy originating in the self is a seductive but ultimately illusory one. The only serious way of approaching the subject is to pay due attention to psychology, and to view autonomy as the liberation from the disabling effects of physiological and psychological afflictions. A sustained critique of concepts such as moral autonomy, self-realisation, ideal autonomy, and identification is offered. The author replaces these with an alternative model that reveals how spontaneity, vitality and competence enable human beings to act in the real world.
    CompatibilismAutonomy, Misc
  •  116
    Hume and the Problem of Causation by Tom L. Beauchamp and Alexander Rosenberg (review)
    Journal of Philosophy 80 (8): 478-492. 1983.
    Hume: CausationHume: Induction
  •  90
    Nature's Challenge to Free Will
    Oxford University Press USA. 2012.
    Bernard Berofsky addresses that metaphysical picture directly.Nature's Challenge to Free Willoffers an original defense of Humean Compatibilism.
    Causal ExplanationCompatibilism
  •  20
    XII. Deterministic Theories and the Observable World
    In Determinism, Princeton University Press. pp. 291-297. 1971.
  •  117
    The regularity theory
    Noûs 2 (4): 315-340. 1968.
    Law Statements
  •  63
    Purposive Action
    American Philosophical Quarterly 7 (4): 311-320. 1970.
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