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Bernard Berofsky

Columbia University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    70
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    10

 More details
  • Columbia University
    Department of Philosophy
    Unknown
New York City, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics
Philosophy of Action
Theories of Free Will
Topics in Free Will
Moral Responsibility
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Physical Science
Theories of Free Will
Topics in Free Will
Moral Responsibility
  • All publications (70)
  •  210
    Global control and freedom
    Philosophical Studies 131 (2): 419-445. 2006.
    Several prominent incompatibilists, e.g., Robert Kane and Derk Pereboom, have advanced an analogical argument in which it is claimed that a deterministic world is essentially the same as a world governed by a global controller. Since the latter world is obviously one lacking in an important kind of freedom, so must any deterministic world. The argument is challenged whether it is designed to show that determinism precludes freedom as power or freedom as self-origination. Contrary to the claims o…Read more
    Several prominent incompatibilists, e.g., Robert Kane and Derk Pereboom, have advanced an analogical argument in which it is claimed that a deterministic world is essentially the same as a world governed by a global controller. Since the latter world is obviously one lacking in an important kind of freedom, so must any deterministic world. The argument is challenged whether it is designed to show that determinism precludes freedom as power or freedom as self-origination. Contrary to the claims of its adherents, the global controller nullifies freedom because she is an agent, whereas natural forces are at work in conventional deterministic worlds. Other key differences that undermine the analogy are identified. It is also shown that the argument begs the question against the classical compatibilist, who believes that determinism does not preclude alternative possibilities.
    CompatibilismLibertarianism about Free WillIncompatibilism
  •  21
    XI
    In Determinism, Princeton University Press. pp. 282-290. 1971.
    Determinism
  • Freedom Without Self
    In Charles Harry Manekin & Menachem Marc Kellner (eds.), Freedom and Moral Responsibility: General and Jewish Perspectives, University Press of Maryland. 1997.
  •  62
    The Question of Free Will (review)
    International Studies in Philosophy 31 (4): 142-143. 1999.
    Compatibilism
  •  58
    On the Absolute Freedom of the Will
    American Philosophical Quarterly 29 (3): 279-289. 1992.
  •  1
    Ifs, cans, and free will: The issues
    In Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, Oxford University Press. 2001.
    CompatibilismValue Theory
  •  179
    In memoriam: James J. Walsh
    with Arthur C. Danto, Isaac Levi, and Charles D. Parsons
    Journal of Philosophy 100 (5): 272. 2003.
  •  92
    Free Will and Determinism (edited book)
    Harper & Row. 1966.
    Theories of Free Will, MiscDeterminism
  •  34
    VI. The Regularity Theory: Translatability
    In Determinism, Princeton University Press. pp. 179-220. 1971.
  •  117
    Classical Compatibilism: Not Dead Yet
    In Michael S. McKenna & David Widerker (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities, Ashgate. pp. 107. 2003.
    Moral Responsibility, MiscFree Will and ResponsibilityCompatibilism
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