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The Luck Argument Against LibertarianismIn Allan McCay & Michael Sevel (eds.), Free Will and the Law: New Perspectives, Routledge. pp. 66-84. 2019.
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30Ultimate Responsibility in a Deterministic WorldThe Significance of Free Will (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1): 135. 2000.
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2XII. Deterministic Theories and the Observable WorldIn Determinism, Princeton University Press. pp. 291-297. 1971.
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8Autonomy and Free WillIn J. S. Taylor (ed.), Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and its Role in Contermporary Philosophy, Cambridge University Press. 2004.If the incompatibilist is right, determinism annuls free will, but not necessarily autonomy. The possibly deterministic origin of values and beliefs that are objectively grounded does not undermine the autonomy of agents who maintain these for the right reasons. Nonobjective perspectives—preferences about lifestyle, profession, choice of mate— cannot anyway be entirely removed even for an unlimited being. Moreover, if one were lucky to have inherited contingencies that mesh perfectly with the w…Read more
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12VII. The Regularity Theory: AdequacyIn Determinism, Princeton University Press. pp. 221-252. 1971.
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Freedom Without SelfIn Charles Harry Manekin & Menachem Marc Kellner (eds.), Freedom and Moral Responsibility: General and Jewish Perspectives, University Press of Maryland. 1997.
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57Freedom as CreativityJournal of Philosophy 112 (7): 373-395. 2015.Determinism poses a prima facie problem about free will only if the latter is understood as counterfactual power, understood categorically, rather than self-determination. A key premise of the defense of incompatibilism provided by the Consequence Argument, namely, that laws are unalterable, presupposes that laws include more than the fundamental laws of physics. This premise is challenged by appeal to actual cases. The necessitarian assumptions embodied in that premise can be successfully chall…Read more
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39Through thick and thin: Mele on autonomyPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3): 689-697. 1998.
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67Classical Compatibilism: Not Dead YetIn Michael McKenna & David Widerker (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities, Ashgate. pp. 107. 2003.
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65Identification, the self, and autonomySocial Philosophy and Policy 20 (2): 199-220. 2003.Autonomy, we suppose, is self-regulation or self-direction. There is a distinct idea that is easily confused with self-direction, namely, self-expression, self-fulfillment, or self-realization. Although it will turn out paradoxically that autonomy is neither self-regulation nor self-realization, it is reasonable to suppose that the former is a superior candidate. My teacher of Indian religion, Dr. Subodh Roy, blind from birth, chose not to undergo an operation that would have made him sighted be…Read more
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150Global control and freedomPhilosophical Studies 131 (2): 419-445. 2006.Several prominent incompatibilists, e.g., Robert Kane and Derk Pereboom, have advanced an analogical argument in which it is claimed that a deterministic world is essentially the same as a world governed by a global controller. Since the latter world is obviously one lacking in an important kind of freedom, so must any deterministic world. The argument is challenged whether it is designed to show that determinism precludes freedom as power or freedom as self-origination. Contrary to the claims o…Read more
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Is Pathological Altruism Altruism?In Barbara Oakley, Ariel Knafo, Guruprasad Madhavan & David Sloan Wilson (eds.), Pathological Altruism, Oxford University Press. 2011.
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1Ifs, cans, and free will: The issuesIn Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, Oxford University Press. 2001.
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7X. The Alleged Triviality of DeterminismIn Determinism, Princeton University Press. pp. 273-281. 1971.
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Theories of Free Will |
Topics in Free Will |
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