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49Nature's Challenge to Free WillOxford University Press USA. 2012.Bernard Berofsky addresses that metaphysical picture directly.Nature's Challenge to Free Willoffers an original defense of Humean Compatibilism.
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177Free will and the mind–body problemAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1). 2010.Compatibilists regard subsumption under certain sorts of deterministic psychological laws as sufficient for free will. As _bona fide_ laws, their existence poses problems for the thesis of the unalterability of laws, a cornerstone of the Consequence Argument against compatibilism. The thesis is challenged, although a final judgment must wait upon resolution of controversies about the nature of laws. Another premise of the Consequence Argument affirms the supervenience of mental states on physica…Read more
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128Freedom From Necessity: The Metaphysical Basis of ResponsibilityRoutledge. 1987.Introduction No philosophical problem is more deserving of the title 'the free will problem' than that concerning the assessment of the claim that a ...
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8VI. The Regularity Theory: TranslatabilityIn Determinism, Princeton University Press. pp. 179-220. 1971.
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76The myth of sourceActa Analytica 21 (4). 2006.If determinism is a threat to freedom, that threat derives solely from its alleged eradication of power. The source incompatibilist mistakenly supposes that special views about the self are required to insure that we are the ultimate source of and in control of our decisions and actions. Source incompatibilism fails whether it takes the form of Robert Kane’s event-causal libertarianism or the various agent-causal varieties defended by Derk Pereboom and Randolph Clarke. It is argued that the sort…Read more
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8Autonomy and Free WillIn J. S. Taylor (ed.), Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and its Role in Contermporary Philosophy, Cambridge University Press. 2004.If the incompatibilist is right, determinism annuls free will, but not necessarily autonomy. The possibly deterministic origin of values and beliefs that are objectively grounded does not undermine the autonomy of agents who maintain these for the right reasons. Nonobjective perspectives—preferences about lifestyle, profession, choice of mate— cannot anyway be entirely removed even for an unlimited being. Moreover, if one were lucky to have inherited contingencies that mesh perfectly with the w…Read more
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1XII. Deterministic Theories and the Observable WorldIn Determinism, Princeton University Press. pp. 291-297. 1971.
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Freedom Without SelfIn C. H. Manekin (ed.), Freedom and Responsibility: General and Jewish Perspectives, University of Maryland. 1997.
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12VII. The Regularity Theory: AdequacyIn Determinism, Princeton University Press. pp. 221-252. 1971.
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55Freedom as CreativityJournal of Philosophy 112 (7): 373-395. 2015.Determinism poses a prima facie problem about free will only if the latter is understood as counterfactual power, understood categorically, rather than self-determination. A key premise of the defense of incompatibilism provided by the Consequence Argument, namely, that laws are unalterable, presupposes that laws include more than the fundamental laws of physics. This premise is challenged by appeal to actual cases. The necessitarian assumptions embodied in that premise can be successfully chall…Read more
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66Classical Compatibilism: Not Dead YetIn Michael McKenna & David Widerker (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities, Ashgate. pp. 107. 2003.
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39Through thick and thin: Mele on autonomyPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3): 689-697. 1998.
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64Identification, the self, and autonomySocial Philosophy and Policy 20 (2): 199-220. 2003.Autonomy, we suppose, is self-regulation or self-direction. There is a distinct idea that is easily confused with self-direction, namely, self-expression, self-fulfillment, or self-realization. Although it will turn out paradoxically that autonomy is neither self-regulation nor self-realization, it is reasonable to suppose that the former is a superior candidate. My teacher of Indian religion, Dr. Subodh Roy, blind from birth, chose not to undergo an operation that would have made him sighted be…Read more
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Philosophy of Action |
Theories of Free Will |
Topics in Free Will |
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