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1441Seeing-In as Aspect PerceptionIn Gary Kemp & Gabriele M. Mras (eds.), Wollheim, Wittgenstein, and Pictorial Representation: Seeing-as and Seeing-In, Routledge. 2016.
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563The Unity of HallucinationsPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (2): 171-191. 2010.My primary aim in this article is to provide a philosophical account of the unity of hallucinations, which can capture both perceptual hallucinations (which are subjectively indistinguishable from perceptions) and non-perceptual hallucinations (all others). Besides, I also mean to clarify further the division of labour and the nature of the collaboration between philosophy and the cognitive sciences. Assuming that the epistemic conception of hallucinations put forward by M. G. F. Martin and othe…Read more
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390Imagination and the WillDissertation, University College London. 2005.The principal aim of my thesis is to provide a unified theory of imagining, that is, a theory which aspires to capture the common nature of all central forms of imagining and to distinguish them from all paradigm instances of non-imaginative phenomena. The theory which I intend to put forward is a version of what I call the Agency Account of imagining and, accordingly, treats imaginings as mental actions of a certain kind. More precisely, it maintains that imaginings are mental actions that aim …Read more
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1036Die Natur der FarbenDe Gruyter. 2009.Farben sind für uns sowohl objektive, als auch phänomenale Eigenschaften. In seinem Buch argumentiert Fabian Dorsch, daß keine ontologische Theorie der Farben diesen beiden Seiten unseres Farbbegriffes gerecht werden k ann. Statt dessen sollten wir akzeptieren, daß letzterer sich auf zwei verschiedene Arten von Eigenschaften bezieht: die repräsentierten Reflektanzeigenschaften von Gegenständen und die qualitativen Eigenschaften unserer Farbwahrnehmungen, die als sinnliche Gegebenheitsweisen erst…Read more
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1108The phenomenology of attitudes and the salience of rational role and determinationPhilosophical Explorations 19 (2): 114-137. 2016.The recent debate on cognitive phenomenology has largely focused on phenomenal aspects connected to the content of thoughts. By contrasts, aspects pertaining to their attitude have often been neglected, despite the fact that they are distinctive of the mental kind of thought concerned and, moreover, also present in experiences and thus less contentious than purely cognitive aspects. My main goal is to identify two central and closely related aspects of attitude that are phenomenologically salien…Read more
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5909HumeIn Amy Kind (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Imagination, Routledge. pp. 40-54. 2016.This chapter overviews Hume’s thoughts on the nature and role of imagining and focusses primarily on three important distinctions that Hume draws among our conscious mental episodes: (i) between impressions and ideas; (ii) between ideas of the memory and ideas of the imagination; and (iii), among the ideas of the imagination, between ideas of the judgement and ideas of the fancy. In addition, the chapter considers Hume’s views on the imagination as a faculty of producing ideas, as well as on the…Read more
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687Transparency and Imagining SeeingPhilosophical Explorations 13 (3): 173-200. 2010.In his paper, The Transparency of Experience, M.G.F. Martin has put forward a well- known – though not always equally well understood – argument for the disjunctivist, and against the intentional, approach to perceptual experiences. In this article, I intend to do four things: (i) to present the details of Martin’s complex argument; (ii) to defend its soundness against orthodox intentionalism; (iii) to show how Martin’s argument speaks as much in favour of experiential intentionalism as it speak…Read more
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517Hume and the Recreative ImaginationRivista di Estetica 53 25-54. 2013.Two particular approaches to the imagination as a recreative capacity have recently gained prominence: neo-Humeanism and simulationatism. According to neo-Humeanism, imaginings have cognitions as a constitutive part of their representational contents; while simulationalists maintain that, in imagining, we essentially simulate the occurrence of certain cognitive states. Two other kinds of constitutive dependence, that figure regularly in the debate, concern the necessity of cognitions for, respe…Read more
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510Conceptual qualia and communicationIn Gilian Crampton Smith (ed.), The Foundations of Interaction Design, . pp. 1-14. 2005.The claim that consciousness is propositional has be widely debated in the past. For instance, it has been discussed whether consciousness is always propositional, whether all propositional consciousness is linguistic, whether propositional consciousness is always articulated, or whether there can be non-articulated propositions. In contrast, the question of whether propositions are conscious has not very often been the focus of attention.
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419Transparency and Imagining SeeingIn Marcus Willaschek (ed.), Disjunctivism – Disjunctive Accounts in Epistemology and in the Philosophy of Perception, Routledge. pp. 5-32. 2013.In his paper, The Transparency of Experience, M.G.F. Martin has put forward a well- known – though not always equally well understood – argument for the disjunctivist, and against the intentional, approach to perceptual experiences. In this article, I intend to do four things: (i) to present the details of Martin’s complex argument; (ii) to defend its soundness against orthodox intentionalism; (iii) to show how Martin’s argument speaks as much in favour of experiential intentionalism as it speak…Read more
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753Review: Hegel's Theory of Imagination (review)British Journal of Aesthetics 45 (3): 309-311. 2005.