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216Akratic BelieversAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 20 (2): 175-183. 1983.A person has performed an action akratically when he intentionally, voluntarily acts contrary to what he thinks, all things considered, is best to do. This is very misleadingly called weakness of the will; less misleadingly, akrasia of action. I should like to show that there is intellectual as well as practical akrasia. This might, equally misleadingly, be called weakness of belief; less misleadingly, akrasia of belief.
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26The Functional Logic of Cartesian PassionsIn Sabrina Ebbersmeyer (ed.), Emotional Minds: The Passions and the Limits of Pure Inquiry in Early Modern Philosophy, De Gruyter. pp. 3-18. 2012.
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1Essays on Aristotle's De Anima. First Paperback Edition, with an Additional Essay by M.F. Burnyeat (edited book)Clarendon Press. 1995.Bringing together a group of outstanding new essays on Aristotle's De Anima, this book covers topics such as the relation between soul and body, sense-perception, imagination, memory, desire, and thought, which present the philosophical substance of Aristotle's views to the modern reader. The contributors write with philosophical subtlety and wide-ranging scholarship, locating their interpretations firmly within the context of Aristotle's thought as a whole. The paperback edition includes an add…Read more
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203The Burdens of LoveThe Journal of Ethics 20 (4): 341-354. 2016.While we primarily love individual persons, we also love our work, our homes, our activities and causes. To love is to be engaged in an active concern for the objective well-being—the thriving—of whom and what we love. True love mandates discovering in what that well-being consists and to be engaged in the details of promoting it. Since our loves are diverse, we are often conflicted about the priorities among the obligations they bring. Loving requires constant contextual improvisatory adjustmen…Read more
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220From Passions to Emotions and SentimentsPhilosophy 57 (220): 159-172. 1982.During the period from Descartes to Rousseau, the mind changed. Its domain was redefined; its activities were redescribed; and its various powers were redistributed. Once a part of cosmic Nous, its various functions delimited by its embodied condition, the individual mind now becomes a field of forces with desires impinging on one another, their forces resolved according to their strengths and directions. Of course since there is no such thing as The Mind Itself, it was not the mind that changed…Read more
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Harvard UniversityRegular Faculty
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Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
1 more
| Philosophy of Action |
| Philosophy of Mind |
| Applied Ethics |
| Normative Ethics |
| Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy |
| 17th/18th Century Philosophy |