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252The two faces of stoicism: Rousseau and FreudJournal of the History of Philosophy 34 (3): 335-356. 1996.The Two Faces of Stoicism: Rousseau and Freud AMI~LIE OKSENBERG RORTY Nor do the Stoics mean that the soul of their wisest man resists the first visions and sudden fantasies that surprise [him]: but [he] rather consents that, as it were to a natural subjection, he yields .... So likewise in other passions, always provided his opinions remain safe and whole, and.., his reason admit no tainting or alteration, and he in no whit consents to his fright and sufferance. Montaigne, Essays, I. 1 THE STOI…Read more
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214Belief and self-deceptionInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 15 (1-4): 387-410. 1972.In Part I, I consider the normal contexts of assertions of belief and declarations of intentions, arguing that many action-guiding beliefs are accepted uncritically and even pre-consciously. I analyze the function of avowals as expressions of attempts at self-transformation. It is because assertions of beliefs are used to perform a wide range of speech acts besides that of speaking the truth, and because there is a large area of indeterminacy in such assertions, that self-deception is possible. …Read more
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187On being rationalRatio 22 (3): 350-358. 2009.To be rational is to be engaged in collaborative, corrigible, historically informed inquiry and deliberation. Critical intelligence is merely the beginning of rationality. Substantive rationality also requires reflective and imaginative inquiry. Its active exercise presupposes trust and mandates a commitment to the common good, to responsible attempts to create the political institutions and social conditions on which intellectual and political trust can flourish. Without these, formal and calcu…Read more
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177The Many Faces of Evil: Historical Perspectives (edited book)Routledge. 2001.This is the first anthology to present the full range of the many forms evil. Amelie Rorty has assembled a collection of readings that include not only the most common forms of evil, such as vice, sin, cruelty and crime, but also some which are less well known, such disobedience and willfulness. The readings are drawn from a rich array of historical, philosophical, theological, literary, dramatic, psychological and legal perspectives. Amelie Rorty's introductions to the readings sets each one in…Read more
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111Adaptivity and self‐knowledgeInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 18 (1): 1-22. 1975.In this paper the view is presented that self‐knowledge has no special status; its varieties constitute distinctive classes, differing from one another more sharply than each does from analogous knowledge of others. Most cases of self‐knowledge are best understood contextually, subsumed under such other activities as decision‐making and socializing. First person, present tense ‘reports’ of sensations, intentions, and thoughts are primarily adaptively expressive, only secondarily truth‐functional…Read more
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58King Solomon and Everyman: A Problem in Coordinating Conflicting Moral IntuitionsAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 28 (3). 1991.
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128The Ethics of Collaborative AmbivalenceThe Journal of Ethics 18 (4): 391-403. 2014.We are all ambivalent at every turn. “Should I skip class on this gorgeous spring day?” “Do I really want to marry Eric?” Despite being uncomfortable and unsettling, there are some forms of ambivalence that are appropriate and responsible. Even when they seem trivial and superficial, they reveal some of our deepest values, the self-images we would like to project. In this paper, I analyze collaborative ambivalence, the kind of ambivalence that arises from our identity-forming close relationships…Read more
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74Comments on Stallknecht's ThesesReview of Metaphysics 9 (3). 1956.2. The equal status mentioned in Thesis 2 need not mean, "equally concrete" or "inclusive," but only, "equally real," where "real" means having a character of its own with reference to which opinions can be true or false. But becoming or process is alone fully concrete or inclusive, since if A is without becoming, and B becomes, then the togetherness of AB also becomes. A new constituent means a new totality. In this sense, becoming is the ultimate principle.
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Harvard UniversityRegular Faculty
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Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
1 more
| Philosophy of Action |
| Philosophy of Mind |
| Applied Ethics |
| Normative Ethics |
| Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy |
| 17th/18th Century Philosophy |