Wybo Houkes

In this paper we examine the possibilities of combining two central intuitions about artefacts: that they are functional objects, and that they are non-natural objects. We do so in four steps. First we argue that, contrary to common opinion, functions cannot be the cornerstone of a characterisation of artefacts. Our argument suggests an alternative view, which characterises artefacts as objects embedded in what we call use plans. Second, we show that this plan-centred successor of the function-focused view is at odds with the non-naturalness intuition. Third, we show that this intuition can be developed by defining artefacts as produced or human-made objects, but that the resulting definition might collapse into the plan-centred view, and has trouble distinguishing artefact types or kinds. Finally, we propose a division of labour between production and use plans: among objects in general, artefacts are distinguished as human-made objects; within the domain of artefacts, types or kinds are characterised by the use plans in which artefacts are embedded.

In recent years, attention for the work of Rudolf Carnap has shifted from polemical discussion to placing Carnap in his intellectual context. Thus, the central question is no longer whether Carnap contributes to solving our current problems, but whether he solved the problems of his day and age. This contextualist approach has resulted in a deeper and more refined understanding of, in particular, Carnap’s early works and has focused on Der logische Aufbau der Welt. This chapter aims to contribute to this understanding by contextualizing Carnap's ideal of complete formalization in the Aufbau.

In this paper, I review Quine's response to the normativity charge against naturalized epistemology. On this charge, Quine's naturalized epistemology neglects the essential normativity of the traditional theory of knowledge and hence cannot count as its successor. According to Quine, normativity is retained in naturalism as ‘the technology of truth-seeking’. I first disambiguate Quine's naturalism into three programs of increasing strength and clarify the strongest program by means of the so-called Epistemic Skinner Box. Then, I investigate two ways in which the appeal to technology as normative enterprise can be made good. I argue that neither coheres with other aspects of Quine's philosophy, most notably the elimination of intentionality. Finally, I briefly consider a third reconstruction of the response, which involves an extension of the web of “belief” to practical know-how. I conclude that the normativity of Quine's (strong) naturalism cannot be found in the technology of truth-seeking.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Die methodische Philosophie Hugo Dinglers und der transzendentale Idealismus Immanuel KantsWybo HoukesKirstin Zeyer. Die methodische Philosophie Hugo Dinglers und der transzendentale Idealismus Immanuel Kants. Hildesheim: Olms, 1999. Pp. 175. Cloth, DM 65.00.History has not been kind to Hugo Dingler. Almost half a century after his death, philosophers of science primarily know him, if at all, from brief remarks in works of Carnap and Popper. Yet anyone who bothers reading Dingler's work can only be struck by the profundity of his attempt to account for developments in mathematics and the sciences—the very factors that shaped, for instance, Carnap's early work.This merits a revival of historical interest in Dingler's philosophy. Yet, in her ambitious first book, Kirstin Zeyer intends to instigate more than that: in the final chapter, she argues that Dingler's "methodical" philosophy is still relevant to contemporary philosophy of science. This may seem a surprising finale to a book devoted to comparing Dingler's thought and Kant's critical philosophy. But in fact there is no topical discontinuity; the earlier, exegetical chapters already carry apologetic overtones and only sketch the historical context of Dingler's work.A mathematician by training and a student of—amongst others—Husserl, his work also shows the influence of Dilthey's analysis of the human will. And as the work of so many philosophers of his generation, Dingler's work was partly shaped by a dialogue with Kant. Therefore, Zeyer's choice of topic is justified. On the other hand, Dingler's background virtually guaranteed that he had to adapt the critical philosophy in places. For example: the criticism of intuition as a source of knowledge was hardly typical of [End Page 607] Dingler, but part of a broad intellectual movement, sometimes called the "crisis of intuition." Therefore, a comparison between Dingler and Kant bears the risk of being rather trivial, unless, for instance, the way in which Dingler adapted Kant is explained in reference to the historical context.Zeyer presents many similarities and differences between Dingler and Kant. Her presentation of Dingler's philosophy is detailed and precise. Dingler's originality, which is amply stressed by Zeyer, lies in his attempt to replace an "intuitive" a priori with a practical one (Herstellungsapriori), which brings out the close connection between knowledge and action, and which focuses on the will rather than the understanding. Unfortunately, however, Zeyer's explication of Kant is less systematic and is more intimately connected to the presentation of Dingler's philosophy than to its own structure. As a result, elements of the critical philosophy surface throughout the book and poignant comparisons, such as between Dingler's and Kant's appeals to "pure synthesis" (29-36), are intermingled by less informative ones, e.g., on the use of regulative ideas of reason (116-126), which fails to bring to light a clear contrast. Moreover, Zeyer presents differences between Dingler and Kant in a rather "internalist" manner, as the result of Dingler's criticism of Kant. Consequently, the emphasis lies on the way in which Dingler corrected Kant's views with respect to a more or less fixed set of problems, rather than on the way in which he attempted to adapt the critical philosophy to changing intellectual circumstances, using elements from phenomenology and Lebensphilosophie. As a result, Zeyer neglects the fact that some of Dingler's central problems, such as that of univocality (e.g., 53) and rejection of ontological presuppositions (45), are not Kantian in origin. At this point, a comparison of Dingler with his contemporaries is indispensable. Again: that certain elements of Kantianism were criticized after 1900 is hardly illuminating, but how the critical philosophy was adapted to the intellectual circumstances by various philosophers is a fascinating topic, as for instance the recent reappraisal of early logical positivism by Michael Friedman and others shows. By approaching her topic in an internalist rather than a contextualist manner, Zeyer misses an opportunity to show the relevance of Dingler's methodical philosophy.This choice of exegetical method is, of course, connected to her ultimate apologetic aim. Contextualizing Dingler's work may show the rationality of some of its elements in his...

Digital artifacts often fail to perform as expected. It has recently been argued that this should not be analyzed as software malfunctioning. Rather, every case that is not the result of hardware failures would be due to design errors. This claim, which hinges on the notion of ‘implementation’, highlights a potential fundamental difference between software and other technical artifacts. It also implies that software engineers have more extensive responsibilities than creators of other artifacts. After reconstructing the argument, we show that it rests on two presuppositions regarding the nature of software and the activities of its creators, which we call ‘complete control’ and ‘self-containedness’. Software is taken to be a self-contained unit through which the software engineer exerts complete control over a machine’s behavior. These two presuppositions as well as the usage of implementation and strong claims regarding responsibility can be found throughout the literature on software engineering. Still, we argue that the presuppositions are untenable in light of current practices. For one thing, software engineers cannot exert complete control because software has become too complex for any technique to reliably locate every fault in it. For another, the creation and running of software are nowadays heavily mediated processes involving many agential activities. As a result, the performance of digital artifacts may vary, often in undesirable ways, without either hardware failures or design errors. This undermines the conclusion that software cannot malfunction, while also revealing the complications in developing a metaphysical account of software that fits contemporary practices.

The consensus among cultural evolutionists seems to be that human cultural evolution is cumulative, which is commonly understood in the specific sense that cultural traits, especially technological traits, increase in complexity over generations. Here we argue that there is insufficient credible evidence in favor of or against this technological complexity thesis. For one thing, the few datasets that are available hardly constitute a representative sample. For another, they substantiate very specific, and usually different versions of the complexity thesis or, even worse, do not point to complexity increases. We highlight the problems our findings raise for current work in cultural-evolutionary theory, and present various suggestions for future research.

Functional claims about technical artefacts set a second stage on which theories of functions can prove themselves. We present a general framework for understanding theories of technical functions. In particular, we argue that theories of technical functions can be seen as sophisticated combinations of three archetypical accounts, which we call the intentional account, the causal-role account and the evolutionist account. These abstracted, general theories of functions apply to both biology and technology, all with their respective drawbacks and benefits. When focusing on technology these drawbacks and benefits appear complementary, suggesting that the archetypes can be combined into a tenable analysis of technical functions. We argue that straightforward combinations inherit the drawbacks of the archetypes or have new ones. Then, we show that three existing theories of technical functions – our own ICE theory and alternatives devised by Krohs and by Longy – can be taken as sophisticated combinations. In each theory, one of the archetypes is corrected by incorporating elements of the others. Finally, we consider the applicability of our three-archetype framework to function theories that apply to biology as well as to technology.

In this paper we examine the possibilities of combining two central intuitions about artefacts: that they are functional objects, and that they are non-natural objects. We do so in four steps. First we argue that, contrary to common opinion, functions cannot be the cornerstone of a characterisation of artefacts. Our argument suggests an alternative view, which characterises artefacts as objects embedded in what we call use plans. Second, we show that this plan-centred successor of the function-focused view is at odds with the non-naturalness intuition. Third, we show that this intuition can be developed by defining artefacts as produced or human-made objects, but that the resulting definition might collapse into the plan-centred view, and has trouble distinguishing artefact types or kinds. Finally, we propose a division of labour between production and use plans: among objects in general, artefacts are distinguished as human-made objects; within the domain of artefacts, types or kinds are characterised by the use plans in which artefacts are embedded.