Patrice Canivez

The question of the relationship between education and democracy emerges from two perspectives. On the one hand, it relates to the role of educational institutions. On the other hand, it involves the democratic process itself, i.e. the interactions and power relations between groups and institutions in the context of delegating power, making collective decisions and implementing the decisions taken. In this article, I will seek to develop the idea that the democratic process consists of an educational exchange between civil society and the state, between the governed and the governors. I will try to demonstrate that this process occurs in such a way that it also produces counterproductive effects on education. The paradox of the democratic process lies in the fact that it enables collective decision-making through a “political pedagogy”, while at the same time engendering a kind of counter-pedagogy by arousing anti-social sentiments. The result is a political variant of Kant’s sociable sociability (ungesellige Geselligkeit), that is, a form of sociable sociability that manifests itself not only in terms of social cooperation (as in the “Essay on Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View”), but also in terms of collective action to address problems that can only be solved jointly, both nationally and internationally. I intend to draw some conclusions from this description at both levels.

This study deals with Eric Weil’s interpretation of the Critique of the Power of Judgment. According to Weil, the Third Critique succeeds in understanding nature in such a way that it allows for the achievement of moral action. In so doing, Kant rediscovers the concept of cosmos. But nature only appears as a cosmos to the moral subject, that is, to the human being as he raises the question of meaning. In Weil’s words, the Third Critique thus reconciles the world of facts and that of meaning. It discovers a layer of human experience where facts and meaning are not yet separated. This discovery leads Kant to inaugurate a philosophy of meaning that breaks away with ontology. However Kant uses a conceptual language that obliterates his own discovery. Eric Weil’s own project, especially in his Logic of Philosophy, is to develop a philosophy of meaning that is in line with his reading of the Third Critique. Therefore, this study also examines how Weil’s idea of a “logic of philosophy” sheds some light on his understanding of Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment.

Legal theory, political sciences, sociology, philosophy, logic, artificial intelligence: there are many approaches to legal argumentation. Each of them provides specific insights into highly complex phenomena. Different disciplines, but also different traditions in disciplines (e.g. analytical and continental traditions in philosophy) find here a rare occasion to meet. The present book contains contributions, both historical and thematic, from leading researchers in several of the most important approaches to legal rationality. One of the main issues is the relation between logic and law: the way logic is actually used in law, but also the way logic can make law explicit. An outstanding group of philosophers, logicians and jurists try to meet this issue. The book is more than a collection of papers. However different their respective conceptual tools may be, the authors share a common conception: legal argumentation is a specific argumentation context.

This contribution presents the idea that the functioning of modern democracy implies a reciprocal education of the governed and those who govern, of public opinion and the political class, within the framework of the rule of law. Such reciprocal interaction is a prerequisite for the development of a collective intelligence (phronesis) that make the achievement of sound political decisions possible. However, the democratic process develops in such a way that it also generates counter-educational effects. This is due to the fact that the same process includes a contest for power that arouses antisocial feelings and achieves a kind of counter-education. One of the reasons for this ambivalence lies in the way in which political parties operate: they are both laboratories for the development and implementation of collective projects and instruments for the conquest and exercise of power. A similar ambivalence characterizes the role of states at the level of international relations concerning the handling of global problems. What is at stake is the possibility of dealing in a sensible way with problems that, at both the national and international levels, can only be solved through concerted and cooperative action.

La question de la justice est partout présente dans l’oeuvre de Rousseau. S’il aborde tout d’abord la question du juste et de l’injuste en rapport avec la loi de nature, la justice n’est cependant pas seulement pour Rousseau un problème de droit. S’interroger sur la justice, c’est poser la question de l’homme et de son rapport au monde. Pour autant, l’idée rousseauiste de justice ne se déduit pas d’une philosophie « compréhensive » du monde et des affaires humaines. La théorie rousseauiste de la justice est en elle-même une théorie compréhensive. C’est une philosophie des rapports humains et de la manière dont ils s’inscrivent dans Tordre du monde. Ce chapitre s’efforce de rendre compte des différentes dimensions de cette théorie. Il commence par montrer comment Rousseau traite de la justice dans le cadre du droit naturel. Puis, il traite successivement du principe intersubjectif de la justice et de la justice comme principe d’un ordre « objectif » du monde, de la société et de l’État.

Without society there is no nature. Paradoxically, this is what Rousseau’s texts teach us. The paradox lies in the fact that the Discourse on Inequality seems to say the exact opposite. In the second Discourse, the history of the human species appears to unfold within the framework of an immutable, ahistorical natural order. In this article, I will highlight two points. First, I will show that nature understood as a whole does not really exist for the human being in the state of nature. It only exists for the educated, cultured, and therefore socialized human being. Second, I will analyze a passage from Rousseau’s Essay on the Origin of Languages, which brings to the fore the “negentropic” function of human labor. Without human labor, the natural order disintegrates. This, I will argue, makes nature a political problem for both Rousseau and for us.

Europe is in the midst of a double crisis: the rise of illiberal democracies and the reshaping of the so-called “world order.” Illiberal and autocratic regimes are on the rise and the “illiberal temptation” is present even in countries with strong democratic traditions, such as in Europe. The conflict between constitutional democracies and autocratic regimes is at the heart of the current struggle for a new international order. In this context, the confidence we have in our shared democratic and humanist values is in crisis. Not only is there a debate about how these values should be interpreted—which is normal—it also seems that these values are no longer widely shared. Significant segments of the public no longer take democratic principles and the rule of law for granted. As a result, the use of violence is no longer taboo, not only in international relations but also within our own societies. This crisis is unfolding on a global scale, but it has implications for the European narrative, which is about both Europe’s post-nationalist, democratic identity, and Europe’s role in the world. In this article, I begin with some comments on this narrative, with an emphasis on the specificity of European cultural diversity. I then try to situate the role of intellectuals in this context. I examine (1) the task of interpreting the current historical situation, of raising collective awareness with regard to problems that require collective action (e.g. climate change, the reduction of gender and cultural discrimination, the prevention of armed conflicts, etc.); (2) the “universalization of tradition”, that is, the hermeneutic process by which a tradition (ethical, religious, political, etc.) reinterprets itself in such a way as to make it understandable and meaningful to other traditions; (3) the impact that the practice of dialogue, as understood in the human and social sciences, should have on actual political discussion; and (4) the role that the human and social sciences have in articulating, within a meaningful discourse, the demands for greater justice and for a meaningful existence that arise in the form of collective feelings, emotions, etc.