Liz Jackson

Humility is regarded as beneficial for individuals, relationships, and society. It is believed to increase well-being and tolerance of difference and enhance interpersonal relationships. Educating for humility could be regarded as an important element and goal of education as it helps students realise their limitations and consider different (even opposite) perspectives. However, as with other virtues, humility may be conceptualised and expressed differently across diverse cultural communities. Similarly, how to educate for humility may look different in schools around the world. This special issue includes varied explorations of the philosophical and theoretical roots underpinning different conceptions of humility and their implications for education. Taken together, the papers in this issue provide a foundation for understanding the importance of humility across cultural and historical traditions of past and present, particularly those of western and Chinese societies. As such, this special issue can be informative to colleagues in virtue ethics, comparative philosophy, and moral education, as well as others who are interested in understanding contexts and meanings of humility around the world, in society and education today.

Schools self-identify as caring communities and teach young children to be caring for each other. But schools also teach other contradictory and competing messages, such as individualism and self-reliance, rationalist concepts of justice and meritocracy, and other neoliberal approaches to life and community. Furthermore, while endorsements of care are commonly found in educational institutions, caring is not always (or even often) practiced or regarded as a major aim in schools, in contrast with human capital approaches to youth development. This essay examines how schools do and don’t care. At its core is the rearticulation of care ethics in education, and what caring means within the contemporary field. Over time, enthusiasm for care ethics has peaked and waned. It begins with a brief explanation of what caring is within the field of care ethics, before it considers how caring is ideally involved in education. In this case, discourses of care ethics and caring in education can be coopted against the writings of care ethicists to complement positive psychology, socially conservative character education and civic education, and individualistic and neoliberal approaches to education. As a result, schools can appear to care, but do so in highly distorted ways. These distortions, I argue, do not reveal fundamental limitations or flaws within care ethics approaches to care. Instead, they demand a reconsideration and rearticulation of care ethics in the contemporary education landscape: a context which has changed considerably since debates and articulations of care ethics in the 1980s.

It is not unusual to hear philosophers of education today describe the field as global. But in what sense is philosophy of education global? In this article, I analyze how and to what extent philosophy of education can be understood as a global field. The article argues that how we conceptualize philosophy of education as a global field (or not) makes a difference for how we conduct and evaluate scholarship, engage and collaborate with others, and consider the strengths and possibilities of the field, as well as its challenges. Overall, I justify a critically reflective approach to thinking about philosophy of education as a global field. I identify opportunities to strengthen global engagement, awareness, and diversity in relation to scholarly norms and values, while also examining pitfalls, obstacles, and risks, and some strategies for tackling challenges faced. I contend here that there are many senses in which philosophy of education is (or can be) global. But not all of these senses are entirely positive. And, in some instances, the globalization of philosophy of education requires scrutiny rather than celebration.

Some may say the rise of parochial, sectarian populism has indicated a failure of civic education. On the other hand, it might be said to demonstrate the increasing power of some alternative forms of education. This paper hopes to shed light on how ordinary people learn in ways and through means that are at odds with the experiences of scholars and elites. To do so it explores the intersections of education, technology, and social mobility, to highlight how people learn social class, and learn in classed ways outside schools. In contrast to the dream of information liberty, this article considers how online media is marked by private control of information, often retracing and broadening gaps between social classes. The article provides a theoretical understanding of the relationship between technology and education and the linkages of class and media consumption. It then integrates these topics by exploring how online learning through segmented social media operates to reproduce class and facilitate and mobilize sectarianism. This paper concludes with a recommendation for more focus on the study of class by philosophers interested in education for democracy and social justice.

This special issue includes a series of interviews with the past women presidents of the Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia (PESA), including Felicity Haynes, Nesta Devine, Tina Besley, and Liz Jackson. This article sets the stage for reading the interviews, though an extended dialogue between the two authors of this project. In what follows, the authors reflect on insights gleaned from the interviews, and the past and future of women leadership in philosophy of education. Using a dialogical format, it highlights different experiences and similar challenges across generations, questions what has changed versus what has stayed the same over decades, and elaborates on the value of the interviews for readers coming from different academic generations and subject positions. It reflects on the state of the field and its future directions from the perspectives of two women philosophers working and thinking across generations.

What is the future of Philosophy of education? Or as many of scholars and thinkers in this final ‘future-focused’ collective piece from the philosophy of education in a new key Series put it, what are the futures—plural and multiple—of the intersections of ‘philosophy’ and ‘education?’ What is ‘Philosophy’; and what is ‘Education’, and what role may ‘enquiry’ play? Is the future of education and philosophy embracing—or at least taking seriously—and thinking with Indigenous ethicoontoepistemologies? And, perhaps most importantly, what is that ‘Future’? These debates have been located in the work of diverse scholars: from the West, from Global South, from indigenous thinkers. In this collective piece, we purposefully juxtapose (and do not categorise under forced headings) diverse takes on the future of these intersections. We have given up the urge to organise, place together, separate with subheadings or connect the paragraphs that follow. Instead, we let these philosophers of education and thinkers who use philosophical texts and ideas to sit together in one long read as potentially ‘strange and unusual bedfellows’. This text urges us to understand how these scholars and thinkers perceive our educational philosophical futures, and how the work and thinking they have done on thinking about what the future of that new key in philosophy of education may look like is embedded in a much deeper and richer literature, and personal experience.

A crucial component of any education, dialogue is viewed by many social justice educators as their primary means towards rectifying social inequalities. Yet the extent to which the particular educational practices they recommend meet the needs or interests of their students who face systemic disadvantage remains unclear. This essay examines claims for and against dialogical pedagogy for increasing social justice. While conceding that dialogue is necessary for developing praxis as a student and participant in society, the essay argues that the prescriptive tone of some educators committed to social justice undermines their capacity for dealing concretely with the needs and interests of those they intend to better serve. The conclusion is drawn that educators committed to increasing equality must develop pedagogical attitudes informed by various educational implications of structural injustice as well as by the specific contexts in which they serve as teachers of both particular skills and content.

South Asian ethnic minorities (SAEMs) represent a growing population in Hong Kong public education. However, schools struggle to offer them fair and equitable education. One frequently mentioned, but rarely studied component in their performance is teachers’ lower expectations. This article reports on a qualitative case study to examine ethnically Chinese teachers’ expectations of South Asian students in a public primary school in Hong Kong. Five Chinese teachers were interviewed, with observations in three of these teachers’ classrooms. Results indicate teachers have lower expectations. Several influencing factors were identified, including perceptions of cultural differences between Chinese teachers and South Asian ethnic minorities’ families and inadequate training of teachers in Chinese as a second language and incorporating diversified learning strategies into the curriculum. This is one of the first studies specifically focused on exploring in greater details primary teachers’ expectations about South Asian students in Hong Kong.

In this chapter, we investigate two aspects of post-truth in education. The first derives from the philosophical work of Jacques Rancière, and the second derives from an analysis of meritocratic ideology in contemporary education. In both cases, we find that education has been producing a certain ‘truth’ about truth. Rancière’s work contrasts the hidden explanatory function of education, which presupposes a collective or shared sense of truth, with the arbitrariness of language as the social mechanism for understanding or determining such truth. This understanding is useful when applied to the case of meritocracy, as we discuss in the second part of this essay, as meritocratic ideology lays a framework in schools for the production of truth. Schooling bolsters, explains and emulates a meritocratic view of the world. In doing so, truth itself gets linked to meritocracy. We conclude this chapter by reflecting on an example of Donald Trump’s notion of the level playing field, briefly commenting on how the persistence and strength of meritocratic ideology in education are tied to a post-truth order.