Liz Jackson

ABSTRACT Patriotism is controversial in moral education across contexts. In China, patriotism is highly politicised by the government and heavily promoted in education. In the last few decades, the moralisation of patriotism, which refers here to the framing of patriotism as a virtue, has become the focus of teaching patriotism in China. This paper demonstrates how patriotism is moralised and promoted in Chinese moral education textbooks. The paper begins by providing a theoretical introduction to patriotism in moral education and defending a rational approach to teaching patriotism given its controversial nature. Then it elaborates on the Chinese context of teaching patriotism and analyses patriotism as part of moral education in Chinese textbooks. Our findings indicate various ways in which patriotism is promoted in Chinese education as a non-controversial virtue and moral duty. Finally, the paper discusses the limitations of this way of teaching patriotism and argues for the adoption of the rational approach as an alternative.

Humility is regarded as beneficial for individuals, relationships, and society. It is believed to increase well-being and tolerance of difference and enhance interpersonal relationships. Educating for humility could be regarded as an important element and goal of education as it helps students realise their limitations and consider different (even opposite) perspectives. However, as with other virtues, humility may be conceptualised and expressed differently across diverse cultural communities. Similarly, how to educate for humility may look different in schools around the world. This special issue includes varied explorations of the philosophical and theoretical roots underpinning different conceptions of humility and their implications for education. Taken together, the papers in this issue provide a foundation for understanding the importance of humility across cultural and historical traditions of past and present, particularly those of western and Chinese societies. As such, this special issue can be informative to colleagues in virtue ethics, comparative philosophy, and moral education, as well as others who are interested in understanding contexts and meanings of humility around the world, in society and education today.

Schools self-identify as caring communities and teach young children to be caring for each other. But schools also teach other contradictory and competing messages, such as individualism and self-reliance, rationalist concepts of justice and meritocracy, and other neoliberal approaches to life and community. Furthermore, while endorsements of care are commonly found in educational institutions, caring is not always (or even often) practiced or regarded as a major aim in schools, in contrast with human capital approaches to youth development. This essay examines how schools do and don’t care. At its core is the rearticulation of care ethics in education, and what caring means within the contemporary field. Over time, enthusiasm for care ethics has peaked and waned. It begins with a brief explanation of what caring is within the field of care ethics, before it considers how caring is ideally involved in education. In this case, discourses of care ethics and caring in education can be coopted against the writings of care ethicists to complement positive psychology, socially conservative character education and civic education, and individualistic and neoliberal approaches to education. As a result, schools can appear to care, but do so in highly distorted ways. These distortions, I argue, do not reveal fundamental limitations or flaws within care ethics approaches to care. Instead, they demand a reconsideration and rearticulation of care ethics in the contemporary education landscape: a context which has changed considerably since debates and articulations of care ethics in the 1980s.

In recent times, schools have begun to focus on issues of wellbeing, engaging with ideas from various fields such as positive psychology. It is in this context that there is a growing interest in humility, rather than this interest having emerged from debates in moral philosophy and moral education. However, to the extent that education for wellbeing initiatives might promote humility as a virtue, it is important to address the extent to which it can be considered as good. This paper critically explores the shift of humility from vice to virtue in the west with the advent of Christianity. Drawing on historical, religious, and philosophical sources, the status of humility as a moral good is brought into question. It is argued that humility can only be understood, like other virtues, within historical, political, and social context. Thus, it is in how humility is operationalised in contexts of social relations that we can evaluate its moral worth. As such, we suggest that educators and schools should take account of the contingent nature of humility, its paradoxes and politics, rather than promoting it as an unquestionable good.

Student-centered learning has been conceived as a Western export to the East and the developing world in the last few decades. Philosophers of education often associate student-centered learning with frameworks related to meeting the needs of individual pupils: from Deweyan experiential learning, to the ‘pedagogy of the oppressed’ and other social justice orientations. Yet student-centered learning has also become, in the era of neoliberal education, a jingoistic advertisement for practices and ideologies which can be seen to lead to a global devaluation of the educational profession, and the bolstering of the view of the student as a customer. In this article, I want to disentangle these views and explore some limitations of either model of student-centered learning. To add context, I consider education in the United Arab Emirates today, which provides an extreme example of the risks involved with prioritizing student’s self-identified needs and interests above all else, as in an idealized or exaggerated student-centered concept. I conclude with brief comments on amending the philosophical concept of student-centered learning to be useful in diverse contexts today.

This paper responds to the question of should civic education still aim to be relatively politically neutral and impartial in undemocratic times? It first introduces the theoretical debate regarding the place of political neutrality and impartiality in civic education. It then dicusses the challenges that civic education faces in the current global environment and why political neutrality and impartiality should not be considered as antidotes. We argue that political neutrality and impartiality are insufficient in the undemocratic times we face for preparing students to be effective and engaged citizens. A more powerful response to our global undemocratic reality is needed to realize the transformative nature of civic education.

Academic freedom is often regarded as an absolute value of higher education institutions. Traditionally, its value is related to such topics as tenure, and the need for academic work to be free from undue political influence and other pressures that can challenge time-consuming research processes. However, when an analysis of student freedom begins with arguments about free research and free speech, undergirded as they generally are by liberal political philosophy, other considerations, related to broader views of freedom, can slip through the cracks. In this essay, I want to take a step back from typical discussions of academic freedom, to take a broader perspective, before considering how freedom relates to student experience. The first part of this essay explores diverse elaborations and defences of freedom: How it is upheld in the liberal philosophy of Kant, the critical pedagogy of Freire, existentialism, and the capabilities approach to development. Exploring the often contrasting insights and implications of these views, I then connect relevant theoretical understandings derived from them to an exploration of the experience of freedom and of students. This essay thus considers how student freedom, and student academic freedom, are more precarious concepts than typically assumed.

This special issue of Educational Philosophy and Theory considers the Hong Kong Umbrella Movement as an educational event, which has impacted attitudes and outlooks and conceptions of young people’s role, of education, and of society. This essay serves as an introduction to the more substantive pieces that follow. It describes two alternative perspectives on youth civic engagement in Hong Kong historically; and in so doing, it addresses some of the challenges related to free academic expression that hinder scholarly research and publishing on the area of Hong Kong-China relations looking into the future. It concludes with a brief glimpse of the contributions that follow.

Educating students for emotional wellbeing is a vital task in schools. However, educating emotions is not straightforward. Emotional processes can be challenging to identify and control. How emotions are valued varies across societies, while individuals within societies face different emotional expectations. For example, girls face pressure to be happy and caring, while boys are often encouraged to be brave. This text analyses the best practices of educating emotions. The focus is not just on the psychological benefits of emotional regulation, but also on how calls for educating emotions connect to the aims of society. The book explores psychology's understanding of emotions, 'the politics of emotions', and philosophy. It also discusses education for happiness, compassion, gratitude, resilience, mindfulness, courage, vulnerability, anger, sadness, and fear.

This paper responds to the dilemma of affective injustice by distinguishing between three forms of anger and recommending a model of virtuous anger the expression of which is consistent with the productive pursuit of justice. It argues that anger may in the first instance be either passive or active, that is, a passive affective register and morally inert experience, or something that is manifest in action towards other agents. Active anger may then be grounded in moral norms, or not. Anger that is properly grounded and guided by morality is consistent with virtuous agency and the productive pursuit of moral ends. In constructing this model of anger we draw inspiration from the Kantian account of virtue. We argue that this model provides a sound structure for morally productive anger while remaining vigilant towards anger’s darker possibilities. To demonstrate the comparative strength of this model, we outline some challenges with the idea of apt anger, arguing that moral norms and constraints are better suited to guide our evaluation of anger. We apply this model to educational settings, where we argue that it is beneficial to channel anger through moral norms, rather than attempt to calibrate its proper magnitude. All things considered, the moral status of anger is equivocal: it can both aid and hinder the pursuit of justice, so it is best to take a cautious while permissive stance towards its use in our common life.

Today, when we look around in our universities and our societies for philosophy of education, it is normal to find women in leadership positions. But this has not always been the case. Women have faced marginalisation as not worthy philosophical subjects or as sociologists or feminist theorists when discussing a wide variety of topics deemed by the powers that be ‘unphilosophical’. The role of women in contemporary academia and philosophy of education is stronger than in the past. At conferences and in higher education, there are plenty of women ‘around’. For these reasons among others, people have questioned why some remain ‘stuck’ on interrogating gender. This special issue focuses on the history of ‘counting women’ in philosophy of education, taking up the case of the recent debate and changing of the name (and mission) of the Committee on the Status of Women (COSW) to the Committee on Gender, Sexuality and the Status of Women (CGSSW), in the Philosophy of Education Society in the United States. Do women count, if we do not count women? In what ways do women ‘count’? These are some of several vital questions raised. This essay serves as an introduction to this special issue which aims to disseminate interviews and other information from an oral history project. It will share more about the history of women in philosophy of education, before providing more context to understand the interviews and essays that follow.

One major aspect of interest in Filipino philosophy is education. Reflecting on the nature, aims, and problems of education, Filipino philosophy of education investigates philosophical issues and emerging trends of philosophical thinking in education which are distinctive to the Filipino context. Filipino philosophy of education has a rich potential that encompasses revisiting cultural and historical narratives, considering inclusivity, reevaluating the educational system, challenging existing pedagogies, and re-discovering indigeneity. In this context it is worth exploring it further. Taking off from a collective work on Filipino philosophy of education by a group of Filipino scholars, this special issue provides a more elaborate discussion of major aspects of Filipino philosophy providing traction on the conversation that which furthers the truth of the existence of Filipino Philosophy, its nuances, and its relevance to education. More specifically, this special issue provides philosophical and theoretical reflections that bring to the fore the state of Filipino philosophy of education and discussions about the nature of Filipino cultural, political, and intellectual heritage. As such, it will be of interest to students and scholars in philosophy of education in the Philippines and globally.

A crucial component of any education, dialogue is viewed by many social justice educators as their primary means towards rectifying social inequalities. Yet the extent to which the particular educational practices they recommend meet the needs or interests of their students who face systemic disadvantage remains unclear. This essay examines claims for and against dialogical pedagogy for increasing social justice. While conceding that dialogue is necessary for developing praxis as a student and participant in society, the essay argues that the prescriptive tone of some educators committed to social justice undermines their capacity for dealing concretely with the needs and interests of those they intend to better serve. The conclusion is drawn that educators committed to increasing equality must develop pedagogical attitudes informed by various educational implications of structural injustice as well as by the specific contexts in which they serve as teachers of both particular skills and content.