Aleksandar Fatic

The paper deals with a perspective of Christian philosophy on artificial memory erasuse for psychotherapeutic purposes. Its central question is whether a safe and reliable technology of memory erasure, once it is available, would be acceptable from a Christian ethics point of view. The main facet of this question is related to the Christian ethics requirement of contrition for the past wrongs, which in the case of memory erasure of particulary troubling experiences and personal choices would not be possible. The paper argues that there are limits to the ethical significance of contrition in the writings of the leading Christian fathers on the theme, where excessive suffering and inability to forgive oneself for one’s actions is an impediment to the achivement of tranquility of mind and spiritual redemption, rather than a prerequisite for it. The paper thus concludes that there is no hindrance in principle from the Christian ethics point of view to pursuing a voluntary and selective memory erasure as a psychotherapeutic technique once a fully adequate technology is available.

The paper discusses the conceptualisation of mental disorder as a representation, rather than an illness, and relates this perspective to the modern understanding of mental health as a healthy »narrative« or life story. The author proceeds to briefly consider the evolution of concepts of illness in psychiatry and a gradual reappearance of Lacanian psychoanalysis and psychiatry. The key concepts of Lacanian psychotherapy pave the way to a growing together of standard psychotherapy and modern philosophical practice within the novel concept of integrative psychotherapy.

This chapter discusses the role of trauma in both modern psychotherapy and modern culture, relating the emphasis on trauma to the prospects of developing the attributes of sound mental health, including resilience. While trauma is an undeniable experience of many, the culture of trauma in psychotherapy presents trauma not merely as an experience coupled with a particular perception and interpretation that leaves a long-term mark on the person, but also as a normative element in psychodiagnostics and therapy. In this perspective, trauma is increasingly seen not only as an event and its reception by the person, but as a hypothesis, a potential explanation, and a prerequisite for treatment, so that trauma is sought as a potential explanation of difficulties that do not initially present as traumatic. The chapter introduces two methods of responding to trauma, the Flow Model and the Concert Model, and elaborates on the role of organic relationships and micro-communities in addressing trauma.

The Introduction outlines the key differences between the traditional use of propositional logic in psychotherapy and modal logic as the logical foundation of Modal Integrative Psychotherapy. One of the main differences between the two is that, while the emphasis of traditional psychotherapy is on changing the client (thus the subjective experience of the world), modal logic (and, correspondingly, Modal Integrative Psychotherapy) ventures into seeking to change the modal worlds, or “possible worlds” as sets of circumstances outside the person that determine the person’s experience of reality. This introduction points at the role of sociality as a normative foundation of our perceptions and self-perceptions and sets the stage for a fuller discussion of key elements of modality in the theory, interventions, and overall methodology of Modal Integrative Psychotherapy.

The paper examines the concept of individual and collective value identities based an emotionalist understanding of values. The main perspective it discusses is one where emotions are the most important practical instruments for the clarification of individual and collective values. The argument implies that moral emotions are not irrational, but have a logic of their own which can reliably pinpoint the persons’ value system; emotions are thus crucial building blocks of an ethics which is able to enhance personal and moral identity. This particular ecology of moral emotions is pivotal in crisis periods, such as the global pandemics, wars or system crashes, either economic, or political, security, diplomatic or cultural. In the current circumstances, where the already shaken individual and collective values throughout the world have been shaken by the Covid-19 pandemic, understanding identities as fundamentally couched in moral emotions may be critical to saving our cultures and our legacies of social and moral capital.

The paper explores the extent to which Epicurean ethics as a general philosophy of life can be integrated in a composite pragmatist approach to philosophical counseling. Epicureanism emerged in a historical era that was very different from the modern time and addressed a different philosophical ethos of the time. This alone makes it difficult for Epicureanism to satisfy all of the normative criteria for a modern ethics. On the other hand, the paper discusses aspects of the modern ‘external’, duty- and demand-driven ethics that may contribute to the emergence of some of the main issues for modern philosophical counseling. The author points out aspects of Epicurean ethics that are potentially powerful tools to address the issues of mood and meaning in philosophical counseling, and thus serve as a contemporary complement to a complex duty-bound, yet pragmatist view of ethics

This chapter discusses the structure of motivation, including the balance of motives, developing a comprehensive account of motivational and behavioural compensations. An overarching principle of the geometry of motivation is that of symmetry, where experience, values, and sensibility all play a part in how a person will approach what could broadly be considered a life project and how one will address important individual situations faced in life. The key role of modality and modal thinking in general in understanding the symmetry of motivation is reflected in the particular choices a person makes seen as geometrical outcomes or an interplay of various motivational directions. In psychosis, where a disturbed reality defines the person’s experience of the world, a particular geometry of motivation remains as basic structure.

A resurgence of scholarly work on proof of God?s existence is noticeable over the past decade, with considerable emphasis on attempts to provide?analytic proof? based on the meanings and logic of various identity statements which constitute premises of the syllogisms of the?proof?. Most recently perhaps, Emmanuel Rutten?s?modal-epistemic proof? has drawn serious academic attention. Like other?analytic? and strictly logical proofs of God?s existence, Rutten?s proof has been found flawed. In this paper I discuss the possibility of an?ethics-based? identity proof of God?s existence. Such a proof, the first version of which, I believe, has been offered, indirectly, by Nikolai Lossky, utilizes the form and structure of the analytic proof, but fundamentally rests on the perception of moral values we associate with God and Godliness. The nature of the proof shifts the focus of the very attempt to?prove? God?s existence from what I believe is an unreasonable standard, unattainable even in?proving? the existence of the more mundane world, towards a more functional, practical and attainable standard. The proof proposed initially by Lossky, and in a more systematic form here, I believe, shows the indubitable existence of God in the sense of his moral presence in the lives of the faithful, at least with the same degree of certainty as the presence or?existence? of anything else that can be epistemically proven in principle.

This paper examines the conceptual matrix of philosophical counseling, and philosophical practice generally, which distinguishes philosophical practice from mainstream theoretical philosophy. I argue that the essence of philosophical practice is the realization and radicalization of Pierre Hadot’s paradigmshifting view of ‘Philosophy as a Way of Life,’ through the projection of philosophical concepts and methods to the goal of attainment of the good life by moral education and character-building. The base-line concept of the good life that the paper works with is the relatively uncontroversial concept of a life based on sustained reflected pleasures that are both socially desirable and individually fulfilling. I argue that this type of concept of the good life as qualified pleasure is inherent in any doctrinal account of what it is to lead a good life, including the ones that emphasise asceticism, such as Christian philosophy of life and ethics. Finally the paper concludes that projections of the good life by philosophical counselors are reflective on philosophical counselor themselves: philosophical counseling is a way of ‘the good life’ that aims to use the resources of philosophy as a whole to help others build the moral qualities and character required to reach their own good lives. By projecting philosophical concepts and methods to the applied conceptual matrix of moral education and the good life, philosophical counseling emancipates philosophy as a whole from its current remoteness and isolation into an active, and reflective, role in the real lives of ordinary people. This heralds a paradigm shift in philosophy, from the pseudo-science that much of mainstream philosophy painstakingly pretends to be to an intellectual powerhouse for the enhancement of the quality, clarity and integrity of life, which was the reason philosophy initially emerged for, both in the Western and in the Eastern philosophical traditions

The book addresses the growing interconnectedness between philosophical counseling and traditional psychotherapy. It explores the organic links between core philosophical concepts and theories, and the corresponding problems and theories in psychotherapy. Aleksandar Fatic focuses on the use of modal logic as a foundation for psychotherapy within the proposed Modal Integrative Psychotherapy model. The book functions both as a research work and a manual for the development and application of integrative psychotherapy, viewed through the lens of philosophical counseling and the exploration of the logical underpinnings of psychotherapy as its conceptual foundation.

The paper deals with the phenomenology of empathy as a particular attitude, but also as an ethical principle. The authors draw a distinction between two key conceptualizations of empathy in recent philosophy: (1) the one that sees empathy as a sort of “fusion” or the interpenetration of emotions of the observer, and the person who the observer empathizes with; this view of empathy derives mainly from the legacy of the Scottish Enlightenment and in particular David Hume; and (2) the one that understands empathy as the ability to sympathize with others, whilst maintaining a clear awareness that the primary emotions of the person empathized with are not our emotions, or the emotions of the observer who empathizes. The latter view of empathy is perhaps first attributable to Max Scheler, and has recently been experimentally supported by Martin Hoffman in his research on empathy in overall moral development. The authors presently argue that the latter concept presents empathy as a relational emotion (emotion that concerns the substantive emotions of other people). They distinguish between relational emotions and meta-emotions, namely the emotions we feel concerning our other emotions. Further, the authors argue that relational emotions are a foundation for sentimentalist ethics, which can support the principle of moral obligation or duty. The text goes on to show why the notion of an organic community, based on the model of a functional group whose relations do not have to be mediated by institutional processes, is in itself a favourable context for improving mental well-being and establishing resistance mechanisms that characterize the very conceptualization of mental health. The authors believe that empathy contributes to individual and collective resilience not by denying individual vulnerability, but transforming it into predispositions for leadership based on emotionality and perception, even of institutions and corporate structures, as “small societies” in which the same types of social capital as in organic communities play a key role, above all moral emotions such as trust, empathy and solidarity.