Aleksandar Fatic

The Introduction outlines the key differences between the traditional use of propositional logic in psychotherapy and modal logic as the logical foundation of Modal Integrative Psychotherapy. One of the main differences between the two is that, while the emphasis of traditional psychotherapy is on changing the client (thus the subjective experience of the world), modal logic (and, correspondingly, Modal Integrative Psychotherapy) ventures into seeking to change the modal worlds, or “possible worlds” as sets of circumstances outside the person that determine the person’s experience of reality. This introduction points at the role of sociality as a normative foundation of our perceptions and self-perceptions and sets the stage for a fuller discussion of key elements of modality in the theory, interventions, and overall methodology of Modal Integrative Psychotherapy.

The paper examines the concept of individual and collective value identities based an emotionalist understanding of values. The main perspective it discusses is one where emotions are the most important practical instruments for the clarification of individual and collective values. The argument implies that moral emotions are not irrational, but have a logic of their own which can reliably pinpoint the persons’ value system; emotions are thus crucial building blocks of an ethics which is able to enhance personal and moral identity. This particular ecology of moral emotions is pivotal in crisis periods, such as the global pandemics, wars or system crashes, either economic, or political, security, diplomatic or cultural. In the current circumstances, where the already shaken individual and collective values throughout the world have been shaken by the Covid-19 pandemic, understanding identities as fundamentally couched in moral emotions may be critical to saving our cultures and our legacies of social and moral capital.

The paper explores the extent to which Epicurean ethics as a general philosophy of life can be integrated in a composite pragmatist approach to philosophical counseling. Epicureanism emerged in a historical era that was very different from the modern time and addressed a different philosophical ethos of the time. This alone makes it difficult for Epicureanism to satisfy all of the normative criteria for a modern ethics. On the other hand, the paper discusses aspects of the modern ‘external’, duty- and demand-driven ethics that may contribute to the emergence of some of the main issues for modern philosophical counseling. The author points out aspects of Epicurean ethics that are potentially powerful tools to address the issues of mood and meaning in philosophical counseling, and thus serve as a contemporary complement to a complex duty-bound, yet pragmatist view of ethics