Dennis Vanden Auweele

To date authors are unsure about Nietzsche's self-critical attitude regarding his Thus Spoke Zarathustra. While few doubt that the narrative reaches a dramatic climax at the end of its third part, the largely satirical fourth part invites to take this climax cum grano salis. I provide an interpretation of the dramatic structure of Thus Spoke Zarathustra by focusing on the tragic nature of Nietzsche's ideal of the Übermensch and the comical relief provided by part four. Accordingly, the completion at the end of part three is relegated to a noble lie to assuage the tragic nature of Zarathustra's ideal.

This book connects Schopenhauer’s philosophy with transcendental idealism by exploring the distinctly Kantian roots of his pessimism. By clearly discerning four types of coming to knowledge, it demonstrates how Schopenhauer’s epistemology can enlighten this connection with other areas of his philosophy. The individual chapters in this book discuss how these knowledge types—immediate or mediate, representational or non-representational—relate to Schopenhauer’s metaphysics, ethics and action, philosophy of religion, aesthetics, and asceticism. In each of these areas, a specific sense of pessimism serves to disarm a number of paradoxes and inconsistencies typically associated with Schopenhauer’s philosophy. _The Kantian Foundation of Schopenhauer's Pessismism _shows how Schopenhauer’s claim that he is a true successor to Kant can be justified.

Most philosophers do not read Kant’s philosophy of religion as providing a foundation for Christianity, or even as in line with it. Recently, however, a number of so-called “affirmative Kantians” have argued that Kant’s philosophy of religion explicitly aims at recovering the spirit of Christianity. In this article I scrutinize this claim with regard to Kant’s conceptualization of “grace” as a supplement to his moral theory. Contrary to these “affirmative Kantians,” I argue that Kant’s account of grace stems from Kant’s moral pessimism, not from any sense of the shortcomings of human beings in fulfilling their duties or the religious need for supernatural cooperation. Kant’s concept of grace tries to moderate this pessimism by providing what is needed for the possibility of moral progress. But simply by the way in which Kant regards grace as a rational concept needed for his moral theory, it seems to me that his philosophy of religion runs counter to certain central convictions of Christianity.