Shan Gao

It is argued that in Bohmian mechanics the effective wave function of a subsystem of the universe does not encode the influences of other particles on the subsystem. This suggests that the ontology of Bohmian mechanics does not consist only in Bohmian particles and their positions. It is nonetheless pointed out that since the wave function in configuration space may represent the state of ergodic motion of non-Bohmian particles in three-dimensional space, the ontology of Bohmian mechanics may still consist only in particles.

Recently Lewis et al. [Phys. Rev. Lett. 109, 150404 ] demonstrated that additional assumptions such as preparation independence are always necessary to rule out a psi-epistemic model, in which the quantum state is not uniquely determined by the underlying physical state. Their conclusion is based on an analysis of conventional projective measurements. Here we demonstrate that protective measurements, which are distinct from projective measurements, already shows that distinct quantum states cannot be compatible with a single state of reality. This improves the interesting result obtained by Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph [Nature Phys. 8, 475 ].

The relationship between quantum collapse and consciousness is reconsidered under the assumption that quantum collapse is an objective dynamical process. We argue that the conscious observer can have a distinct role from the physical measuring device during the process of quantum collapse owing to the intrinsic nature of consciousness; the conscious observer can know whether he is in a definite state or a quantum superposition of definite states, while the physical measuring device cannot “know”. As a result, the consciousness observer can distinguish the definite states and their quantum superposition, while the physical measuring device without consciousness cannot do. This provides a possible quantum physical method to distinguish man and machine. The new result also implies that consciousness has causal efficacies in the physical world when considering the existence of quantum collapse. Accordingly consciousness is not reducible or emergent, but a new fundamental property of matter. This may establish a quantum basis for panpsychism, and make it be a promising solution to the hard problem of consciousness. Furthermore, it is suggested that a unified theory of matter and consciousness includes two parts: one is the psychophysical principle or corresponding principle between conscious content and matter state, and the other is the complete quantum evolution of matter state, which includes the definite nonlinear evolution element introduced by consciousness and relating to conscious content. Lastly, some experimental schemes are presented to test the proposed quantum theory of consciousness

We suggest a new answer to this intriguing question and argue that the answer may have implications for the solutions to the measurement problem. The main basis of our analysis is the doctrine of psychophysical supervenience. First of all, based on this doctrine, we argue that an observer in a quantum superposition or a quantum observer has a definite conscious experience, which is neither disjunctive nor illusive. The inconsistency of this result with the bare theory is further analyzed, and it is shown that an appropriate use of the strategy of analyzing the disposition of an observer to answer a particular question also leads to the same result. Next, we argue that this new result seems to disfavor Everett's and Bohm's approaches to quantum mechanics when considering the doctrine of psychophysical supervenience. This suggests that dynamical collapse theories are in the right direction to solve the measurement problem. Thirdly, we analyze the concrete content of the conscious experience of a quantum observer. It is argued that the mental content of a quantum observer is related to both the amplitude and relative phase of each branch of the superposition she is physically in, and it is composed of the mental content corresponding to every branch of the superposition. In addition, we argue that when assuming the modulus squared of the amplitude of each branch determines the vividness of the mental content corresponding to the branch, the structured tails problem of dynamical collapse theories can be solved.

The ontological model framework provides a rigorous approach to address the question of whether the quantum state is ontic or epistemic. When considering only conventional projective measurements, auxiliary assumptions are always needed to prove the reality of the quantum state in the framework. For example, the Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph theorem is based on an additional preparation independence assumption. In this paper, we give a new proof of psi-ontology in terms of protective measurements in the ontological model framework. The proof does not rely on auxiliary assumptions, and also applies to deterministic theories such as the de Broglie-Bohm theory. In addition, we give a simpler argument for psi-ontology beyond the framework, which is based on protective measurements and a weaker criterion of reality. The argument may be also appealing for those people who favor an anti-realist view of quantum mechanics

In this article, we give a clearer argument for the reality of the wave function in terms of protective measurements, which does not depend on nontrivial assumptions and also overcomes existing objections. Moreover, based on an analysis of the mass and charge properties of a quantum system, we propose a new ontological interpretation of the wave function. According to this interpretation, the wave function of an N-body system represents the state of motion of N particles. Moreover, the motion of particles is discontinuous and random in nature, and the modulus squared of the wave function gives the probability density that the particles appear in certain positions in space.

This thesis is an attempt to reconstruct the conceptual foundations of quantum mechanics. First, we argue that the wave function in quantum mechanics is a description of random discontinuous motion of particles, and the modulus square of the wave function gives the probability density of the particles being in certain locations in space. Next, we show that the linear non-relativistic evolution of the wave function of an isolated system obeys the free Schrödinger equation due to the requirements of spacetime translation invariance and relativistic invariance. Thirdly, we argue that the random discontinuous motion of particles may lead to a stochastic, nonlinear collapse evolution of the wave function. A discrete model of energy-conserved wavefunction collapse is proposed and shown to be consistent with existing experiments and our macroscopic experience. In addition, we also give a critical analysis of the de Broglie-Bohm theory, the many-worlds interpretation and other dynamical collapse theories, and briefly discuss the issue of unifying quantum mechanics and special relativity.

According to Penrose, the fundamental conflict between the superposition principle of quantum mechanics and the principle of general covariance of general relativity entails the existence of wavefunction collapse, e.g. a quantum superposition of two different space–time geometries will collapse to one of them due to the ill-definedness of the time-translation operator for the superposition. In this paper, we argue that Penrose's conjecture on gravity's role in wavefunction collapse is debatable. First of all, it is still a controversial issue what the exact nature of the conflict is and how to resolve it. Secondly, Penrose's argument by analogy is too weak to establish a necessary connection between wavefunction collapse and the conflict as understood by him. Thirdly, the conflict does not necessarily lead to wavefunction collapse. The reason is that the conflict or the problem of ill-definedness for a superposition of different space–time geometries also needs to be solved before the collapse of the superposition finishes, and once the conflict has been resolved, the wavefunction collapse will lose its physical basis relating to the conflict. In addition, we argue that Penrose's suggestions for the collapse time formula and the preferred basis are also problematic

In this paper, we propose an ontological interpretation of the wave function in terms of random discontinuous motion of particles. According to this interpretation, the wave function of an N-body quantum system describes the state of random discontinuous motion of N particles, and in particular, the modulus squared of the wave function gives the probability density that the particles appear in every possible group of positions in space. We present three arguments supporting this new interpretation of the wave function. These arguments are mainly based on an analysis of the mass and charge properties of a quantum system. It is realized that the Schroedinger equation, which governs the evolution of a quantum system, contains more information about the system than the wave function of the system, such as the mass and charge properties of the system, which might help understand the ontological meaning of the wave function. Finally, we briefly analyze possible implications of the suggested ontological interpretation of the wave function for the solutions to the measurement problem.

We analyze the possible implications of spacetime discreteness for the special and general relativity and quantum theory. It is argued that the existence of a minimum size of spacetime may explain the invariance of the speed of light in special relativity and Einstein’s equivalence principle in general relativity. Moreover, the discreteness of spacetime may also result in the collapse of the wave function in quantum mechanics, which may provide a possible solution to the quantum measurement problem. These interesting results might have some important implications for a complete theory of quantum gravity.

It is a fundamental and widely accepted assumption that a measurement result exists universally, and in particular, it exists for every observer, independently of whether the observer makes the measurement or knows the result. In this paper, we will argue that, based on an analysis of protective measurements, this assumption is rejected by the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, and worlds, if they indeed exist according to the interpretation, can only exist relative to systems which are decoherent with respect to the measurement result.

This article analyzes the implications of protective measurement for the meaning of the wave function. According to protective measurement, a charged quantum system has mass and charge density proportional to the modulus square of its wave function. It is shown that the mass and charge density is not real but effective, formed by the ergodic motion of a localized particle with the total mass and charge of the system. Moreover, it is argued that the ergodic motion is not continuous but discontinuous and random. This result suggests a new interpretation of the wave function, according to which the wave function is a description of random discontinuous motion of particles, and the modulus square of the wave function gives the probability density of the particles being in certain locations. It is shown that the suggested interpretation of the wave function disfavors the de Broglie-Bohm theory and the many-worlds interpretation but favors the dynamical collapse theories, and the random discontinuous motion of particles may provide an appropriate random source to collapse the wave function.

It has been argued that the existence of a minimum observable interval of space and time is a model-independent result of the combination of quantum field theory and general relativity. In this paper, I promote this result to a fundamental postulate, called the MOIST postulate. It is argued that the postulate leads to the existence of a maximum signal speed and its invariance. This new result may have two interesting implications. On the one hand, it suggests that the MOIST postulate can explain the invariance of the speed of light, and thus it might provide a deeper logical foundation for special relativity. Moreover, it suggests that the speed constant c in modern physics is not the actual speed of light in vacuum, but the ratio of the minimum observable length to the minimum observable time interval. On the other hand, the result also suggests that the existing experiments confirming the invariance of the speed of light already provide observational evidence to support the MOIST postulate.

The physical origin of holographic dark energy is investigated. The main existing explanations, namely the UV/IR connection argument of Cohen et al, Thomas' bulk holography argument, and Ng's spacetime foam argument, are shown to be not satisfactory. A new explanation of the HDE model is then proposed based on the ideas of Thomas and Ng. It is suggested that the dark energy might originate from the quantum fluctuations of spacetime limited by the event horizon of the universe. Several potential problems of the explanation are also discussed.

It is widely accepted that continuity is the most essential characteristic of motion; the motion of macroscopic objects is apparently continuous, and classical mechanics, which describes such motion, is also based on the assumption of continuous motion. But is motion really continuous in reality? In this paper, I will try to answer this question through a new analysis of the cause of motion. It has been argued that the standard velocity in classical mechanics cannot fulfill the causal role required for explaining continuous motion in a deterministic way. However, there is a hot debate over the solution to this causal explanation problem. The existing solutions, i.e. the "at-at" theory, the impetus view and the "no instants" view, have serious drawbacks. After reviewing their drawbacks and presenting my own objections, I propose a new solution to this causal explanation problem. It is argued that the relativity of motion or the equivalence between motion and rest demands that motion has no deterministic cause, and thus no causal explanation is needed for motion. Based on this result, I further argue that the uncaused motion is not deterministic and continuous but essentially random and discontinuous. Moreover, objects have a potential that determines the probabilities of their future positions. This suggests a possible connection with quantum mechanics. Lastly, I give a brief explanation for the apparent inconsistency between the suggested potential theory of motion and the appearance of continuous motion in the macroscopic world.

The remarkable connections between gravity and thermodynamics seem to imply that gravity is not fundamental but emergent, and in particular, as Verlinde suggested, gravity is probably an entropic force. In this paper, we will argue that the idea of gravity as an entropic force is debatable. It is shown that there is no convincing analogy between gravity and entropic force in Verlinde’s example. Neither holographic screen nor test particle satisfies all requirements for the existence of entropic force in a thermodynamics system. As a result, there is no entropic force in the gravity system. Furthermore, we show that the entropy increase of the screen is not caused by its statistical tendency to increase entropy as required by the existence of entropic force, but in fact caused by gravity. Therefore, Verlinde’s argument for the entropic origin of gravity is problematic. In addition, we argue that the existence of a minimum size of spacetime, together with the Heisenberg uncertainty principle in quantum theory, may imply the fundamental existence of gravity as a geometric property of spacetime. This provides a further support for the conclusion that gravity is not an entropic force.

The ontological model framework provides a rigorous approach to address the question of whether the quantum state is ontic or epistemic. When considering only conventional projective measurements, auxiliary assumptions are always needed to prove the reality of the quantum state in the framework. For example, the Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph theorem is based on an additional preparation independence assumption. In this paper, we give a new proof of psi-ontology in terms of protective measurements in the ontological model framework. It is argued that the proof needs not rely on auxiliary assumptions, and also applies to deterministic theories such as the de Broglie-Bohm theory. In addition, we give a simpler argument for psi-ontology beyond the framework, which is only based on protective measurements and a weaker criterion of reality. The argument may be also appealing for those people who favor an anti-realist view of quantum mechanics.

Protective measurement is a new measuring method introduced by Aharonov, Anandan and Vaidman. By a protective measurement, one can measure the expectation value of an observable on a single quantum system, even if the system is initially not in an eigenstate of the measured observable. This remarkable feature of protective measurements was challenged by Uffink. He argued that only observables that commute with the system's Hamiltonian can be protectively measured, and a protective measurement of an observable that does not commute with the system's Hamiltonian does not actually measure the observable, but measure another related observable that commutes with the system's Hamiltonian. In this paper, we show that there are several errors in Uffink's arguments, and his alternative interpretation of protective measurements is untenable.

It is shown that the de Broglie-Bohm theory has a potential problem concerning the charge distribution of a quantum system such as an electron. According to the guidance equation of the theory, the electron's charge is localized in a position where its Bohmian particle is. But according to the Schrödinger equation of the theory, the electron's charge is not localized in one position but distributed throughout space, and the charge density in each position is proportional to the modulus square of the wave function of the electron there. Although this tension may be resolved by assuming that the electron's charge is not e but 2e, one for its Bohmian particle and the other for its wave function, the resolution will introduce more serious problems.

According to Penrose, the fundamental conflict between the superposition principle of quantum mechanics and the general covariance principle of general relativity entails the existence of wavefunction collapse, e.g. a quantum superposition of two different space-time geometries will collapse to one of them due to the ill-definedness of the time-translation operator for the superposition. In this paper, we argue that Penrose's conjecture on gravity's role in wavefunction collapse is debatable. First of all, it is still a controversial issue what the exact nature of the conflict is and how to resolve it. Secondly, Penrose's argument by analogy is too weak to establish a necessary connection between wavefunction collapse and the conflict as understood by him. Thirdly, the conflict does not necessarily lead to wavefunction collapse. For the conflict or the problem of ill-definedness for a superposition of different space-time geometries also needs to be solved before the collapse of the superposition finishes, and once the conflict has been resolved, the wavefunction collapse will lose its physical basis relating to the conflict. In addition, we argue that Penrose's suggestions for the collapse time formula and collapse states are also problematic.

The ontological status of the wave function in quantum mechanics has been analyzed in the context of conventional projective measurements. These analyses are usually based on some nontrivial assumptions, e.g. a preparation independence assumption is needed to prove the PBR theorem. In this paper, we give a PBR-like argument for psi-ontology in terms of protective measurements, by which one can directly measure the expectation values of observables on a single quantum system. The proof does not resort to nontrivial assumptions such as preparation independence assumption.

It has been realized that in order to solve the measurement problem, the physical state representing the measurement result is required to be also the physical state on which the mental state of an observer supervenes. This introduces an additional restriction on the solutions to the measurement problem. In this paper, I give a new formulation of the measurement problem which lays more stress on psychophysical connection, and analyze whether Everett's theory, Bohm's theory and dynamical collapse theories can satisfy the restriction of psychophysical supervenience and thus can indeed solve the measurement problem. My analysis of the potential problems of the forms of psychophysical supervenience required by Everett's and Bohm's theories suggests that dynamical collapse theories might provide a promising solution to the measurement problem. Finally, by further analyzing how the mental state of an observer supervenes on her wave function, I also propose a possible solution to the structured tails problem of dynamical collapse theories.

The meaning of the wave function and its evolution are investigated. First, we argue that the wave function in quantum mechanics is a description of random discontinuous motion of particles, and the modulus square of the wave function gives the probability density of the particles being in certain locations in space. Next, we show that the linear non-relativistic evolution of the wave function of an isolated system obeys the free Schrödinger equation due to the requirements of spacetime translation invariance and relativistic invariance. Thirdly, we argue that the random discontinuous motion of particles may lead to a stochastic, nonlinear collapse evolution of the wave function. A discrete model of energy-conserved wavefunction collapse is proposed and shown consistent with existing experiments and our macroscopic experience. Besides, we also give a critical analysis of the de Broglie-Bohm theory, the many-worlds interpretation and other dynamical collapse theories, and briefly discuss the issues of unifying quantum mechanics and relativity.