Bruno Borge

Las teorías de la referencia puramente descriptivistas o causales fracasan a la hora de dar cuenta del modo en que se fija y puede rastrearse la referencia de los términos teóricos. Psillos propuso dos versiones del descriptivismo causal que recogen argu-mentos presentes en defensas previas de dicha posición. Se trata de una teoría mixta que pretende solucionar el problema y acomodarse a intuiciones presentes en enfo-ques alternativos, como el que apela a oraciones de Ramsey. El artículo se propone mostrar la insuficiencia del descriptivismo causal como solución al problema de la referencia de los términos teóricos.

El problema de cómo un modelo teórico —i.e., una entidad matemática—puede representar algo en la naturaleza es central para el EstructuralismoEmpirista (EE) de van Fraassen. Su solución consiste en identificar unelemento indexical presente en toda aserción de la forma “X representa aY”. El presente trabajo pretende mostrar que: (a) dicho problema no es unobstáculo para el realismo más de lo que lo es para el EE; (b) la soluciónde van Fraassen deja al defensor del EE ante un dilema fatal: o bien nopuede dar cuenta de algunos de los supuestos más básicos de su posición,o bien debe conceder demasiado al realismo.

Los desacuerdos acerca de la ontología científica han sido frecuentemente reconstruidos como el resultado de una disputa entre stances epistémicas rivales. En el presente trabajo, (i) caracterizamos algunos de estos desacuerdos como desacuerdos profundos. Además, (ii) mostramos que los desacuerdos profundos sobre ontología científica pueden surgir no solo de la adopción de diferentes stances epistémicas, sino entre posiciones que se encuadran dentro de una misma stance. El desarrollo de ese punto nos permite, a su vez, establecer una distinción entre tipos de desacuerdos profundos y explorar la posibilidad de que existan diferencias de grado entre ellos.

In several academic studies, Pablo Melogno lays the groundwork for formulating election rational criteria between incommensurable theories, seeking to reconcile the Kuhnian notion of incommensurability with rationalist reconstructions of the processes of theoretical change. One of the axes of this project focuses on the semantic aspects of incommensurability, particularly the development of historical semantics that relativizes the scope of semantic holism. In this analysis, I deepen and extend Melogno’s project by considering various aspects of hybrid theories of reference.

As questões das leis da natureza e da modalidade subjacente à regularidade natural muitas vezes têm sido tratadas como uma só. No entanto, a análise metafísica mostra que só as posições que assumem um compromisso ontológico com as leis da natureza podem ser consideradas dentro do Realismo Nomológico. Mumford propõe uma alternativa ao RN compatível com os compromissos modais comumente associados a posições realistas. Neste ponto de vista, o peso da modalidade não está posto nas leis, mas sim em propriedades entendidas em termos de poderes e propensões. De acordo com sua própria nomenclatura, trata-se de um Realismo sem Leis. Neste trabalho pretende-se mostrar, em primeiro lugar, que os argumentos de Mumford contra o RN não justificam a sua rejeição e, em segundo lugar, defende-se que a metafísica disposicional do RSL leva, pelo menos, aos mesmos problemas que o RN.

This work applies Jessica Wilson’s metaphysical indeterminacy approach, ba-sed on the determinable-determinate distinction, to ancient ontologies, focu-sing on the Cyrenaic school. It argues that this conceptual framework elucida-tes the nature of indeterminacy in Cyrenaic metaphysics, complementing and resolving tensions in Ugo Zillioli’s interpretation. The study reviews the con-temporary debate on metaphysical indeterminacy, presents Wilson’s approach and its applications, and applies it to ancient ontologies, particularly the Cyre-naic school. It discusses the conceptual and interpretative advantages of this application, contributing to a deeper understanding of Cyrenaic metaphysics within the context of indeterminacy ontologies in ancient philosophy.

RESUMEN Un experimento mental en ciencias fácticas consiste en la representación de un escenario imaginario. A partir de la presentación de condiciones iniciales y la postulación de una situación hipotética o contrafáctica, se solicita al lector que realice mentalmente alguna operación, manipule ciertas variables o ponga en funcionamiento algún aparato o instrumento. En virtud de este ejercicio sería posible, en principio, obtener nuevo conocimiento acerca de algún aspecto del mundo natural. El debate acerca de las funciones de los experimentos mentales en las ciencias fácticas está centrado en establecer la validez del conocimiento acerca del mundo empírico que estos dispositivos son capaces de proporcionar. La propuesta interpretativa de Brown da sustento a la idea de que, en casos excepcionales, los experimentos mentales pueden cumplir funciones probatorias. Los denominados “experimentos mentales platónicos” permiten intuir leyes de la naturaleza y justificar a priori las hipótesis propuestas. Sostenemos que la conexión trazada por Brown entre los experimentos mentales y leyes naturales exhibe un aspecto problemático de su filosofía: el compromiso injustificado con una metafísica inflacionaria. Mostramos que es posible explicar el mecanismo a través del cual estos dispositivos proporcionan conocimiento nuevo y dar cuenta tanto de su poder heurístico cómo de su valor evidencial a partir compromisos metafísicos más modestos. ABSTRACT Thought experiments in factual science consists on the representation of an imaginary scenario. Starting with the presentation of a hypothetical or counterfactual situation and the description of initial conditions, the reader is asked to mentally perform some operation, to manipulate certain variables or to put into operation some apparatus or instrument. In virtue of this exercise, it would be possible to obtain new knowledge about the natural world. The debate on the functions of thought experiments in physics is focused on determining the validity of the empirical knowledge that these devices are capable of providing. Brown supports the idea that, in exceptional cases, thought experiments can perform probative functions. The so-called “Platonic Thought Experiments” allow us to intuit laws of nature and provide an a priori justification of the proposed hypotheses. We hold that Brown's connection between thought experiments and laws of nature exhibits a problematic aspect of his philosophy: the unjustified commitment with an inflationary metaphysics. We show that it is possible to explain the mechanism through which these devices provide new knowledge and give an account of both their heuristic power and their evidential value from modest metaphysical commitments.

In recent decades, the metaphysics of science has established itself as a distinct and dynamic field. This development has not only revitalized metaphysics as a serious area of inquiry but has also built a crucial bridge between scientific practice and enduring metaphysical questions. By anchoring metaphysical investigation in our best scientific theories, the field seeks to uncover and explore the fundamental nature of reality. This approach moves beyond a priori speculation, engaging directly with the empirical concepts and theoretical structures that shape our understanding of the physical world.

This paper defends weak and local methodological continuity—that is, continuity with respect to specific shared devices rather than global methodological frameworks—across science, naturalized metaphysics, and autonomous metaphysics. The contemporary debate has conflated two distinct continuity problems: whether naturalized metaphysics can share in science's epistemic success and whether proximity to science privileges certain metaphysical approaches over others. Additionally, continuity claims involve multiple dimensions that are not always properly distinguished. The paper makes two interconnected contributions. First, I develop a triadic framework that distinguishes these continuity problems and dimensions, providing analytical tools for practice-sensitive assessments. Second, applying this framework, I argue that thought experiments, understood as shared methodological devices, exhibit methodological continuity across all three domains. The analysis shows that thought experiments perform structurally analogous roles in each domain despite operating under different epistemic constraints and background commitments. This methodological continuity neither presupposes nor entails strong epistemic conclusions, but demonstrates that the science-metaphysics relationship resists simple dichotomies of complete continuity or categorical discontinuity. The framework suggests a productive methodological reorientation: rather than debating global continuity a priori, philosophical inquiry should examine how specific methodological devices function across domains through careful, local case studies. Thought experiments provide one such case; the approach developed here applies to other shared methodological tools.