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818Ought, Can, and Presupposition: An Experimental StudyMethode 4 (6): 232-243. 2015.In this paper, I present the results of an experimental study on intuitions about moral obligation (ought) and ability (can). Many philosophers accept as an axiom the principle known as “Ought Implies Can” (OIC). If the truth of OIC is intuitive, such that it is accepted by many philosophers as an axiom, then we would expect people to judge that agents who are unable to perform an action are not morally obligated to perform that action. The results of my experimental study show that participants…Read more
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1325Does ‘Ought’ Imply ‘Can’ from an Epistemic Point of View?Philosophia 40 (4): 829-840. 2012.In this paper, I argue that the “Ought Implies Can” (OIC) principle, as it is employed in epistemology, particularly in the literature on epistemic norms, is open to counterexamples. I present a counterexample to OIC and discuss several objections to it. If this counterexample works, then it shows that it is possible that S ought to believe that p, even though S cannot believe that p. If this is correct, then OIC, considered from an epistemic point of view, is false, since it is supposed to hold…Read more
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105Against Phenomenal Conservatism: a Reply to MorettiThe Reasoner 8 (3): 26. 2014.In this paper, I reply to Moretti's objection to my reductio against Phenomenal Conservatism.
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336Are Seemings Trustworthy? A Reply to PiazzaThe Reasoner 8 (9): 100-101. 2014.I reply to Piazza's objection to my reductio against phenomenal conservatism.
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5185Why Gettier Cases are misleadingLogos and Episteme 7 (1): 31-44. 2016.In this paper, I argue that, as far as Gettier cases are concerned, appearances are deceiving. That is, Gettier cases merely appear to be cases of epistemic failure (i.e., failing to know that p) but are in fact cases of semantic failure (i.e., failing to refer to x). Gettier cases are cases of reference failure because the candidates for knowledge in these cases contain ambiguous designators. If this is correct, then we may simply be mistaking semantic facts for epistemic facts when we consider…Read more
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3390Skeptheism: Is Knowledge of God’s Existence Possible?European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9 (1): 41-64. 2017.In this paper, I sketch an argument for the view that we cannot know (or have good reasons to believe) that God exists. Some call this view “strong agnosticism” but I prefer the term “skeptheism” in order to clearly distinguish between two distinct epistemic attitudes with respect to the existence of God, namely, agnosticism and skepticism. For the skeptheist, we cannot know (or have good reasons to believe) that God exists, since there can be neither conceptual (a priori) nor empirical (a poste…Read more
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2269The Fine-Tuning Argument and the Simulation HypothesisThink 16 (47): 93-102. 2017.In this paper, I propose that, in addition to the multiverse hypothesis, which is commonly taken to be an alternative explanation for fine-tuning, other than the design hypothesis, the simulation hypothesis is another explanation for fine-tuning. I then argue that the simulation hypothesis undercuts the alleged evidential connection between ‘designer’ and ‘supernatural designer of immense power and knowledge’ in much the same way that the multiverse hypothesis undercuts the alleged evidential co…Read more
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1988Kuhn’s Incommensurability Thesis: What’s the Argument?Social Epistemology 29 (4): 361-378. 2015.In this paper, I argue that there is neither valid deductive support nor strong inductive support for Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis. There is no valid deductive support for Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis because, from the fact that the reference of the same kind terms changes or discontinues from one theoretical framework to another, it does not necessarily follow that these two theoretical frameworks are taxonomically incommensurable. There is no strong inductive support for Kuhn’s incomme…Read more
Melbourne, Florida, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
General Philosophy of Science |
Metaphilosophy |
Philosophy of Religion |
Areas of Interest
Argument |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |
Meta-Ethics |
Moral Psychology |
PhilPapers Editorships
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