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490The Pessimistic Induction: A Bad Argument Gone Too FarSynthese 190 (15): 3209-3226. 2013.In this paper, I consider the pessimistic induction construed as a deductive argument (specifically, reductio ad absurdum) and as an inductive argument (specifically, inductive generalization). I argue that both formulations of the pessimistic induction are fallacious. I also consider another possible interpretation of the pessimistic induction, namely, as pointing to counterexamples to the scientific realist’s thesis that success is a reliable mark of (approximate) truth. I argue that this inte…Read more
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477Is Philosophy Exceptional? A Corpus-Based, Quantitative StudySocial Epistemology 37 (5): 666-683. 2023.Drawing on the epistemology of logic literature on anti-exceptionalism about logic, we set out to investigate the following metaphilosophical questions empirically: Is philosophy special? Are its methods (dis)continuous with science? More specifically, we test the following metaphilosophical hypotheses empirically: philosophical deductivism, philosophical inductivism, and philosophical abductivism. Using indicator words to classify arguments by type (namely, deductive, inductive, and abductive a…Read more
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477The Relativity of Theory by Moti Mizrahi: Reply by the AuthorStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 87 (C): 173-174. 2021.I’m grateful to Aleta Quinn and Studies in History and Philosophy of Science for hosting this book forum for my book, The Relativity of Theory (Springer, 2020). I’m also grateful to Margaret Greta Turnbull and Joseph Martin for their commentaries. In what follows, I address their comments as I understand them.
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471Philosophical reasoning about science: a quantitative, digital studySynthese 200 (2). 2022.In this paper, we set out to investigate the following question: if science relies heavily on induction, does philosophy of science rely heavily on induction as well? Using data mining and text analysis methods, we study a large corpus of philosophical texts mined from the JSTOR database (n = 14,199) in order to answer this question empirically. If philosophy of science relies heavily on induction, just as science supposedly does, then we would expect to find significantly more inductive argumen…Read more
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443Is Truth the Gold Standard of Inquiry? A Comment on Elgin’s Argument Against VeritismFoundations of Science 26 (2): 275-280. 2021.In True enough,, Elgin argues against veritism, which is the view that truth is the paramount epistemic objective. Elgin’s argument against veritism proceeds from considering the role that models, idealizations, and thought experiments play in science to the conclusion that veritism is unacceptable. In this commentary, I argue that Elgin’s argument fails as an argument against veritism. I sketch a refutation by logical analogy of Elgin’s argument. Just as one can aim at gold medals and still fin…Read more
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423Why Gettier Cases Are Still Misleading: A Reply to AtkinsLogos and Episteme 8 (1): 129-139. 2017.In this paper, I respond to Philip Atkins’ reply to my attempt to explain why Gettier cases (and Gettier-style cases) are misleading. I have argued that Gettier cases (and Gettier-style cases) are misdealing because the candidates for knowledge in such cases contain ambiguous designators. Atkins denies that Gettier’s original cases contain ambiguous designators and offers his intuition that the subjects in Gettier’s original cases do not know. I argue that his reply amounts to mere intuition mon…Read more
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408Jewish Survival, Divine Supervision, and the Existence of GodShofar: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Jewish Studies 30 (4): 100-112. 2012.In this paper, I discuss an argument for the existence of God known as “The Argument from the Survival of the Jews.” This argument has the form of an Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE). It proceeds from the phenomenon of Jewish survival to the existence of God as the best explanation for this phenomenon. I will argue that, even if we grant that Jewish survival is a remarkable occurrence that demands an explanation, and even if we gloss over the difficulties in defining the terms “Jewish” an…Read more
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394Comment on David Kaspar's IntuitionismReason Papers 37 (2): 26-35. 2015.In his book Intuitionism, David Kaspar is after the truth. That is to say, on his view, “philosophy is the search for the whole truth” (p. 7). Intuitionism, then, “reflects that standpoint” (p. 7). My comments are meant to reflect the same standpoint. More explicitly, my aim in these comments is to evaluate the arguments for intuitionism, as I understand them from reading Kaspar’s book. In what follows, I focus on three arguments in particular, which c…Read more
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391The Kuhnian Image of Science: Time for a Decisive Transformation? (edited book)Rowman & Littlefield. 2018.More than 50 years after the publication of Thomas Kuhn’s seminal book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, this volume assesses the adequacy of the Kuhnian model in explaining certain aspects of science, particularly the social and epistemic aspects of science. One argument put forward is that there are no good reasons to accept Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis, according to which scientific revolutions involve the replacement of theories with conceptually incompatible ones. Perhaps, there…Read more
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386Weak Scientism Defended Once More: A Reply to WillsSocial Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 7 (6): 41-50. 2018.Bernard Wills (2018) joins Christopher Brown (2017, 2018) in criticizing my defense of Weak Scientism (Mizrahi 2017a, 2017b, 2018a). Unfortunately, it seems that Wills did not read my latest defense of Weak Scientism carefully, nor does he cite any of the other papers in my exchange with Brown.
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383Idealizations and scientific understandingPhilosophical Studies 160 (2): 237-252. 2012.In this paper, I propose that the debate in epistemology concerning the nature and value of understanding can shed light on the role of scientific idealizations in producing scientific understanding. In philosophy of science, the received view seems to be that understanding is a species of knowledge. On this view, understanding is factive just as knowledge is, i.e., if S knows that p, then p is true. Epistemologists, however, distinguish between different kinds of understanding. Among epistemolo…Read more
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382Why the ultimate argument for scientific realism ultimately failsStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1): 132-138. 2012.In this paper, I argue that the ultimate argument for Scientific Realism, also known as the No-Miracles Argument (NMA), ultimately fails as an abductive defence of Epistemic Scientific Realism (ESR), where (ESR) is the thesis that successful theories of mature sciences are approximately true. The NMA is supposed to be an Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) that purports to explain the success of science. However, the explanation offered as the best explanation for success, namely (ESR), fail…Read more
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376In Defense of Weak Scientism: A Reply to BrownSocial Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 6 (2): 9-22. 2017.In “What’s So Bad about Scientism?” (Mizrahi 2017), I argue that Weak Scientism, the view that “Of all the knowledge we have, scientific knowledge is the best knowledge” (Mizrahi 2017, 354; emphasis in original) is a defensible position. That is to say, Weak Scientism “can be successfully defended against objections” (Mizrahi 2017, 354). In his response to Mizrahi (2017), Christopher Brown (2017) provides more objections against Weak Scientism, and thus another opportunity for me to show that We…Read more
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370More in Defense of Weak ScientismSocial Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 7 (4): 7-25. 2018.In my (2017a), I defend a view I call Weak Scientism, which is the view that knowledge produced by scientific disciplines is better than knowledge produced by non-scientific disciplines. Scientific knowledge can be said to be quantitatively better than non-scientific knowledge insofar as scientific disciplines produce more impactful knowledge–in the form of scholarly publications–than non-scientific disciplines (as measured by research output and research impact). Scientific knowledge can be sai…Read more
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362The (Lack of) Evidence for the Kuhnian Image of ScienceSocial Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 7 (7): 19-24. 2018.In their reviews of The Kuhnian Image of Science: Time for a Decisive Transformation? (2018), both Markus Arnold (2018) and Amanda Bryant (2018) complain that the contributors who criticize Kuhn’s theory of scientific change have misconstrued his philosophy of science and they praise those who seek to defend the Kuhnian image of science. In what follows, then, I would like to address their claims about misconstruing Kuhn’s theory of scientific change. But my focus here, as in the book, will be t…Read more
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341On appeals to intuition: a reply to Muñoz-SuárezThe Reasoner 9 (2): 12-13. 2015.I reply to Muñoz-Suárez's objection to my argument by analogy with appeals to authority for the following necessary, but not sufficient, condition for strong appeals to intuition: (PAI) When philosophers appeal to intuitions, there must be an agreement among the relevant philosophers concerning the intuition in question; otherwise, the appeal to intuition is weak.
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338Are Seemings Trustworthy? A Reply to PiazzaThe Reasoner 8 (9): 100-101. 2014.I reply to Piazza's objection to my reductio against phenomenal conservatism.
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333Take My Advice—I Am Not Following It: Ad Hominem Arguments as Legitimate Rebuttals to Appeals to AuthorityInformal Logic 30 (4): 435-456. 2010.In this paper, I argue that ad hominem arguments are not always fallacious. More explicitly, in certain cases of practical reasoning, the circumstances of a person are relevant to whether or not the conclusion should be accepted. This occurs, I suggest, when a person gives advice to others or prescribes certain courses of action but fails to follow her own advice or act in accordance with her own prescriptions. This is not an instance of a fallacious tu quoque provided that such circumstantial a…Read more
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319Ought, Can, and Presupposition: A Reply to Kurthy and Lawford-SmithMethode 4 (6): 250-256. 2015.I report the results of a follow-up study, designed to address concerns raised by Kurthy and Lawford-Smith in response to my original study on intuitions about moral obligation (ought) and ability (can). Like the results of the original study, the results of the follow-up study do not support the hypothesis that OIC is intuitive. The results of both studies suggest that OIC is probably not a principle of ordinary moral cognition. As I have argued in my paper, I take this to mean that OIC can no …Read more
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291Why Arguments from Expert Opinion are Weak ArgumentsInformal Logic 33 (1): 57-79. 2013.In this paper, I argue that arguments from expert opinion, i.e., inferences from “Expert E says that p” to “p,” where the truth value of p is unknown, are weak arguments. A weak argument is an argument in which the premises, even if true, provide weak support—or no support at all—for the conclusion. Such arguments from expert opinion are weak arguments unless the fact that an expert says that p makes p significantly more likely to be true. However, research on expertise shows that expert opinion…Read more
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254A Reply to James Marcum’s “What’s the Support for Kuhn’s Incommensurability Thesis?”Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 4 (11): 21-24. 2015.I reply to James Marcum’s “What’s the Support for Kuhn’s Incommensurability Thesis? A Response to Mizrahi and Patton”
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243Factivity and Epistemic Certainty: A Reply to SankeyLogos and Episteme 10 (4): 443-444. 2019.This is a reply to Howard Sankey’s comment (“Factivity or Grounds? Comment on Mizrahi”) on my paper, “You Can’t Handle the Truth: Knowledge = Epistemic Certainty,” in which I present an argument from the factivity of knowledge for the conclusion that knowledge is epistemic certainty. While Sankey is right that factivity does not entail epistemic certainty, the factivity of knowledge does entail that knowledge is epistemic certainty.
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235The Role of Justification in the Ordinary Concept of Scientific ProgressJournal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 45 (1): 151-166. 2014.Alexander Bird and Darrell Rowbottom have argued for two competing accounts of the concept of scientific progress. For Bird, progress consists in the accumulation of scientific knowledge. For Rowbottom, progress consists in the accumulation of true scientific beliefs. Both appeal to intuitions elicited by thought experiments in support of their views, and it seems fair to say that the debate has reached an impasse. In an attempt to avoid this stalemate, we conduct a systematic study of the facto…Read more
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186A Pedagogical Challenge in Teaching Arguments for the Existence of GodAPA Newsletter on Teaching Philosophy 11 (1): 10-12. 2011.In this paper, I describe the way in which I introduce arguments for the existence of God to undergraduate students in Introduction to Philosophy.
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133Against Phenomenal ConservatismThe Reasoner 7 (10): 117-118. 2013.In this paper, I outline a reductio against Phenomenal Conservatism. If sound, this reductio shows that the phenomenal conservative is committed to the claim that appealing to appearances is not a trustworthy method of fixing belief.
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130For and Against Scientism: Science, Methodology, and the Future of Philosophy (edited book)Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 2022.The term scientism is used in several ways. It is used to denote an epistemological thesis according to which science is the source of our knowledge about the world and ourselves. Relatedly, it is used to denote a methodological thesis according to which the methods of science are superior to the methods of non-scientific fields or areas of inquiry, or even used to put forward a metaphysical thesis that what exists is what science says exists. In recent decades, the term scientism has acquired a…Read more
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116A Decision Procedure for Evaluating Natural Language ArgumentsAPA Newsletter on Teaching Philosophy 12 (1): 11-12. 2012.In this paper, I present a decision procedure for evaluating arguments expressed in natural language. I think that other instructors of informal logic and critical thinking might find this decision procedure to be a useful addition to their teaching resources.
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109This book offers a close and rigorous examination of the arguments for and against scientific realism and introduces key positions in the scientific realism/antirealism debate, which is one of the central debates in contemporary philosophy of science. On the one hand, scientific realists argue that we have good reasons to believe that our best scientific theories are approximately true because, if they were not even approximately true, they would not be able to explain and predict natural phenom…Read more
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105Against Phenomenal Conservatism: a Reply to MorettiThe Reasoner 8 (3): 26. 2014.In this paper, I reply to Moretti's objection to my reductio against Phenomenal Conservatism.
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97The Scientism Debate: A Battle for the Soul of Philosophy?Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 8 (9): 1-13. 2019.In this paper, I report the results of an empirical study, which was designed to test the following hypotheses: (H1) Many philosophers find scientism threatening because they see it as a threat to the future of philosophy as a major in colleges and universities; (H2) Many philosophers find scientism threatening because they see it as a threat to the soul or essence of philosophy as an a priori discipline. My results provide some empirical evidence in support of H2. These results are also in line…Read more
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