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63A Reply to Patton's "Incommensurability and the Bonfire of the Meta-Theories"Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 4 (10): 51-53. 2015.I reply to Patton's "Incommensurability and the Bonfire of the Meta-Theories"
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61Why Everything You Think You Know about Scientism is Probably WrongSocial Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 12 (11): 1-8. 2023.I would like to thank Renia Gasparatou, Philip Goff, and Andreas Vrahimis for contributing to the book symposium on For and Against Scientism: Science, Methodology, and the Future of Philosophy (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2022). I am grateful to James Collier for hosting this book symposium on the Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective. In what follows, I will reply to Gasparatou and Vrahimis’s contributions to this book symposium.1 Before I do so, I will summarize what I take to be …Read more
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57Scientism and Sentiments about Progress in Science and Academic PhilosophySocial Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 12 (6): 39-60. 2023.Mizrahi (2017a) advances an argument in support of Weak Scientism, which is the view that scientific knowledge is the best (but not the only) knowledge we have, according to which Weak Scientism follows from the premises that scientific knowledge is quantitatively and qualitatively better than non-scientific knowledge. In this paper, I develop a different argument for Weak Scientism. This latter argument for Weak Scientism proceeds from the premise that academic disciplines that make progress ar…Read more
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54Correction to: An Absurd Consequence of Stanford’s New Induction Over the History of Science: A Reply to SterpettiAxiomathes 29 (5): 529-529. 2019.In the Introduction section, 6th point under the paragraph “Given the parallels between Stanford’s PUA and the PUO, and those between Stanford’s NIS and the NIP, I have sketched the following reductio against Stanford’s NIS (Mizrahi 2016a, pp. 63–64):….. should read as (6) Scientific antirealism is a philosophical theory.
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52Philosophical Sentiments Toward Scientism: A Reply to BryantSocial Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 10 (11): 19-24. 2021.In a reply to Mizrahi (2019), Bryant (2020) raises several methodological concerns regarding my attempt to test hypotheses about the observation that academic philosophers tend to find “scientism” threatening empirically using quantitative, corpus based methods. Chief among her methodological concerns is that numbers of philosophical publications that mention “scientism” are a “poor proxy for scholarly sentiment” (Bryant 2020, 31). In reply, I conduct a sentiment analysis that is designed to fin…Read more
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30Why Park’s Argument from Double Spaces is Not a Problem for Relative RealismSocial Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 10 (6): 58-62. 2021.In this paper, I reply to Seungbae Park’s (2021) reply to my (Mizrahi 2021) reply to his (Park 2020) critique of the view I defend in Chapter 6 of The Relativity of Theory: Key Positions and Arguments in the Contemporary Scientific Realism/Antirealism Debate (Cham: Springer, 2020), namely, Relative Realism. Relative Realism is the view that, of a set of competing scientific theories, the more successful theory is comparatively true. Comparative truth is a relation between competing theories. So,…Read more
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14The Relativity of Theory by Moti Mizrahi: Reply by the AuthorStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 87 173-174. 2021.I’m grateful to Aleta Quinn and Studies in History and Philosophy of Science for hosting this book forum for my book, The Relativity of Theory (Springer, 2020). I’m also grateful to Margaret Greta Turnbull and Joseph Martin for their commentaries. In what follows, I address their comments as I understand them.
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13In Defense of Relative Realism: A Reply to ParkSocial Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 10 (1): 1-6. 2021.In this paper, I reply to Seungbae Park’s (2020) critique of the view I defend in Chapter 6 of The Relativity of Theory: Key Positions and Arguments in the Contemporary Scientific Realism/Antirealism Debate (Cham: Springer, 2020), namely, Relative Realism. Relative Realism is the view that, of a set of competing scientific theories, the more predictively successful theory is comparatively true. Comparative truth is a relation between competing theories. So, to say that T1 is comparatively true i…Read more
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