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422Why Gettier Cases Are Still Misleading: A Reply to AtkinsLogos and Episteme 8 (1): 129-139. 2017.In this paper, I respond to Philip Atkins’ reply to my attempt to explain why Gettier cases (and Gettier-style cases) are misleading. I have argued that Gettier cases (and Gettier-style cases) are misdealing because the candidates for knowledge in such cases contain ambiguous designators. Atkins denies that Gettier’s original cases contain ambiguous designators and offers his intuition that the subjects in Gettier’s original cases do not know. I argue that his reply amounts to mere intuition mon…Read more
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186A Pedagogical Challenge in Teaching Arguments for the Existence of GodAPA Newsletter on Teaching Philosophy 11 (1): 10-12. 2011.In this paper, I describe the way in which I introduce arguments for the existence of God to undergraduate students in Introduction to Philosophy.
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1175The Problem of Unconceived ObjectionsArgumentation 28 (4): 425-436. 2014.In this paper, I argue that, just as the problem of unconceived alternatives provides a basis for a New Induction on the History of Science to the effect that a realist view of science is unwarranted, the problem of unconceived objections provides a basis for a New Induction on the History of Philosophy to the effect that a realist view of philosophy is unwarranted. I raise this problem not only for skepticism’s sake but also for the sake of making a point about philosophical argumentation, name…Read more
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1578Phenomenal Conservatism, Justification, and Self-defeatLogos and Episteme 5 (1): 103-110. 2014.In this paper, I argue that Phenomenal Conservatism (PC) is not superior to alternative theories of basic propositional justification insofar as those theories that reject PC are self-defeating. I show that self-defeat arguments similar to Michael Huemer’s Self-Defeat Argument for PC can be constructed for other theories of basic propositional justification as well. If this is correct, then there is nothing special about PC in that respect. In other words, if self-defeat arguments can be advance…Read more
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776Historical Inductions: New Cherries, Same Old Cherry-pickingInternational Studies in the Philosophy of Science 29 (2): 129-148. 2015.In this article, I argue that arguments from the history of science against scientific realism, like the arguments advanced by P. Kyle Stanford and Peter Vickers, are fallacious. The so-called Old Induction, like Vickers's, and New Induction, like Stanford's, are both guilty of confirmation bias—specifically, of cherry-picking evidence that allegedly challenges scientific realism while ignoring evidence to the contrary. I also show that the historical episodes that Stanford adduces in support of…Read more
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894Phenomenal Conservatism and Self-defeat Arguments: A Reply to HuemerLogos and Episteme 5 (3): 343-350. 2014.In this paper, I respond to Michael Huemer’s reply to my objection against Phenomenal Conservatism (PC). I have argued that Huemer’s Self-defeat Argument for PC does not favor PC over competing theories of basic propositional justification, since analogous self-defeat arguments can be constructed for competing theories. Huemer responds that such analogous self-defeat arguments are unsound. In this paper, I argue that Huemer’s reply does not save his Self-defeat Argument for PC from my original o…Read more
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250A Reply to James Marcum’s “What’s the Support for Kuhn’s Incommensurability Thesis?”Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 4 (11): 21-24. 2015.I reply to James Marcum’s “What’s the Support for Kuhn’s Incommensurability Thesis? A Response to Mizrahi and Patton”
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916Why the argument from zombies against physicalism is question-beggingThe Reasoner 7 (8): 94-95. 2013.I argue that the argument from zombies against physicalism is question-begging unless proponents of the argument from zombies can justify the inference from the metaphysical possibility of zombies to the falsity of physicalism in an independent and non-circular way, i.e., a way that does not already assume the falsity of physicalism.
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1535What is Scientific Progress? Lessons from Scientific PracticeJournal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 44 (2): 375-390. 2013.Alexander Bird argues for an epistemic account of scientific progress, whereas Darrell Rowbottom argues for a semantic account. Both appeal to intuitions about hypothetical cases in support of their accounts. Since the methodological significance of such appeals to intuition is unclear, I think that a new approach might be fruitful at this stage in the debate. So I propose to abandon appeals to intuition and look at scientific practice instead. I discuss two cases that illustrate the way in whic…Read more
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Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
General Philosophy of Science |
Metaphilosophy |
Philosophy of Religion |
Areas of Interest
Argument |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |
Meta-Ethics |
Moral Psychology |
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