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''Correlative Obligations''In Dean K. Chatterjee (ed.), Encyclopedia of Global Justice, Springer. 2011.
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30Lara Denis , Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide (review)Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (3): 361-364. 2013.
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1''Non-combatant Immunity''In Dean K. Chatterjee (ed.), Encyclopedia of Global Justice, Springer. 2011.
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19Book Review: Recidivist Punishments: The Philosopher’s View, edited by Claudio Tamburrini and Jesper Ryberg (review)Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (4): 531-534. 2014.
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100''Deterrent Punishment and Respect for Persons''Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 8 (2): 369-384. 2011.This article defends deterrence as an aim of punishment. Specifically, I contend that a system of punishment aimed at deterrence (with constraints to prohibit punishing the innocent or excessively punishing the guilty) is consistent with the liberal principle of respect for offenders as autonomous moral persons. I consider three versions of the objection that deterrent punishment fails to respect offenders. The first version, raised by Jeffrie Murphy and others, charges that deterrent punishment…Read more
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153PunishmentAnalysis 77 (3). 2016.Philosophical writing about the legal practice of punishment has traditionally focused on two central questions: what (if anything) justifies the practice of tr.
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''Obligation''In James E. Crimmins (ed.), The Bloomsbury Encyclopedia of Utilitarianism, Bloomsbury Academic. 2013.
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42Education, Civic Empowerment, and RaceSocial Philosophy Today 31 163-168. 2015.Meira Levinson’s No Citizen Left Behind is a thoughtful, accessible, philosophically rich look at civic education in U.S. schools. The book’s central claims are, on the whole, quite persuasive. In the interests of fostering further discussion, this essay raises some questions about the book’s accounts of racial microaggressions in schools, the extent of authenticity in student experiences, and the practice of code-switching.
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108Ex‐offender RestrictionsJournal of Applied Philosophy 31 (1): 33-48. 2014.Individuals convicted of crimes are often subject to numerous restrictions — on housing, employment, the vote, public assistance, and other goods — well after they have completed their sentences, and in some cases permanently. The question of whether — and if so, when — ex-offender restrictions are morally permissible has received surprisingly little philosophical scrutiny. This article first examines the significance of completing punishment, of paying one's debt to society, and contends that w…Read more
Nottingham, England, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Specialization
Applied Ethics |
Philosophy of Law |
Social and Political Philosophy |