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Kirk Ludwig

Indiana University, Bloomington
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    156
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 More details
  • Indiana University, Bloomington
    Department of Philosophy
    Cognitive Science Program
    Professor
University of California, Berkeley
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1990
APA Central Division
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Bloomington, Indiana, United States of America
0000-0002-9037-6292
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Action
Philosophy of Mind
Epistemology
Metaphysics
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Action
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Mind
Epistemology
Philosophy of Social Science
Metaphysics
Social and Political Philosophy
Logic and Philosophy of Logic
Metaphilosophy
4 more
PhilPapers Editorships
Collective Intentionality
  • All publications (156)
  •  805
    Davidson’s Objection to Horwich’s Minimalism about Truth
    Journal of Philosophy 101 (8): 429-437. 2004.
    This paper shows how one can respond within truth-theoretic semantics, without appeal to parataxis, to Donald Davidson's objection to the intelligibility of Paul Horwich's statement of the minimalist position on truth.
    Donald DavidsonMinimalism about Truth
  •  118
    The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality (edited book)
    with Marija Jankovic
    Routledge. 2017.
    The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality is the first of its kind, synthesizing research from several disciplines for all students and professionals interested in better understanding the nature and structure of social reality. The contents of the volume are divided into eight sections, each of which begins with a short introduction: Collective Action and Intention Shared and Joint Attitudes Epistemology and Rationality in the Social Context Social Ontology Collectives and Responsibil…Read more
    The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality is the first of its kind, synthesizing research from several disciplines for all students and professionals interested in better understanding the nature and structure of social reality. The contents of the volume are divided into eight sections, each of which begins with a short introduction: Collective Action and Intention Shared and Joint Attitudes Epistemology and Rationality in the Social Context Social Ontology Collectives and Responsibility Collective Intentionality and Social Institutions The Extent, Origins, and Development of Collective Intentionality Semantics of Collectivity The eight sections contain a total of 40 accessible chapters, all written exclusively for this volume by a team of internationally recognized experts. Each chapter ends with a References and a Further Reading section as well as cross-references to other germane chapters in the volume. A longer General Introduction provides an initial overview of the history as well as the current issues and problems in collective intentionality, the range of topics and their interconnections, and the organization of the _Handbook_. Systematic in its approach and thorough and detailed in its coverage_, The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality_ provides readers with a valuable reference to this rapidly growing, cross-disciplinary research area and a trailhead to its most promising future directions.
    Collective IntentionalityCollective IntentionsCollective ActionCollective EpistemologyCollective Res…Read more
    Collective IntentionalityCollective IntentionsCollective ActionCollective EpistemologyCollective ResponsibilityCollective Mentality, Misc
  •  1676
    Collective intentional behavior from the standpoint of semantics
    Noûs 41 (3). 2007.
    This paper offers an analysis of the logical form of plural action sentences that shows that collective actions so ascribed are a matter of all members of a group contributing to bringing some event about. It then uses this as the basis for a reductive account of the content of we-intentions according to which what distinguishes we-intentions from I-intentions is that we-intentions are directed about bringing it about that members of a group act in accordance with a shared plan.
    Collective IntentionalityCollective ActionCollective IntentionsAction Sentences
  •  1169
    Singular thought and the cartesian theory of mind
    Noûs 30 (4): 434-460. 1996.
    (1) Content properties are nonrelational, that is, having a content property does not entail the existence of any contingent object not identical with the thinker or a part of the thinker.2 (2) We have noninferential knowledge of our conscious thoughts, that is, for any of our..
    Narrow ContentDe Re BeliefSingular PropositionsObject-Dependent ContentsSubstitutivity in Attitude A…Read more
    Narrow ContentDe Re BeliefSingular PropositionsObject-Dependent ContentsSubstitutivity in Attitude Ascriptions
  •  1469
    Donald Davidson
    with Ernest Lepore
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 28 (1). 2004.
    This chapter reviews the major contributions of Donald Davidson to philosophy in the 20th century.
    Donald Davidson
  •  493
    Review Essay: Scott Soames, Philosophy of Language: Princeton University Press, 2010, Pp. ix, 189 (review)
    Philosophia 41 (3): 905-916. 2013.
    This is a review of Scott Soames's Philosophy of Language, Princeton, 2010.
    Meaning, Misc
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