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101Perception-consciousness and action-consciousness?Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2): 247-248. 1995.Block's distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness is accepted, and it is agreed that one may be found without the other, but his account of the distinction is challenged. Phenomenal consciousness is perceptual consciousness, and it is a matter of gaining information of a detailed, nonverbal sort about the subject's body and environment. Access consciousness is good, old-fashioned introspection.
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93Necessity, Essence and Individuation: A Defence of ConventionalismPhilosophical Books 32 (2): 106-108. 1991.
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75Comte, x Coombs, CH, 31, 36 Cox. LE, 205,207 Darwin, C., 29, 36In Bruce A. Thyer (ed.), The philosophical legacy of behaviorism, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 257. 1999.
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121Comment on SmartIn Howard Sankey (ed.), Causation and Laws of Nature, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 171--172. 1999.
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109Critical NoticesPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2): 485-487. 2006.Powers: A Study in Metaphysics. GEORGE MOLNAR, edited by STEPHEN MUMFORD. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. Pp. xiv, 238.
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532An argument against David Lewis' theory of possible worldsAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (2). 1984.This Article does not have an abstract
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151
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1543IntrospectionIn Quassim Cassam (ed.), Self-Knowledge, Oxford University Press. pp. 109-117. 1994.This paper will argue that there is no such thing as introspective access to judgments and decisions. I t won't challenge the existence of introspective access to perceptual and imagistic states, nor to emotional feelings and bodily sensations. On the contrary, the model presented in Section 2 presumes such access. Hence introspection is here divided into two categories: introspection of propositional attitude events, on the one hand, and introspection of broadly perceptual events, on the other.…Read more
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149Going through the open door again: Counterfactual versus singularist theories of causationIn Gerhard Preyer & Frank Siebelt (eds.), Reality and Humean Supervenience: Essays on the Philosophy of David Lewis, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. 163--176. 2001.
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227The scope and limits of human knowledgeAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2). 2006.This paper argues that the foundations of our knowledge are the bed-rock certainties of ordinary life, what may be called the Moorean truths. Beyond that are the well-established results within the empirical sciences, and whatever has been proved in the rational sciences of mathematics and logic. Otherwise there is only belief, which may be more or less rational. A moral drawn from this is that dogmatism should be moderated on all sides.
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216Arda Denkel's resemblance nominalismPhilosophical Quarterly 41 (165): 478-482. 1991.Arda Denkel, in "Real Resemblances," argues for a moderate Nominalism where substances objectively have properties and relations, the latter being particulars, but dependent particulars, grouped into classes by objective relations of resemblance. This view is contrasted unfavorably with the view that properties and relations are universals instantiated by particulars. It is conceded that Denkel's scheme has much to commend it. But it is argued that the universals view has much more to be said fo…Read more
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198In defence of the cognitivist theory of perceptionHarvard Review of Philosophy 12 (1): 19-26. 2004.
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Dispositions: A DebateRoutledge. 2002.Dispositions are essential to our understanding of the world. _Dispositions: A Debate_ is an extended dialogue between three distinguished philosophers - D.M. Armstrong, C.B. Martin and U.T. Place - on the many problems associated with dispositions, which reveals their own distinctive accounts of the nature of dispositions. These are then linked to other issues such as the nature of mind, matter, universals, existence, laws of nature and causation.
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6Against Ostrich Nominalism: A Reply to Michael DevittIn David Hugh Mellor & Alex Oliver (eds.), Properties, Oxford University Press. 1997.
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2The Mind-Body Problem: An Opinionated Introduction (Boulder: Westview, 1999); U. Place,'Thirty Years On: Is Consciousness Still a Brain Process?'Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (2). 1988.
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42This paper presents a philosophical response to the problem first articulated by Parmenides of the relationship between truth and appearance. The essay draws upon Heidegger's retrieval of aletheia as unconcealment to consider an epistemic interpretation of Parmenidean monism in which becoming occurs through disclosure and reality can be understood as having an underlying unity whilst understanding of that unity is historically and experientially disclosed.
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University of SydneyProfessor
Lancaster University
PhD, 1994
Sydney, New South Wales, Australia
Areas of Specialization
| Metaphysics and Epistemology |
| Philosophical Traditions |
| Social and Political Philosophy |