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Derrick Armstrong

University of Sydney
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    63
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 More details
  • University of Sydney
    Professor
Lancaster University
PhD, 1994
Sydney, New South Wales, Australia
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics and Epistemology
Philosophical Traditions
Social and Political Philosophy
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics and Epistemology
Philosophical Traditions
Social and Political Philosophy
  • All publications (63)
  •  97
    Causes are perceived and introspected
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1): 29-29. 1993.
    Philosophy of Cognitive ScienceAspects of Consciousness
  •  101
    Perception-consciousness and action-consciousness?
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2): 247-248. 1995.
    Block's distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness is accepted, and it is agreed that one may be found without the other, but his account of the distinction is challenged. Phenomenal consciousness is perceptual consciousness, and it is a matter of gaining information of a detailed, nonverbal sort about the subject's body and environment. Access consciousness is good, old-fashioned introspection.
    Philosophy of Cognitive SciencePhilosophy of Consciousness
  •  93
    Necessity, Essence and Individuation: A Defence of Conventionalism
    Philosophical Books 32 (2): 106-108. 1991.
  •  158
    Reply to Cheyne and Pigden
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2). 2006.
    Truthmakers
  •  84
    Reply to Rosen
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (4). 1995.
  •  151
    Reply to Heil
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2). 2006.
    Truthmakers
  •  103
    Reply to Efird and Stoneham
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2). 2006.
    Truthmakers
  •  75
    Comte, x Coombs, CH, 31, 36 Cox. LE, 205,207 Darwin, C., 29, 36
    with R. Abelson, L. Addis, K. D. Allen, W. P. Alston, J. T. Andresen, W. J. Arnold, K. J. Arrow, B. J. Baars, and A. Bandura
    In Bruce A. Thyer (ed.), The philosophical legacy of behaviorism, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 257. 1999.
    Behaviorism
  •  121
    Comment on Smart
    In Howard Sankey (ed.), Causation and Laws of Nature, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 171--172. 1999.
    Nomological NecessityLaws as Relations between Universals
  •  109
    Critical Notices
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2): 485-487. 2006.
    Powers: A Study in Metaphysics. GEORGE MOLNAR, edited by STEPHEN MUMFORD. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. Pp. xiv, 238.
  •  532
    An argument against David Lewis' theory of possible worlds
    with Peter Forrest
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (2). 1984.
    This Article does not have an abstract
    David LewisModal Realism
  •  144
    David Lewis, 1941-2001
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (1): 134-135. 2002.
    David Lewis
  •  29
    Aspects of Mind
    Philosophical Books 35 (2): 113-114. 2010.
  •  5
    Theses on Causality
    Dialogue and Universalism 5 (5): 5-15. 1995.
  •  151
    Appearance in this list neither guarantees nor precludes a future review of the book
    with John Anderson and Dirk Baltzly
    Mind 116 463. 2007.
    Giorgio Agamben
  •  2
    Reply to Stephen's Review
    Behaviorism 15 (2): 157-160. 1987.
    Philosophy of MindMental States and Processes
  •  1543
    Introspection
    In Quassim Cassam (ed.), Self-Knowledge, Oxford University Press. pp. 109-117. 1994.
    This paper will argue that there is no such thing as introspective access to judgments and decisions. I t won't challenge the existence of introspective access to perceptual and imagistic states, nor to emotional feelings and bodily sensations. On the contrary, the model presented in Section 2 presumes such access. Hence introspection is here divided into two categories: introspection of propositional attitude events, on the one hand, and introspection of broadly perceptual events, on the other.…Read more
    This paper will argue that there is no such thing as introspective access to judgments and decisions. I t won't challenge the existence of introspective access to perceptual and imagistic states, nor to emotional feelings and bodily sensations. On the contrary, the model presented in Section 2 presumes such access. Hence introspection is here divided into two categories: introspection of propositional attitude events, on the one hand, and introspection of broadly perceptual events, on the other. I shall assume that the latter exists while arguing that the fonner doesn't. Section I makes some preliminary points and distinctions, and outlines the scope of the argument. Section 2 presents and motivates the general model of introspection that predicts a divided result. Section 3 provides independent evidence for the conclusion that judgments and decisions aren't introspectable. Section 4 then replies to a number of objections to the argument, the most important of which is made from the perspective of so-called "dual systems theories" of belief formation and decision making, The upshot is a limited form of eliminativism about introspection, in respect of at least two core categories of propositional attitude.
    Epistemology of MindIntrospection and Introspectionism
  •  149
    Going through the open door again: Counterfactual versus singularist theories of causation
    In Gerhard Preyer & Frank Siebelt (eds.), Reality and Humean Supervenience: Essays on the Philosophy of David Lewis, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. 163--176. 2001.
    Laws as Relations between UniversalsDavid Lewis
  •  360
    God’s lottery
    with Storrs McCall
    Analysis 49 (4). 1989.
    The Infinite
  •  80
    Reply to Magalhães
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2). 2006.
  •  227
    The scope and limits of human knowledge
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2). 2006.
    This paper argues that the foundations of our knowledge are the bed-rock certainties of ordinary life, what may be called the Moorean truths. Beyond that are the well-established results within the empirical sciences, and whatever has been proved in the rational sciences of mathematics and logic. Otherwise there is only belief, which may be more or less rational. A moral drawn from this is that dogmatism should be moderated on all sides.
  •  216
    Arda Denkel's resemblance nominalism
    Philosophical Quarterly 41 (165): 478-482. 1991.
    Arda Denkel, in "Real Resemblances," argues for a moderate Nominalism where substances objectively have properties and relations, the latter being particulars, but dependent particulars, grouped into classes by objective relations of resemblance. This view is contrasted unfavorably with the view that properties and relations are universals instantiated by particulars. It is conceded that Denkel's scheme has much to commend it. But it is argued that the universals view has much more to be said fo…Read more
    Arda Denkel, in "Real Resemblances," argues for a moderate Nominalism where substances objectively have properties and relations, the latter being particulars, but dependent particulars, grouped into classes by objective relations of resemblance. This view is contrasted unfavorably with the view that properties and relations are universals instantiated by particulars. It is conceded that Denkel's scheme has much to commend it. But it is argued that the universals view has much more to be said for it than Denkel allows, and that it is indeed, on balance, the superior view.
    Property Nominalism
  •  198
    In defence of the cognitivist theory of perception
    Harvard Review of Philosophy 12 (1): 19-26. 2004.
    Intentionalist Theories of Perception
  •  10
    The 'form and pressure' of Australian philosophy (review)
    Quadrant 48 (10): 44-45. 2004.
    Australasian Philosophy, Misc
  •  4
    Classes Are States of Affairs
    Mind 100 (398): 189-200. 1991.
  • Dispositions: A Debate
    with C. B. Martin and U. T. Place
    Routledge. 2002.
    Dispositions are essential to our understanding of the world. _Dispositions: A Debate_ is an extended dialogue between three distinguished philosophers - D.M. Armstrong, C.B. Martin and U.T. Place - on the many problems associated with dispositions, which reveals their own distinctive accounts of the nature of dispositions. These are then linked to other issues such as the nature of mind, matter, universals, existence, laws of nature and causation.
  •  6
    Against Ostrich Nominalism: A Reply to Michael Devitt
    In David Hugh Mellor & Alex Oliver (eds.), Properties, Oxford University Press. 1997.
  •  193
    Appearance in this list does not preclude a future review of the book. Where they are known prices are given either in $ US or in£ UK. Books which are not, centrally, academic philosophy appear in a supplementary list at the end. Al Azmeh, Aziz, Ibn Khaldun, London, Routledge, 1990, 191pp., paper£ 8.95 Aldwinckle, Stella, Christ's Shadow in Plato's Cave, Oxford, The Amate Press (review)
    with Leonard Angel, Cambridge Cambridge, and M. C. Banner
    Mind 99 395. 1990.
  •  2
    The Mind-Body Problem: An Opinionated Introduction (Boulder: Westview, 1999); U. Place,'Thirty Years On: Is Consciousness Still a Brain Process?'
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (2). 1988.
    Philosophy of ConsciousnessPhysicalism about the Mind, Misc
  •  42
    Becoming Without Change: A New Reading of Parmenides
    This paper presents a philosophical response to the problem first articulated by Parmenides of the relationship between truth and appearance. The essay draws upon Heidegger's retrieval of aletheia as unconcealment to consider an epistemic interpretation of Parmenidean monism in which becoming occurs through disclosure and reality can be understood as having an underlying unity whilst understanding of that unity is historically and experientially disclosed.
    Epistemology
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