Bianca Cepollaro

In this paper we distinguish two dimensions in which the reclamation of slurs can succeed (or fail). By reclamation we refer to the linguistic practice whereby certain speakers employ slurs in order to express pride, foster camaraderie, manifest solidarity, subvert extant structures of discrimination, and so on. Reclamation can succeed, we propose, in at least two senses: in terms of felicity, insofar as a certain use of a slur counts as a move within a reclamatory practice; and in terms of accomplishment, insofar as it achieves the goals typically associated with reclamation. In the first part, we present the distinction between felicity and accomplishment. In the second, we show that it provides a deeper understanding of the worries and concerns to which reclamation may give rise within and outside the academic debate. This distinction thus constitutes a valuable addition to the theoretical toolkit for analyzing the phenomenon of reclamation.

In addition to its descriptive uses, ‘autistic’—originally a medical label—is also used pejoratively (against ingroups and outgroups), and has recently been proudly reclaimed, especially in connection with neurodiversity movements. This phenomenon raises interesting questions for the philosophical debate on pejoratives. In this paper, we focus on two such questions: (i) Is ‘autistic’ a pejorative term? And (ii), How is ‘autistic’ being reclaimed? As for (i), we argue that ‘autistic’ doesn’t look like a prototypical slur, nor like a prototypical ESTI (Ethnic/Social Term used as an Insult), nor like a derived pejorative, but displays a mixed behavior that approximates these kinds of terms. Our observations point towards the need for a broader conception of oppressive speech, beyond the most standard instances. As for (ii), we illustrate the analogies and disanalogies between the reclamation of ‘autistic’ and that of prototypical slurs. What’s peculiar about reclaimed uses of ‘autistic’ is that they do not merely respond to derogatory uses of the term that abuse ingroups, but they (also) react to the introduction of alternative expressions (like ‘person with autism’) that are perceived as offensively euphemistic. This work adds to the contemporary literature in social philosophy of language, by encouraging scholars to make room for terms that can be used pejoratively and display a peculiar mixed behavior. Moreover, it highlights a further function of reclamation that goes beyond repurposing pejorative labels, which is to reject certain euphemistic expressions by representing some ways of being and living as positive and legitimate.

In this paper I offer a brief introduction about what derogatory epithets are, how we use them and why they should ever interest philosophers of language and lin-guists; I will present three kinds of possible analyses of slurs, focusing on what kind of intui-tions they account for and what kind of problems they encounter. In the last session, I sketch the theory I defend: an analysis of slurs’ derogatory content in terms of presuppositions. Be-sides presenting the explanatory advantages of such approach, I briefly present the challenges this strategy faces and propose possible solutions to the main objections.

We present two experimental studies on the Italian expressive ‘stronzo’. The first study tests whether, and to which extent, the acceptability of using an expressive is sensitive to the information available in the context. The study looks both at referential uses of expressives and predicative uses of expressives. The results show that expressives are sensitive to contextual information to a much higher degree than the non-expressive control items in their referential use, but also, albeit to a lesser degree, in their predicative use. The second study tests whether the lower acceptability of expressives in their predicative use may be simply due to saying something negative about someone. A comparison between expressives, such as ‘jerk’, and non-expressive negative terms, such as ‘nasty’ or ‘unbearable’, suggests that it is the expressive nature of these terms, rather than the mere negative valence, that affects acceptability. Our studies present a major challenge to the existing accounts of expressives, and raise several theoretical issues that still call for an answer.

In this paper, we identify and examine an overlooked strategy to counter bigoted speech on the spot. Such a strategy we call ‘bending’. To ‘bend’, in our sense, is to deliberately give a distorted response to a speaker’s harmful move – precisely, an ameliorative response, which may turn that move into a different, less harmful, contribution. To substantiate our proposal, we distinguish two ideas of uptake – interpretation and response – and argue for the general claim that a distorted response on the hearer’s part may end up transforming a speaker’s contribution. Patterns of distortion have been analyzed in the literature as unjustly undermining speakers’ agency and exacerbating oppression. Our analysis shows that, under certain circumstances, distortion can be employed to derail bigoted speech and thus serve the purposes of social justice. We close by discussing the virtues and limits of bending vis-à-vis a different, much-discussed, counterspeech strategy, i.e. ‘blocking’ (Langton 2018).