Stanford University
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1998
Los Angeles, California, United States of America
  •  132
    Comments on John Fischer’s My Way
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1): 251-258. 2009.
  •  22
    Replies to Guerrero and Greenberg
    Jurisprudence 6 (1): 112-123. 2015.
  •  168
    Waldron's Locke and Locke's Waldron: A review of Jeremy Waldron's God, Locke, and equality (review)
    with Nomi M. Stolzenberg
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 49 (2). 2006.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  192
    Free will and agency at its best
    Philosopical Perspectives 14 (s14): 203-230. 2000.
  •  108
    Trying, Intending, and Attempted Crimes
    Philosophical Topics 32 (1-2): 505-531. 2004.
  •  113
    More Attempts: A Reply to Duff, Husak, Mele and Walen (review)
    Criminal Law and Philosophy 6 (3): 429-444. 2012.
    In this paper, I reply to the very thoughtful comments on my book by Antony Duff, Doug Husak, Al Mele and Alec Walen
  •  100
    In Defense of Criminal Possession
    Criminal Law and Philosophy 10 (3): 441-471. 2016.
    Criminal law casebooks and treatises frequently mention the possibility that criminal liability for possession is inconsistent with the Voluntary Act Requirement, which limits criminal liability to that which includes an act or an omission. This paper explains why criminal liability for possession is compatible with the Voluntary Act Requirement despite the fact that possession is a status. To make good on this claim, the paper defends the Voluntary Act Requirement, offers an account of the natu…Read more
  •  301
    Thomas Reid on consciousness and attention
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (2). 2009.
    It was common enough in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to find philosophers holding the position that for something to be ‘in the mind’ and for that mind to be conscious of it are one and the same thing. The thought is that consciousness is a relation between a mind and a mental entity playing the same role as the relation of inherence found between a substance and qualities belonging to it. What it is, on this view, for something to ‘inhere’ in the mind is for that mind to be consciou…Read more
  •  158
    Comment on Stephen Darwall’s The Second Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect and Accountability
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1): 246-252. 2010.
  •  163
    Gideon Yaffe presents a ground-breaking work which demonstrates the importance of philosophy of action for the law. Many people are serving sentences not for completing crimes, but for trying to. Yaffe's clear account of what it is to try to do something promises to resolve the difficulties courts face in the adjudication of attempted crimes.
  • Nicholas Jolley: Locke: His Philosophical Thought
    British Journal for the History of Philosophy 8 (2): 384-385. 2000.
  •  218
    Locke on ideas of substance and the veil of perception
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (3). 2004.
    John Yolton has argued that Locke held a direct realist position according to which sensory ideas are not perceived intermediaries, as on the representational realist position, but acts that take material substances as objects. This paper argues that were Locke to accept the position Yolton attributes to him he could not at once account for appearance‐reality discrepancies and maintain one of his most important anti‐nativist arguments. The paper goes on to offer an interpretation of Locke's dist…Read more
  •  73
    Free Will and Agency at its Best
    Noûs 34 (s14): 203-229. 2000.
  •  105
    Time in the movies
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 27 (1). 2003.
  •  124
    Reid on the Perception of Visible Figure
    Journal of Scottish Philosophy 1 (2): 103-115. 2003.
  • Thomas Reid: Context, Influence, Significance
    with Joseph Houston
    Philosophical Quarterly 56 (223): 297-300. 2006.
  •  149
    Manifest activity: Thomas Reid's theory of action
    Oxford University Press. 2004.
    Manifest Activity presents and critically examines the model of human power, the will, our capacities for purposeful conduct, and the place of our agency in the natural world of one of the most important and traditionally under-appreciated philosophers of the 18th century: Thomas Reid. For Reid, contrary to the view of many of his predecessors, it is simply manifest that we are active with respect to our behaviours; it is manifest, he thinks, that our actions are not merely remote products of fo…Read more
  •  113
    Intending to Aid
    Law and Philosophy 33 (1): 1-40. 2014.
    Courts and commentators are notoriously puzzled about the mens rea standards for complicity. Accomplices intend to aid, but what attitude need they have towards the crimes that they aid? This paper both criticizes extant accounts of the mens rea of complicity and offers a new account. The paper argues that an intention can commit one to an event’s occurrence without committing one to promoting the event, or making it more likely to take place. Under the proposed account of the mens rea of compli…Read more
  •  99
    Desert for Wrongdoing
    The Journal of Ethics 20 (1): 149-171. 2016.
    Much government and personal conduct is premised on the idea that a person made thereby to suffer deserves that suffering thanks to prior wrongdoing by him. Further, it often appears that one kind of suffering is more deserved than another and, in light of that, conduct inflicting the first is superior, or closer to being justified than conduct inflicting the second. Yet desert is mysterious. It is far from obvious what, exactly, it is. This paper offers and argues for a theory of comparative de…Read more
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