Stanford University
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1998
Los Angeles, California, United States of America
  •  79
    Free will and agency at its best
    Philosopical Perspectives 14 (s14): 203-230. 2000.
  •  20
    "the Government Beguiled Me": The Entrapment Defense and the Problem of Private Entrapment
    Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 (1): 1-50. 2005.
    Defendants who are being tried for accepting a temptation issued by the government sometimes employ the entrapment defense. Acquittal of some of them is thought to be justified either on the grounds that culpability was undermined by the temptation or on the grounds that the government acted objectionably in issuing the temptation . Advocates of the objective approach often criticize those who employ the subjective by citing what is here called “the problem of private entrapment”: we don’t grant…Read more
  •  32
    Book review (review)
    The Journal of Ethics 11 (4): 485-497. 2007.
  •  61
    Promises, social acts, and Reid's first argument for moral liberty
    Journal of the History of Philosophy 45 (2): 267-289. 2007.
    This paper is concerned to bring out the philosophical contribution that Thomas Reid makes in his discussions of promising. Reid discusses promising in two contexts: he argues that the practice of promising presupposes the belief that the promisor is endowed with what he calls 'active power' , and he argues against Hume's claim that the very act of promising—and the obligation to do as one promised—are "artificial," or the products of human convention . In addition to explaining what Reid says i…Read more
  • Thomas Reid: Context, Influence, Significance
    with Joseph Houston
    Philosophical Quarterly 56 (223): 297-300. 2006.
  •  36
    More Attempts: A Reply to Duff, Husak, Mele and Walen (review)
    Criminal Law and Philosophy 6 (3): 429-444. 2012.
    In this paper, I reply to the very thoughtful comments on my book by Antony Duff, Doug Husak, Al Mele and Alec Walen
  •  27
    In Defense of Criminal Possession
    Criminal Law and Philosophy 10 (3): 441-471. 2016.
    Criminal law casebooks and treatises frequently mention the possibility that criminal liability for possession is inconsistent with the Voluntary Act Requirement, which limits criminal liability to that which includes an act or an omission. This paper explains why criminal liability for possession is compatible with the Voluntary Act Requirement despite the fact that possession is a status. To make good on this claim, the paper defends the Voluntary Act Requirement, offers an account of the natu…Read more
  •  90
    Comment on Stephen Darwall's The Second Person Standpoint
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1): 246-252. 2010.
  •  77
    The Point of Mens Rea: The Case of Willful Ignorance
    Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (1): 19-44. 2018.
    Under the “Willful Ignorance Principle,” a defendant is guilty of a crime requiring knowledge he lacks provided he is ignorant thanks to having earlier omitted inquiry. In this paper, I offer a novel justification of this principle through application of the theory that knowledge matters to culpability because of how the knowing action manifests the agent’s failure to grant sufficient weight to other people’s interests. I show that, under a simple formal model that supports this theory, omitting…Read more
  •  4
    Replies to Guerrero and Greenberg
    Jurisprudence 6 (1): 112-123. 2015.
  •  34