James Fieser

The term "virtue" has traditionally been used to designate morally good character traits such as benevolence, charity, honesty, wisdom, and honor. Although ethicists do not commonly offer a definitive list of virtues, the number of virtues discussed is often short and their moral significance is clear. Hume's analysis of the virtues departs from this tradition both in terms of the quantity of virtues discussed and their obvious moral significance. A conservative estimate of the various virtues Hume refers to in his moral writings would put the number at around seventy, with the more untraditional ones including wit, good manners, and dialog. Unsurprisingly, Hume's critics have attacked him for making nonsense of the concept of virtue by construing it so widely. Hume was aware that his broad understanding of virtue was controversial and he offered several defenses for it. After presenting the neglected attacks of his contemporaries along with Hume's response, I argue that a problem remains: by failing to distinguish between degrees of virtue, Hume also fails to distinguish between degrees of vice. But, some vices clearly deserve punishment whereas other alleged vices clearly do not. Thus, for adequate retribution, a distinction is needed between important and less important virtues and vices. I conclude that Hume could have used his own account of instinctive vengeance as a natural indicator for distinguishing between important and unimportant vices.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Religion and Faction in Hume’s Moral Philosophy by Jennifer A. HerdtJames FieserJennifer A. Herdt. Religion and Faction in Hume’s Moral Philosophy. Studies in Religion and Critical Thought 3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Pp. xv + 300. Cloth, $59.95.Jennifer A. Herdt’s book, Religion and Faction in Hume’s Moral Philosophy, is a study of Hume’s notion of sympathy. It is not, however, just an analysis of the psychological mechanism of sympathy as expounded in Books II and III of the Treatise. For Herdt, sympathy plays a crucial role in Hume’s vision of how to combat many social ills, especially the effects of religious fanaticism, and Hume self-consciously drew on the notion of sympathy to secularize discourse about morality and social responsibility. Awareness of Hume’s use of sympathy illuminates Hume’s critique of religion and it also casts new light on the philosophical merits of Hume’s History. Herdt notes that, according to most Hume commentators, Hume’s attacks on religion were driven by epistemological problems arising from attempts at rationally justifying religion. According to Herdt, though, the unfortunate effects of religion on society more directly motivated Hume’s religious critique. Hume exposes these effects in his History, and offers sympathy as an antidote to religious fanaticism. Hume is not merely a vocal philosophical critic of religion, but he is also a social reformer attempting to advance peace and prosperity in Scotland.The key to Herdt’s interpretation is Hume’s distinction between limited and extensive sympathy (T 384–389). Briefly, for Hume, the degree to which I sympathetically commiserate with you hinges on both the degree of your misery and my relation to you. Herdt refines Hume’s notions of sympathy, distinguishing between active/passive sympathy, occurrent/dispositional sympathy, weak/strong sympathy, the sympathetic understanding, and the sympathetic imagination. In essence, there are both bad and good social aspects of the various types of sympathy. A bad social aspect is when sympathy is only a superficial emotional contagion, which can even breed religious fanaticism. The principal good social aspect is when sympathy becomes more generalized and gives rise to a sense of concern for the well-being of others. Herdt’s refinement of Hume’s sympathy vocabulary is both textually justified and an important aid in understanding the various technical senses of sympathy especially in Hume’s Treatise. Herdt argues that, after the moral Enquiry, Hume’s use of the term “sympathy” diminished, and when he did use it he meant it mainly in the sense of limited sympathy. Herdt believes, though, that the fundamental conception of extended and general sympathy is a running theme in the History.Hume’s later use of the term “sympathy” is not quite as diminished as Herdt contends. By consulting a text file database of Hume’s writings, we can quickly spot the frequency with which Hume used both the term “sympathy” and the related word “compassion”: Treatise: sympathy (150), compassion (8), First Enquiry: sympathy (6), Second Enquiry: sympathy (26), compassion (9), “Of Tragedy:” sympathy (4), compassion (6), “Dissertation on the Passions:” sympathy (3), compassion (8), Natural History of Religion: sympathy (3), History: Sympathy (25); compassion (54). Additionally, about twelve of Hume’s essays contain one or two occurrences each of either the words “sympathy” or “compassion.” Examination of the various occurrences of these terms shows that Hume [End Page 170] sometimes had in mind a technical notion of sympathy and other times a colloquial notion. The technical notion typically makes a psychological point, such as the discussion at T 384–389. We find the technical notion largely in the Treatise and the Moral Enquiry, with more isolated discussions in the Natural History of Religion, “Of Tragedy,” the “Dissertation on the Passions,” and a letter to Adam Smith on July 28, 1759.By contrast, Hume’s more colloquial uses of “sympathy” and “compassion” usually appear alongside other terms, such as fellow-feeling, cordial affection, humanity, friendship, mutual attachment, and fidelity. The colloquial use is also sometimes designated in the phrases “sympathy of manners” and “sympathy of character.” Hume’s use of the terms “sympathy” and “compassion” in the History are virtually all...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:93 HUME'S PYRRHONISM: A DEVELOPMENTAL INTERPRETATION* Hume's approach to philosophical problems is unique. Whether the issue is causality, external objects, or personal identity, we find the same approach. He begins by launching devastating attacks against popular theories. He then convinces us that his solution to the issue at hand is the only one that makes sense. But, then, he dashes our hopes by arguing that even his solutions contain 'contradictions', 'manifest absurdities', 'obscurities', and 'perplexities '. In short, Hume is a skeptic in the Pyrrhonian tradition in his belief that fundamental aspects of the human understanding are wrought with contradiction. Commentators invariably recognize these contradictions in Hume's writings, but further explanation is desirable. What are these contradictions which Hume finds inevitable, and when do they arise? This is the question I will try to answer. The answer is no less intriguing than Hume himself, for throughout his philosophical career, Hume continually discovered new contradictions. I will be arguing for a developmental interpretation of Hume's Pyrrhonism, the key area of change involving a contradiction with morality. Briefly, I will argue that in the main text of the Treatise. Hume discovers contradictions in areas involving external objects and causality, but denies that contradictions arise with morality. For, insofar as morality involves only the world of mental events, he believes it to be free from contradiction. However, in his discussion of 'the self in the Appendix to the Treatise, he changes his position and asserts that contradictions arise even for the world of mental events. In the conclusion to his second Enquiry, Hume 94 extends this Pyrrhonism even further in the face of another contradiction, this time directly involving morality. Thus, where Hume rejects Pyrrhonian moral skepticism in the Treatise, he comes to affirm it in the second Enquiry. I conclude by comparing Hume's lists of contradictions in the Treatise and first Enquiry showing that, again, Hume expanded the realm of Pyrrhonism. What I have been calling 'Pyrrhonism' (skepticism involving the discovery of contradictions) Hume also calls 'excessive consequential skepticism'. Some background here will be helpful. 'Excessive consequential skepticism' refers to the negative conclusions that skeptics come to at the end of an investigation, because of "either the absolute fallaciousness of their mental faculties, or their unfitness to reach any fixed determination in all those curious subjects of speculation, about which they are commonly employed" (E 150). Here the skeptic is at his strongest since, for a certain class of epistemological Iy foundational propositions P. (such as the existence of external objects), the best evidence supporting P also emplies 'not P.'. Hume notes, though, that this excessive skepticism, even when securely argued, cannot be followed in practice since it runs counter to our common experiences. It is a theoretical enterprise, and Hume objects strongly to those who recommend cynicism in such matters. Hume's excessive consequential skepticism (which is purely theoretical) stands in contrast to what he calls moderate consequential skepticism. This moderate variety involves two practical lessons which can be learned from Pyrrhonism or extreme theoretical skepticism. These lessons are what Flew has recently called Hume's effort at the 95 Containment of his skepticism. First, the philosopher should entertain "a degree of doubt, and caution, and modesty, which, in all kinds of scrutiny and decision, ought for ever to accompany a just reasoner" (E 162). Second, philosophers should limit their inquiries so they will "never be tempted to go beyond common life, so long as they consider the imperfection of those faculties which they employ, their narrow reach, and their inaccurate operations" (E 162). Although Hume opts for moderate skepticism, he makes it quite clear that the moderate variety is "the result of this Pyrrhonism, or excessive scepticism, when its undistinguished doubts are, in some measure, corrected by common sense and reflection" (E 161). In other words, Hume's moderate skepticism must presuppose the theoretical legitimacy of the contradictions that the excessive skeptic uncovers. The moderate skeptic, though, does not carry these problems over into common life. Thus, broadly construed, consequential skepticism involves three features: (1) the discovery of a contradiction within the understanding (excessivetheoretical ), (2) a recommendation for philosophical modesty (moderate-practical), and (3) a recommendation...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume XX, Number 1, April 1994, pp. 73-84 Beattie's Lost Letter to the London Review JAMES FIESER The most well known written attack on Hume's philosophy during his life was James Beattie's Essay on the nature and immutability of truth (1770). Beattie's target was Hume's Treatise and its skeptical discussions of personal identity, the origin of ideas, causality, and virtue. His Essay was highly praised and resulted in a yearly pension from King George III. Hume is reported to have reacted with anger to the publication of the Essay,1 and Hume's advocates retaliated by charging Beattie with unjustly abusing Hume. One such advocate was the London Review. The last issue of the London Review contains an editorial response to a letter they received from James Beattie. The context of the London Review response indicates that Beattie's letter was to have been printed in that journal. Strangely, however, the letter never appeared. Enough detail is provided in the London Review's response to reconstruct the thrust of Beattie's letter: Beattie contends that, contrary to the London Review's accusations, he did not abuse Hume in the Essay, and that Hume's criticisms of Beattie's poetic writings were based on prejudice. The letter is important since it represents Beattie's only attempt at a public defense of his treatment of Hume, and an explanation of Hume's unfavorable reaction to his poetical writings. After presenting the London Review's "Answer," I will discuss the nature of the conflict between Beattie and the London Review, and reconstruct the key James Fieser is at the Department of Philosophy, University of Tennessee at Martin, Martin, TN 38238 USA. e-mail: [email protected] 74 James Fieser points in Beattie's letter. It will be helpful to begin with background on the London Review itself. The London review of English and foreign literature was founded in January 1775 by William Kenrick as a monthly book review journal styled after, and in competition with, the Monthly Review and Critical Review. The review lasted for twelve Volumes with its final issue in December 1780. Kenrick, born in 1725, reviewed for the Monthly Review for seven years and was himself the author of books and articles on a range of subjects. As early as 1759 Kenrick voices his praise for Hume in an article for the Monthly Review, referring to him as a "masterly writer."2 Kenrick had a reputation for maliciously and deceptively provoking disputes with other writers, including Johnson, Garrick, and Goldsmith. Unlike the Monthly Review and Critical Review, which zealously preserved the anonymity of their reviewers,3 the London Review hinted at the authorship of their reviews by providing a single initial at the close of each article. The initial "W" refers to Kenrick himself. Kenrick's son, William Shakespeare Kenrick, assumed editorship of the journal when Kenrick was taken ill in the Spring of 1779 and after his death in June 1779. The Response to Beattie's Letter The reply to Beattie's letter appeared as the final item in the July 1780 issue of the London Review under the heading "Correspondences," and under the subheading "Answer to an Extract from a Letter from Dr. Beattie." The complete reply is as follows: Having, we apprehend, done Dr. Beattie ample justice by publishing his defence, let us now be equally just to the memory of a man who can no longer defend himself. Dr. Beattie's defence charges Mr. Hume with the meanness of contradicting himself in a fit of disgust, and of being swayed by passion in pronouncing sentence upon his poetical works. Till he produces his evidence, this attack upon the established character of Mr. Hume will have but little weight with the public, who have been long apprised of his exemplary probity, and strict honour. Why should Dr. Beattie suppose that we should be misinformed by a disinterested person, and desire us to disbelieve his testimony, when he would have us believe himself, who is not disinterested? Does he wish to prove that "we believe in all unbelief?" The Dr. says, "I never had any personal pique at Mr. Hume...

This bibliography covers the Hume literature for 2010, and follows upon the annual update begun by Rolland Hall for the years 1977 through 1985 and continued by William Edward Morris for 1986 through 2003. This installment, like previous ones, excludes items published in Hume Studies, which are indexed annually in each November issue. Readers of Hume Studies may contact me at [email protected] with additions or corrections to any previous year, which can be noted in future installments. I am grateful to all who have provided input on an earlier draft of this bibliography that was posted on the Internet. Aside from the yearly bibliographies published in Hume Studies, readers may find the following bibliographical ..

The Scottish Common Sense School of philosophy emerged during the Scottish Enlightenment of the second half of the eighteenth century. The School’s principal proponents were Thomas Reid, James Oswald, James Beattie and Dugald Stewart. They believed that we are all naturally implanted with an array of common sense intuitions and these intuitions are in fact the foundation of truth. Their approach dominated philosophical thought in Great Britain and the United States until the mid nineteenth century. In recent years philosophers have renewed their appreciation of the notion of common sense. In particular, discussions of common sense intuitions are integral to contemporary epistemological foundationalism. Scottish Common Sense Philosophy: Sources and Origins is a 5-volume collection of writings by and about philosophers in the eighteenth-century Scottish Common Sense School. The writings by Thomas Reid and Dugald Stewart are readily available in recent editions and facsimile reprints so this series focuses on less accessible and less well-known items. Oswald’s Appeal appears here in print for the first time in any form since 1772. Volume 2 is the first reset printing of Beattie’s Essay in over 100 years, and is the only edition to contain annotations that trace the major changes that he made to the text. Almost all of the responses in volumes 3 and 4 appear here in print for the first time since their original publication. These include reviews, pamphlets and excerpts from books. Also included is previously unpublished discussion of Beattie’s Essay by Dugald Stewart. The final volume is a bibliography of around 80 Scottish philosophers from the early eighteenth century to the close of the nineteenth century. Unlike the 1932 bibliography of Scottish philosophers offered by T. E. Jessop, which selectively presents only the philosophical writings by the various Scottish philosophers, this volume attempts to catalogue all of the writings by these philosophers in all of their editions.