Rajiv Kaushik

The turn away from phenomenology in 20th century French philosophy was in large part due to an increased emphasis on Ferdinand de Saussure’s notion of “linguistic structure”, i.e., that language is the internal system of differences between signs. Thinkers such as Paul Ricoeur and Jean-François Lyotard famously offered a “semiological challenge” to phenomenology. The idea was that phenomenology, especially Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, reduces to the sensible world and cannot think linguistic structure. Thus, the argument goes that phenomenology leaves out a basic element of human life: not only can it not think linguistic structure, but it also cannot think about elements, e.g., writing and text, which are its result. This paper takes up this challenge, especially in reference to Merleau-Ponty’s terminology in Phenomenology of Perception of “speaking speech” (parole parlante) and “spoken speech” (parole parlée). I point out that, in retrospect of his later work, Merleau-Ponty very clearly did want to take linguistic structure seriously. This, however, means that we need to reconsider some of the basic themes in his work. Taking inspiration from the recently published “problem of speech” lectures, I reconstruct Merleau-Ponty’s idea that speech is a concrete limit situation from which we get both the idea of a language structure in which there are differences and of an ontological difference between being and beings. This is an internal criticism of both linguistic structure and formal ontology. I begin the paper by noting that, in Merleau-Ponty’s descriptions of the tacit and spoken cogito, also in Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty criticizes the notion of a subject to which language refers and highlights the notion of a subject that defies representational and denotational structure. I do not, however, go along with Merleau-Ponty’s own criticism of the tacit ego, which he ultimately declared too subjectivistic. Ultimately, I hope to stress the importance of linguistic structure and writing in Merleau-Ponty’s ontology. This is an ontology of that is fragile and requires symbolization. This paper emphasizes under-developed themes in Merleau-Ponty’s work such as bodily event, difference, symbolization, and the writing of philosophy.

This chapter introduces the book. It gives an outline of the chapters. Before this, it gives some historical context to the writing of the Preface of Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception. The chapter also discusses Merleau-Ponty’s own criticism of Phenomenology of Perception in his later work, The Visible and the Invisible. There, Merleau-Ponty finds his term “tacit ego” problematic. I argue that this does not mean we need to abandon the earlier phenomenology in favor of the later ontology, that the Preface is already on the way to an ontological articulation of phenomenology which is unique to Merleau-Ponty.

In a Working Note to The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty uses the fine phraseology of an “architectonic past” and a “mythical time” to describe Proust’s remembrances of things past. This paper first considers how this architectonic past sheds light on Merleau-Ponty’s ontology, and second how this results in a mythical time, which is an originary encounter with this past. Paying also attention to Merleau-Ponty’s final, completed reflections on “Swann’s Way,” Volume One of Remembrances of Things Past, I suggest that by exposing the inner-connection between the two senses of time, Proust is highly significant for Merleau-Ponty’s thesis of “reversibility”. Proustian remembrances are used by Merleau-Ponty not to expose an inwardness, but something that is withdrawn and behind the sensible. The way in which these remembrances operate in myth time bespeaks of a memorial dimension of the past of being itself.