Rajiv Kaushik

Merleau-Ponty famously states in the Preface that phenomenology’s greatest insight is that the phenomenological reduction cannot be completed. This is due to the upsurge of the world and its constant and ongoing interception of consciousness.Merleau-Ponty’s early work is often compared to his later work by stressing an increasing reliance on Heidegger’s ontology. But, according to Merleau-Ponty’s articulations of the reduction and the upsurge of the world, the Preface in fact indicates an ontology distinct from Heidegger’s, what Merleau-Ponty will later call the “indirect ontology.” If the reduction cannot be completed, it is because of an existence that likewise cannot be complete and is irreducible. Rather than suggesting the possibility of a “Being of beings” (as in Heidegger), the incompletion, both of the reduction and of the existence, already moves in the direction of Merleau-Ponty’s later terminology, for example, “écart,” “fragmentation,” “dehiscence,” “explosion,” or “promiscuity.” This is not an ontology that demands to be completed but the ontology of a being that can never be directly acquired.

The struggle to “adapt” to the presence of the corpse serves as the central turning point for this investigation into the theatrical encounters with the corpse in the early modern anatomy theatre. Beginning with novelist W.G. Sebald’s claim, in The Rings of Saturn, that the art of anatomy was a way of “making the reprobate body invisible,” Alvarez queries how the corpse as the central “gure of this theatrical space challenges conventional modes of theatrical looking and how the particular viewing procedures invited by the anatomy theatre, as a theatrical space, effectively make the body “unseen.” Using Restoration diarist Samuel Pepys’ documented encounter with a corpse and the early phenomenologist Aurel Kolnai’s writings On Disgust, Alvarez attempts to account for the “perceptual and interpretive black hole” that the corpse presents in this schema. The corpse’s “radical actuality” and, paradoxically, its “surplus of life” act as a cipher that cuts through the virtual space constructed by the anatomical demonstration, undermining the gravitas of the scientific gaze that has acquired its weight in contradistinction to the theatricality of the event. But the corpse’s “radical actuality” and its “surplus of life” introduces a danse macabre of theatrical looking that moves between absorption and repulsion, reversing the otherwise consumptive gaze of the onlooker.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty is widely recognized as one of the major figures of twentieth-century philosophy. The recent publication of his lecture courses and posthumous working notes has opened new avenues for both the interpretation of his thought and philosophy in general. These works confirm that, with a surprising premonition, Merleau-Ponty addressed many of the issues that concern philosophy today. With the benefit of this fuller picture of his thought, Merleau-Ponty and Contemporary Philosophy undertakes an assessment of the philosopher's relevance for contemporary thinking. Covering a diverse range of topics, including ontology, epistemology, anthropology, embodiment, animality, politics, language, aesthetics, and art, the editors gather representative voices from North America and Europe, including both Merleau-Ponty specialists and thinkers who have come to the philosopher's work through their own thematic interest.

In a Working Note to The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty uses the fine phraseology of an “architectonic past” and a “mythical time” to describe Proust’s remembrances of things past. This paper first considers how this architectonic past sheds light on Merleau-Ponty’s ontology, and second how this results in a mythical time, which is an originary encounter with this past. Paying also attention to Merleau-Ponty’s final, completed reflections on “Swann’s Way,” Volume One of Remembrances of Things Past, I suggest that by exposing the inner-connection between the two senses of time, Proust is highly significant for Merleau-Ponty’s thesis of “reversibility”. Proustian remembrances are used by Merleau-Ponty not to expose an inwardness, but something that is withdrawn and behind the sensible. The way in which these remembrances operate in myth time bespeaks of a memorial dimension of the past of being itself.