•  219
    The nature of number
    Philosophical Papers 16 (3): 165-186. 1987.
    The article develops and extends the theory of Glenn Kessler (Frege, Mill and the foundations of arithmetic, Journal of Philosophy 77, 1980) that a (cardinal) number is a relation between a heap and a unit-making property that structures the heap. For example, the relation between some swan body mass and "being a swan on the lake" could be 4.
  •  7
    Supertasks and material objects
    Logique Et Analyse 166 (167): 441-446. 1999.
  •  346
    Ways worlds could be
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (1). 1986.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  • The Tree of Life: Agency and Immortality in a Metaphysics Inspired by Quantum Theory
    In Peter van Inwagen & Dean Zimmerman (eds.), Persons: Human and Divine, Oxford University Press Uk. pp. 245-253. 2007.
  •  95
    Towards an epistemology of religious traditions
    Sophia 38 (1): 25-40. 1999.
    Starting from the acceptance of the Egalitarian Principle I exhibited a version which I considered too lax (BEP) and one I considered too strict (NEP), arriving at a version (MEP) which allows that there can be tolerance-limiting reasons for adhering to traditions but only if they are based on unreasoned knowledge claims. In fact, I hold that the situation most of us find ourselves in restricts such claims on religious topics to very general ones. Hence the choice between NEP and MEP is not sign…Read more
  •  178
    Several authors, including Stephen Law in this journal, have argued that the case for an evil God is (about) as strong as for a good God. In this article I take up the challenge on behalf of theists who, like Richard Swinburne, argue for an agent of unrestricted power and knowledge as the ultimate explanation of all contingent truths. I shall argue that an evil God is much less probable than a good one. I do so by (1) distinguishing the analogical predication of 'good' or 'evil' of God from the …Read more
  •  216
    Nonclassical Mereology and Its Application to Sets
    Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 43 (2): 79-94. 2002.
    Part One of this paper is a case against classical mereology and for Heyting mereology. This case proceeds by first undermining the appeal of classical mereology and then showing how it fails to cohere with our intuitions about a measure of quantity. Part Two shows how Heyting mereology provides an account of sets and classes without resort to any nonmereological primitive
  •  494
    Chris Heathwood requires the sentence 'Caesar was conscious when he crossed the Rubicon' to be made true in much the same way as 'Caesar was wet when he crossed the Rubicon'. Yet because the Growing Block theorist is committed to the zombiedom of the past,the former is not made true by past objects, although the latter is. Heathwood demands a uniform account of the grounding of truths and he will be given a uniform account. But we should exercise care in deciding just what sort of uniformity is …Read more
  •  90
    In this paper, I present a piece of natural theology, whose pro tanto conclusion is the existence of god-the-artist, that is a lower case “g” god, a creator who creates for the sake of beauty, but who is not worthy of worship, a god who can be admired but should not be loved. I then consider some only partially successful responses to this dismal conclusion. Finally, I show to reconcile the idea of a god motivated by love of beauty with the religious tradition of an upper case “G” God, who is no…Read more
  •  133
    Space curvature and repeatable properties: Mormann's perspectival theory
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (2). 1996.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  206
    In this book Timothy O’Connor combines an investigation of modal epistemology with a fresh look at the traditional contingency version of the cosmological argument. The connection between the two parts is that he defends the practice of hypothesizing necessities for explanatory purposes, resisting those accounts that link possibility too closely to conceivability. This provides the context in which he asks the existence question, ‘Why do the particular contingent objects there are exist and unde…Read more
  •  59
    The personal pantheist conception of God
    In Andrei Buckareff & Yujin Nagasawa (eds.), Alternative Concepts of God: Essays on the Metaphysics of the Divine, Oxford University Press. pp. 21-40. 2016.
    This chapter is a case for the pantheist conception considered as a species of theism, rather than a rival to it. The starting point, the premise of the argument, is properly anthropomorphic metaphysics, which I propose as a rival to scientific naturalism; I begin, then, by stating my version of pantheism, by expounding PAM, and by sketching my argument
  •  258
    The mereology of structural universals
    Logic and Logical Philosophy 25 (3): 259-283. 2016.
    This paper explores the mereology of structural universals, using the structural richness of a non-classical mereology without unique fusions. The paper focuses on a problem posed by David Lewis, who using the example of methane, and assuming classical mereology, argues against any purely mereological theory of structural universals. The problem is that being a methane molecule would have to contain being a hydrogen atom four times over, but mereology does not have the concept of the same part o…Read more
  •  1
    The Epistemology of Religion
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 1997.
  •  233
    Universals as Sense‐data
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3): 622-631. 2007.
    This paper concerns the structure of appearances. I argue that to be appeared to in a certain way is to be aware of one or more universals. Universals therefore function like the sense‐data, once highly favoured but now out of fashion. For instance, to be appeared to treely, in a visual way, is to be aware of the complex relation, being tree‐shaped and tree‐coloured and being in front of, a relation of a kind which could be instantiated by a material object and a perceiver, which is thus instant…Read more
  •  790
    In "How Do We Know It Is Now Now?" David Braddon-Mitchell (Analysis 2004) develops an objection to the thesis that the past is real but the future is not. He notes my response to this, namely that the past, although real, is lifeless and (a fortiori?) lacking in sentience. He argues, however, that this response, which I call 'the past is dead hypothesis', is not tenable if combined with 'special relativity'. My purpose in this reply is to argue that, on the contrary, 'special relativity' support…Read more
  •  283
    The fixed and the zerked
    Mind 96 (382): 245-246. 1987.
  •  207
    In his recent paper in Sophia , ‘Theodicy: The Solution to the Problem of Evil, or Part of the Problem?’ Nick Trakakis endorses the position that theodicy, whether intellectually successful or not, is a morally obnoxious enterprise. My aim in this paper is to defend theodicy from this accusation. I concede that God the Creator is a moral monster by human standards and neither to be likened to a loving parent nor imitated. Nonetheless, God is morally perfect. What is abhorrent is not tough-minded…Read more
  •  200
    The epistemology of religion
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2008.
    Contemporary epistemology of religion may conveniently be treated as adebate over whether evidentialism applies to thebelief-component of religious faith, or whether we should insteadadopt a more permissive epistemology. Here evidentialism is theinitially plausible position that a belief is justified only if``it is proportioned to the evidence''. For example, supposea local weather forecaster has noticed that over the two hundred yearssince records began a wetter than average Winter is followed …Read more
  •  176
    Neither magic nor mereology: A reply to Lewis
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (1). 1986.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  113
    Methodological Naturalism Undercuts Ontological Naturalism
    American Philosophical Quarterly 60 (1): 99-110. 2023.
    Naturalism, as I understand it, includes cosmological naturalism, ontological naturalism and methodological naturalism. After clarifying these three theses I argue that the combination of ontological with methodological naturalism is untenable. I do so by providing a pro tanto case against ontological naturalism and show that it can be resisted, but only by abandoning methodological naturalism. The pro tanto case is that ontological naturalism requires a version of what I call Redundancy Nominal…Read more
  •  51
    Heterodox Probability Theory
    In Dale Jacquette (ed.), A Companion to Philosophical Logic, Wiley-blackwell. 2007.
    This chapter contains sections titled: The Bayesian Orthodoxy Idealization Two Approaches to a Theory of Probability Adjustment for Nonclassical Logics Carnap's Confirmation Theory Proportional Syllogisms Kyburg's Fuzzy Probabilities Levi's Indeterminate Systems Qualitative Theories of Probability The Dynamics of Subjective Probability Probability Theory and Quantum Theory.
  •  168
    Pantheism and Science
    The Monist 80 (2): 307-319. 1997.
    Does contemporary science tend to favour pantheism over its rivals or vice versa? Here I take the rivals to be the other members of a five-point spectrum: atheism, polytheism, pantheism, panentheism, and transcendent theism. And the features of contemporary science that I shall consider are: that the Universe has only existed for a finite time; that the Universe is expanding; that there are ubiquitous and pervasive laws of nature; and the ‘fine tuning’ required for life.
  •  117
    Operators Solve the Many Categories Problem with Universals
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (5): 747-762. 2018.
    ABSTRACTBy the Many Categories problem, I mean the prima facie violation of Ockham’s Razor by realists about universals: there is, it might seem, just too much variety. Thus, David Armstrong posits both properties and relations. He also theorises about determinates of determinables. Another influential realist, E. J. Lowe distinguishes non-substantial from substantial universals. Yet again, both Armstrong and Lowe include in their ontology abstract particulars in addition to universals. My aim i…Read more