•  1517
    Introspection, Phenomenality, and the Availability of Intentional Content
    In Tim Bayne & Michelle Montague (eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology, Oxford University Press Uk. pp. 141-173. 2011.
    Some analytic philosophers have recently been defending the thesis that there’s “something it’s like” to consciously think a particular thought, which is qualitatively different from what it’s like to be in any other kind of conscious mental state and from what it’s like to think any other thought, and which constitutes the thought’s intentional content. (I call this the “intentional phenomenology thesis”). One objection to this thesis concerns the introspective availability of such content: …Read more
  •  815
    Mental Representation
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2020.
    The notion of a "mental representation" is, arguably, in the first instance a theoretical construct of cognitive science. As such, it is a basic concept of the Computational Theory of Mind, according to which cognitive states and processes are constituted by the occurrence, transformation and storage (in the mind/brain) of information-bearing structures (representations) of one kind or another