Daryl Pullman

This paper explores the problem of universalism and particularism in contemporary ethics, and its relationship to Christian bioethics in particular. An ethic of human dignity is outlined, which, it is argued, constrains moral discourse in the broad sense – thus meeting the demands of universalism – but which is at the same time amenable to a variety of particularist interpretations – thus acknowledging the current shift toward historicism, traditionalism, and culture. The particularist interpretations that are of central concern here are those provided by historic Christianity. The eventual goal is to indicate how a Christian conception of human dignity can have universal normative relevance both as a standard against which to assess competing particularist conceptions, and as a practical guide for everyday living. A Christian conception of dignity will in turn have significant implications when addressing contemporary issues in bioethics. These are ambitious goals, and a full explication of the ideas presented will not be possible in this context. Nevertheless, there is value in getting a bird's-eye view of the landscape before one goes about scaling the mountains and exploring the valleys. The present essay is intended as a general geography of the moral terrain in which an ethic of dignity in general, and a Christian perspective on dignity in particular, can provide normative guidance.

Le concept de dignité humaine occupe une place prépondérante dans les débats sur l’aide médicale à mourir. Pourtant, la notion de « dignité » est souvent ambiguë. Cet article vise à clarifier une partie de cette ambiguïté en distinguant deux conceptions différentes mais liées de la dignité, l’une étant une notion fondamentalement morale (« Dignité » — majuscule) et l’autre une conception plus esthétique (« dignité » — minuscule). La relation dynamique qui existe entre la notion morale de « Dignité » et son pendant esthétique (« dignité ») est examinée. Si une société pluraliste a besoin des deux notions, seule la notion morale objective (Dignité) est adéquate pour servir de fondement à un régime juridique fondamental. Si toute société pluraliste doit offrir des possibilités d’expression des notions esthétiques subjectives de dignité, ces dernières ne peuvent ni servir de fondement à une éthique publique globale en général, ni définir les paramètres d’une politique publique en matière d’homicide médicalisé. En effet, l’expansion sans limite d’une notion particulière de « dignité » menace d’effacer la conception plus fondamentale de la Dignité qui sert de fondement à toute société démocratique libérale.

The author examines fundamental problems involved in teaching applied ethics in the educational environment of contemporary university culture. American universities are increasingly turning away from liberal arts education and focusing their efforts on constructing more professionalized degrees and programs. As a result, the education process has become increasingly commodified and ethics courses in universities have been further removed from the liberal arts project of moral development in the classroom. The author argues that ethicists should work to reframe the project of moral education if they hope to retain a central role in the process of teaching ethics. The author suggests a growth model to be installed in the undergraduate curriculum that would reacquaint students with the aims and benefits of learning ethical and moral philosophy.