Kathrin Glüer

Realists about color, be they dispositionalists or physicalists, agree on the truth of the following claim: (R) x is red iff x is disposed to look red under standard conditions. The disagreement is only about whether to identify the colors with the relevant dispositions, or with their categorical bases. This is a question about the representational content of color experience: What kind of properties do color experiences ascribe to objects? It has been argued (for instance by Boghossian and Velleman, 1991) that truths like (R) cannot be used in an account of the colors as they would result in ‚circular’, and therefore empty, contents. It has also been argued (for instance by Harman, 1996) that switching to an account of color in terms of a functional account of color sensations would result in a circular, and therefore empty, account. In this paper, I defend a realist account of color in terms of a (non-reductive) functional account of color sensations. Such an account of sensations has been suggested by Pagin (2000), and it can be applied to color sensations without the resulting account of the colors themselves being circular or empty. I argue that the so-called transparency of experience does not provide any argument against such an account. I also argue that on such an account, the issue of physicalism vs. dispositionalism boils down to the question of the modal profile of the color concepts.

In earlier work (Glüer, K. and P. Pagin. 2006. Proper names and relational modality. Linguistics & Philosophy 29: 507–35; Glüer, K. and P. Pagin. 2008. Relational modality. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 17: 307–22), we developed a semantics for (metaphysical) modal operators that accommodates Kripkean intuitions about proper names in modal contexts even if names are not rigid designators. Graeme Forbes (2011. The problem of factives for sense theories. Analysis 71: 654–62.) criticizes our proposal. He argues that our semantics predicts readings for certain natural language sentences which these simply do not have. These sentences contain mixed contexts involving factive attitude verbs. We argue that the readings our semantics predicts do indeed exist, even if it might take a little work to bring them out. Moreover, denying their existence would have some rather unattractive consequences

A natural way of understanding (non-epistemic) looks talk in natural language is phenomenalist: to ascribe looks to objects is to say something about the way they strike us when we look at them. This explains why the truth values of looks-sentences intuitively vary with the circumstances with respect to which they are evaluated. But Mike Martin (2010) argues that there is no semantic reason to prefer a phenomenalist understanding of looks to “Parsimony”, the position according to which looks are basic visible properties. He suggests a semantics for looks-sentences that explains their intuitive truth values and is compatible with Parsimony. I argue that there is semantic reason to prefer a phenomenalist understanding of looks to a parsimonious one since there is a simpler semantics compatible with a phenomenalist understanding of looks, but not with Parsimony. This semantics provides a better explanation of the relevant truth value distribution

Die Arbeit wendet sich einem zentralen Problem der Modernen Sprachphilosophie zu. Mit Kripkes 'Wittgenstein' hat die Sprachphilosophie einen neuen Slogan erhalten: Beudeutung ist normativ. Dass die Sprache nicht naturlich, sondern konventionell sei, gehort dabei seit der griechischen Sophistik zu den Binsenweisheiten dieses Zweigs der Philosophie. Sehen wir jedoch mit Wittgenstein sprachliche Bedeutung als durch den Gebrauch sprachlicher Ausdrucke bestimmt an, wird daraus schnell die These, es seien die 'Regeln' fur den Gebrauch solcher Ausdrucke, die deren Bedeutung bestimmen, die - mit anderen Worten - bestimmen, was korrekter und was inkorrekter Gebrauch ist. Als Normativthese reformuliert, findet die antike Binsenweisheit so auch in der aktuellen Kontroverse breiten Konsens, eint sie Sprachphilosophen unterschiedlicher Couleur. In Auseinadnersetzung u.a. mit Dummett, Kripke, McDowell, Putnam und Wittgenstein arbeitet Kathrin Gluer nicht nur heraus, dass dieser Konsens aufgrund der Unterschiedlichkeit der dabei in Anspruch genommenen Normativitatsverstandnisse ein scheinbarer isr. Daruber hinaus argumentiert sie, an der Normativitatsthese selbst sei so gut wie alles falsch. Auf der Grundlage eines teilweise an der Philosophie Davidsons orientierten nicht-reduktiven Verstandnisses von Bedeutung und Intentionalitat zeige sich vielmehr, dass Normen oder Regeln nicht in den elementaren "Zirkel" intentionaler Begriffe gehoren. Bei der Untersuchung dieser Fragen erweisen sich Sprachphilosophie, Handlungstheorie und Philosophie des Geistes als untrennbar miteinander verbunden.

In previous work, I have suggested a doxastic account of perceptual experience according to which experiences form a kind of belief: Beliefs with what I have called “phenomenal” or “looks-content”. I have argued that this account can not only accommodate the intuitive reason providing role of experience, but also its justificatory role. I have also argued that, in general, construing experience and perceptual beliefs, i.e. the beliefs most directly based on experience, as having different contents best accounts for the defeasibility of experiential reasons. In this paper, I shall have a closer look at the evidential or inferential relation between looks-propositions and the contents of perceptual beliefs and argue for a form of what I shall call “Pollockianism” about experiential reasons: such reasons are good unless defeated. Questions to be investigated include: Does the resulting picture of perceptual justification contain an externalist element? Is it compatible with Bayesianism? And how does it do with respect to problems that have been raised for other forms of Pollockianism such as dogmatism or phenomenal conservatism?