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338Practical reasoningRoutledge. 1989.Practical Reasoning and Ethical Decision presents an account of practical reasoning as a process that can explain action, connect reasoning with intention,...
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344Reliability as a virtuePhilosophical Studies 142 (1): 43-54. 2009.This paper explores what constitutes reliability in persons, particularly intellectual reliability. It considers global reliability, the overall reliability of persons, encompassing both the theoretical and practical realms; sectorial reliability, that of a person in a subject-matter (or behavioral) domain; and focal reliability, that of a particular element, such as a belief. The paper compares reliability with predictability of the kind most akin to it and distinguishes reliability as an intel…Read more
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338Self-deception vs. self-caused deception: A comment on professor MeleBehavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1): 104-104. 1997.Mele's study of philosophical and psychological theories of self-deception informatively links the conceptual and dynamic aspects of self-deception and explicates it without positing mutually inconsistent beliefs, such as those occurring in two-person deception. It is argued, however, that he does not do full justice to the dissociation characteristic of self-deception and does not sufficiently distinguish self-deception from self-caused deception.
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302Divine Command Morality and the Autonomy of EthicsFaith and Philosophy 24 (2): 121-143. 2007.This paper formulates a kind of divine command ethical theory intended to comport with two major views: that basic moral principles are necessary truths and that necessary truths are not determined by divine will. The theory is based on the possibility that obligatoriness can be a theological property even if its grounds are such that the content of our obligations has a priori limits. As developed in the paper, the proposed divine command theory is compatible with the centrality of God in pract…Read more
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128Eschatological verification and personal identityInternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7 (4): 391-408. 1976.
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226Experience and inference in the grounding of theoretical and practical reasons: Replies to professors Fumerton, Marras, and sinnott–armstrong (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1): 202-8211. 2003.Professors Richard Fumerton, Ausonio Marras, and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong have provided valuable and challenging examinations of The Architecture of Reason, and I am grateful for their work in producing these critiques and for the insight and ingenuity they exhibit in pursuing some of the difficult issues. In the space I have, I cannot do full justice to all the questions and problems they raise, but I will indicate along what lines the resources of the book provide for responses that may advanc…Read more
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185Reasons, practical reason, and practical reasoningRatio 17 (2). 2004.The concepts of reasons as supporting elements, of practical reason as a capacity, and of practical reasoning as a process are central in the theory of action. This paper provides a brief account of each. Several kinds of reason for action are distinguished. Practical reason is characterized both as a capacity whose exercise is largely constituted by a kind of responsiveness to reasons and as governed by certain normative principles; and practical reasoning is described as a kind of mental proce…Read more
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217Intention, cognitive commitment, and planningSynthese 86 (3): 361-378. 1991.This paper defends a cognitive-motivational account of intending against recent criticism by J. Garcia, connects intending with a number of other concepts important in the theory of action — including decison, volition, and planning — and explores some principles of intention transfer construed as counterparts of epistemic principles governing closure for belief and justification. Several routes to intention formation are described; the role of intentions in planning is examined; and a holistic …Read more
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114Wants and intentions in the explanation of actionJournal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 9 (3). 1979.This paper replies to criticisms of the author's accounts of intending ("journal of philosophy", 1973), wanting ("philosophical studies", 1973), and common-sense explanations of intentional actions; and it extends the nomological theory of intentional action developed in those and other articles. the paper argues, negatively, that theoretical construct accounts of intentional concepts do not entail implausible views of self-knowledge, nor assimilate reasons to mechanical causes; and, positively,…Read more
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419The separation of church and state and the obligations of citizenshipPhilosophy and Public Affairs 18 (3): 259-296. 1989.
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190Deductive closure, defeasibility and scepticism: A reply to FeldmanPhilosophical Quarterly 45 (181): 494-499. 1995.
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81Religious commitment and secular reason: A reply to professor WeithmanPhilosophy and Public Affairs 20 (1): 66-76. 1991.
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145Justification, truth, and reliabilityPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (1): 1-29. 1988.
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365Weakness of will and practical judgmentNoûs 13 (2): 173-196. 1979.Weakness of will is a common phenomenon of human experience. But what is it? It has proved highly resistant to analysis, and even the accounts that seem to capture our intuitions about what weakness of will is raise problems about how it is possible. This is because these accounts seem inconsistent with some highly plausible principles about action. My aim here is to propose a new account of weakness of will and its relation to practical judgment, and to explain how weakness of will so conceived…Read more
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194Prospects for a naturalization of practical reason: Humean instrumentalism and the normative authority of desireInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies 10 (3). 2002.This is an age of naturalization projects. Much epistemological work has been done toward naturalizing theoretical reason. One might view Hume as seeking to naturalize reason in both the theoretical (roughly, epistemological) and the practical realms. I suggest that whatever else underlies the vitality of Hume's instrumentalism - encapsulated in his view that 'reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions' - one incentive is the hope of naturalizing practical reason. This paper explor…Read more
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58On the conception and measurement of attitudes in contemporary Anglo-american psychologyJournal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 2 (2). 1972.