Robert Audi

Intuitions are sometimes conceived as intellectual perceptions. They share with physical perceptions being direct and, in that way, non‐inferential. Contemporary epistemologists tend to consider all knowledge dependent in some way on perception but not as requiring countenancing abstract objects. We do, however, speak of seeing truths of logic and mathematics, even if we do not view the abstracta they apparently concern as in the causal order. How, then, is knowing them possible if, as is quite plausible, knowledge depends on a causal connection between objects known and beliefs constituting knowledge of them? Much language concerning abstracta—using “seeing”, “grasping”, “perceiving”, and the like—invites comparing the apprehension of abstract entities with the perception of concrete entities. How much like perception of the physical is apprehension of the abstract? And can an account of perception encompass both? Might intuition, taken as apprehension in the way W. D. Ross did, be a kind of intellectual perception and, if so, must there be a causal element in it after all? This paper draws on an overall account of perception to frame a theory that provides for an ontology applicable to perception of the physical, apprehension of the abstract, and knowledge of the normative.

Philosophers and others characteristically give multiple arguments for their important controversial views. Why is one good argument not enough? Most philosophers would perhaps agree to this much: at their best, arguments are paths to understanding, pillars of conviction, providers of confirmation, and nourishment for the intellect. But how should we unpack these metaphors? This paper attempts to contribute to that task. It shows why a good cumulative case should not be identified with a conjunctive one (culminating in a single argument with all the relevant premises conjoined), and it brings out how propositional and non-propositional grounds differ significantly from one another but can be integrated into a unified case for what they mutually support.

This chapter has three main aims: first, to distinguish between different kinds and degrees of moral disagreement, particularly between disagreements _in_ reasons and disagreements _on_ reasons; second, to show how, in both moral and non-moral disputes, rational disagreement is possible even on self-evident propositions; and third, to sketch a conception of disagreement between rational parties that bears on the problem of religious diversity as a challenge to philosophical theology. Disagreement in moral matters has long been considered a challenge to objectivist ethical theories, and the difficulty of resolving such disagreement appears to support skepticism about the possibility of knowledge, and even of justification, regarding religious beliefs, religious faith, and religious conduct. The chapter explores rational disagreements of many kinds and concludes with an assessment of how, given what we learn from examining them, objectivity can be plausibly claimed in normative matters.

This chapter extends and clarifies the Kantian intuitionist view that a qualified Rossian intuitionism can be integrated with a version of Kant's humanity formula. In doing this, it briefly sketches Kantian intuitionism; it explicates the notion of treatment of persons — whether merely as means or as ends in themselves — as kinds of _conduct_ in a sense the chapter explicates; and it introduces a distinction between thick and thin ethical questions. Thin ethical questions concern act-types, understood one-dimensionally; thick ethical questions concern conduct-types, which are three-dimensional. The theoretical framework provided by the chapter clarifies the way in which an understanding of the obligations expressed in the humanity formula bear on interpreting Rossian principles and on resolving conflicts of obligation that constitute a challenge to the adequacy of intuitionist ethics as developed by Ross. The final section of the chapter formulates a set of weighting principles that enhance the scope, concreteness, and practical applicability of Kantian intuitionism as an ethical theory.

This chapter comprises Audi's responses to the critical chapters that comprise Part I, “Problems and Prospects for Intuitionist Ethics.” Audi defends his version of ethical intuitionism against the objections of Walter Sinnott‐Armstrong (Chapter 2), Roger Crisp (Chapter 3), and Hugh McCann (Chapter 4), and he defends his integration of Rossian pluralism with a Kantian unification of morality under the categorical imperative against the challenges raised by Bernard Gert (Chapter 5), Thomas Hurka (Chapter 6), and Candace Vogler (Chapter 7).

Nicholas Rescher was no stranger to the philosophy of mathematics or the philosophy of science, but his interests ranged to general epistemology and to the metaphysics of abstract objects. His epistemology combined Aristotle's insight that there are important propositions that can be known but not demonstrated with a conception of how we might intuitively apprehend such propositions. With admirable brevity, he provides a sketch of intuition as a rational capacity; a conception of its deliverances—which are specific intuitions—that allows for intuitive self-knowledge as well as for knowledge of what is external to the mind; and pragmatic criteria for choice among axiom sets. This paper traces some of his thinking about these matters and suggests how he successfully combines mathematical realism with a pragmatic theory of axiom choice in mathematics and theory choice in empirical science.

Moral epistemology is central to ethical theory and, after a period of some neglect, is currently receiving much attention. Discussion of the subject suffered no small setback from the influence of positivistic noncognitivism. Nor was moral epistemology a main object of the narrowly metaethical focus that dominated much of ethical discussion between the Second World War and the early 1970s; the concern during that period was mainly semantical and metaphysical. Even now, many writers in ethics who tend to take for granted that there is much scientific knowledge are skeptical about the possibility of any moral knowledge; and some of them accept the view, especially common in university communities, that moral judgments represent at best cultural assumptions having no claim to truth.

Is any justification absolutely indefeasible? This cannot be determined without a good understanding of what defeasibility is. There are two central cases: overriding and undermining. If undermining is complete, there was no real justification to begin with, whereas overridden justification can be simply weaker than the overriding element(s). This paper explores both kinds of defeasibility and appraises the case that certain kinds of justification are overridable but not underminable. This is a quite general thesis, and the paper argues that if we take seriously the analogy between justification in the realm of belief—the traditional focus of epistemology—and justification in the practical realm—the traditional focus of moral philosophy—we can see a stronger case for the existence of certain indefeasible sources of justification.

Moral properties lead a double life. We invoke them as high authorities when we feel mistreated or want to redirect others; but we also doubt their authority—or even their existence—when we seek to understand them philosophically. Some philosophers would say that even this open-ended contrast between respect and skeptical doubt presupposes too much: ontological neutrality requires speaking not of moral properties but instead of moral predicates. Nonetheless, even if we confine the contrast to those, a comparable duality is evident. For nearly everyone, moral terms are apparently quite well understood when it comes to bringing up children—an activity in which our true colors surely show—but deeply puzzling when it comes to the attempt at analysis. In this, to be sure, moral language is not so different from many other kinds: we learn how to use moral terms, much as we do psychological and other “descriptive” terms, and in that crucial way we know what they mean, yet even most philosophers are unable to give definitions that capture their meaning. This plainly applies to psychological language embodying action-explaining terms, and it clearly applies to at least a great many physical terms, perhaps all those not ostensively “definable.” This kind of parity between moral and descriptive language is one among many reasons to explore the moral domain on the tentative assumption of realism. This paper does not argue directly for moral realism, but if the framework it presents for understanding moral discourse and practice is plausible, that will perhaps constitute an indirect argument for the view that moral judgments belong to the realm of the true and the real, not simply to that of attitudinal expression and behavioral regulation.

In appraising human actions, an important consideration is whether they are free. If they are compelled, this may be excusatory; if controlled by someone other than the agent, this may mitigate; and if selfishly motivated, this may invalidate excuses. Moral appraisals of action by non‐philosophers do not normally consider whether it can be free under determinism. Metaphysical inquiry about action, by contrast, seems incomplete if it does not consider this. Are there two free will problems, one normative and one metaphysical? If so, they share such terms as ‘could’ and ‘could not’, and thoughtful non‐philosophers question their own normative assumptions once they understand the metaphysical problem determinism poses for the philosophy of action. This paper distinguishes metaphysical from action‐theoretic elements of the free will problem but also connects the metaphysical issues with normative questions about responsibility; it critically appraises some major metaphysical arguments concerning free action; and—to the extent possible in a single paper—it provides a positive account of free action neutral toward determinism.

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What we believe typically seems true to us. Phenomenal conservatism takes something’s seeming true as a basis for believing it. Are beliefs, then, innocent unless “proven” guilty? There is some reason to think this, at least regarding rational persons, but even they may have beliefs falling short of rationality. This paper contends that beliefs are rational on the basis of grounds for them. There are many kinds of grounds. Here the focus is a phenomenal kind, such as visual experience indicating facts. Are justificatory grounds for a belief a kind of phenomenal seeming—one having, as part of its content, that its propositional object is true? What are the sources of propositional seemings, and are such seemings basic grounds of justification? This paper sketches a theory of basic grounds and their sources, appraises phenomenal conservatism in that light, extends the resulting appraisal to the realm of practical reason, and defends the justificatory power of intuition.

Moral judgment commonly depends on intuition. It is also true, though less widely agreed, that ethical theory depends on it. The nature and epistemic status of intuition have long been concerns of philosophy, and, with the increasing importance of ethical intuitionism as a major position in ethics, they are receiving much philosophical attention. There is growing agreement that intuition conceived as a kind of seeming is essential for both the justification of moral judgment and the confirmation of ethical theories. This paper describes several importantly different kinds of intuition, particularly the episodic kinds often called seemings. This is done partly by sketching numerous examples of intuition. Intuitive seemings and moral judgments based on them differ in content, basis, epistemic authority, and phenomenology. The paper explores these four dimensions of intuition and, in doing so, compares moral intuition with moral perception. The overall aim is to clarify moral phenomenology both descriptively and epistemologically and to support the view that intuitions are often discriminative responses to experience and have justificatory power analogous to the power of sense-perceptions.

The problem of evil is an intellectual challenge for philosophers and theologians and an existential threat to many religious believers. It is sustained by the commitments of what is now called perfect being theology, which is above all a philosophical theology centered on the conception of God as creator of the cosmos and as omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good. With Kontny and Müller-Salo, I do not try to evade the problem by treating evil as illusory or subjective. I agree that there are genuine evils of horrendous proportions. The question why there is evil at all is urgent enough in a world under an omnicompetent God—‘omnicompetence’ being shorthand for the conjunction of omniscience, omnipotence, and perfect goodness. But the question why there is so much and such excruciating evil seems on the face of it unanswerable. Kontny and Müller-Salo have contributed much to our understanding of the problem, and here, rather than elaborate on all of their points, I shall simply reply to those that indicate a need to reinforce or extend major theses I have defended.

Perception is a central topic in both epistemology and philosophy of mind. This essay addresses perception from both perspectives, exploring its structure, phenomenology, and relation to belief and knowledge. Perception embodies sensory experience and in that way is phenomenologically representational; it is a response to its object and in that way a source of information about what is perceived; and it is a basis of belief and knowledge and in that way enables us to navigate the world. These points are examined in relation to five dimensions of the theory of perception: the “contents” of perceptual experience; the levels of its responsiveness to its objects; the extent to which, in various forms, it may depend on conceptualizing what is perceived; its liability to influence by the perceiver’s beliefs or theoretical commitments; and its role in grounding justification and knowledge.

Testimony is a special challenge in epistemology. Human life as we know it would be impossible without it; we commonly accept it without question; and only the highly skeptical doubt that from it we gain much knowledge about matters on which we lack independent evidence. In my theory of testimony, it figures as an essential source of knowledge in our lives, but not as a basic source of it; and the way in which testimony yields justification for believing its content is very different from the way in which it yields knowledge. Isabelle Keßels, David Lambert, and Christian Quast have produced a long and detailed study of my treatment of the topic, and here I can note only some important aspects of it and seek to discuss them in ways that may advance understanding of some major aspects of the topic.

That self-interest is a source of reasons for action has rarely if ever been controversial in philosophy. That the interest of others is such a source for normal persons has often seemed to philosophers to need argument. I refer to non-instrumental normative reasons, and I assume that when one has a reason of this kind to do something, doing it is prima facie rational. If the only source of basic reasons for action—those having non-instrumental normative force, and in a certain sense non-derivative force—is self-interest, then the only way ethics can have a rational grip on us is through our viewing others as in some sense means to our own ends. This does not make ethics impossible, for it might be true and quite credible that in the long run our self-interest is adequately served only by leading a minimally moral life. I have long argued, however, that self-interest is not the only basic source of reasons for action and, more positively, that the basic grounds of practical rationality are in a special way impersonal. In “Audi on the Rationality of Altruism”, Charlott Becker and her colleagues explore my case for this view.

The epistemology of moral principles should be developed in relation to general epistemology and integrated with a plausible moral ontology. On both counts, it is important to consider the nature of moral properties and, more generally, normative properties. This paper distinguishes two kinds of normative properties, indicates how they are related to one another and to moral properties, contrasts their supervenience on natural properties with their grounding in those properties, and, in the light of the points then in view, argues for a moderately rationalist account of knowledge of moral principles. The paper also considers in detail how one might account for the a priori status of certain moral principles—a status that remains controversial and is in any case difficult to establish. The final section shows how the overall position of the paper may be consistent with moral naturalism but does not depend on it.

The point of departure of this paper is a conception of faith that is broader than traditional conceptions on which it is essentially doxastic. On the theory presupposed here, neither propositional faith nor attitudinal faith entails belief. Faith is also irreducible to hope, though it is not without some kinship to it. More positively, on the view presented here, faith entails a set of positive attitudes of a certain kind. This positive element makes it natural to consider faith a kind of stance toward its object. That conception, in turn, indicates the presence of volitional elements in faith. With these points in view, the paper pursues in detail the kinds of volitional elements that are essential in faith or, at least, characteristic of certain major kinds of faith. The conception of faith as a kind of volitional stance helps to explain both the importance of faith—secular as well as religious—in human life and the resilience of faith in the encounter with counterevidence.