•  266
    Negligence, Belief, Blame and Criminal Liability: The Special Case of Forgetting
    Criminal Law and Philosophy 5 (2): 199-218. 2011.
    Commentators seemingly agree about what negligence is—and how it is contrasted from recklessness. They also appear to concur about whether particular examples (both real and hypothetical) portray negligence. I am less confident about each of these matters. I explore the distinction between recklessness and negligence by examining a type of case that has generated a good deal of critical discussion: those in which a defendant forgets that he has created a substantial and unjustifiable risk of har…Read more
  • Transferred Intent
    Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics and Public Policy 10 (1): 65-98. 1996.
  •  77
    Convergent Ends, Divergent Means: A Response to My Critics
    Criminal Justice Ethics 28 (1): 119-134. 2009.
    When writing Overcriminalization, I entertained a fantasy about the reaction my book might produce. I hoped that philosophers would not merely criticize my shortcomings but would join me to produce...