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4"Rights, Goods, and Democracy" by Ramon M. Lemos (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (3): 541. 1989.
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66Killing, letting die and euthanasiaJournal of Medical Ethics 5 (4): 200-202. 1979.Medical ethicists debate whether or not the moral assessment of cases of euthanasia should depend on whether the patient is 'killed' or 'allowed to die'. The usual presupposition is that a clear distinction between killing and letting die can be drawn so that this substantive question is not begged. I contend that the categorisation of cases of instances of killing rather than as instances of letting die depends in part on a prior moral assessment of the case. Hence is it trivially rather than s…Read more
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18Drug legalizationIn Rosamond Rhodes, Leslie Francis & Anita Silvers (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Medical Ethics, Wiley-blackwell. 2007.The prelims comprise: Introduction 1 Should I Use Drugs? Is the State Justified in Punishing Drug Users? Conclusion References Further Reading.
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86Retributivism In ExtremisLaw and Philosophy 32 (1): 3-31. 2013.I defend two objections to Tadros’s views on punishment. First, I allege that his criticisms of retributivism are persuasive only against extreme versions that provide no justificatory place for instrumentalist objectives. His attack fails against a version of retributivism that recognizes a chasm between what offenders deserve and the allthings-considered permissibility of treating offenders as they deserve. Second, I critique Tadros’s duty view – his alternative theory of punishment. Inter ali…Read more
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104Why Punish Attempts at All? Yaffe on 'The Transfer Principle'Criminal Law and Philosophy 6 (3): 399-410. 2012.Gideon Yaffe is to be commended for beginning his exhaustive treatment by asking a surprisingly difficult question: Why punish attempts at all? He addresses this inquiry in the context of defending (what he calls) the transfer principle: “If a particular form of conduct is legitimately criminalized, then the attempt to engage in that form of conduct is also legitimately criminalized.” I begin by expressing a few reservations about the transfer principle itself. But my main point is that we are j…Read more
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172Negligence, Belief, Blame and Criminal Liability: The Special Case of ForgettingCriminal Law and Philosophy 5 (2): 199-218. 2011.Commentators seemingly agree about what negligence is—and how it is contrasted from recklessness. They also appear to concur about whether particular examples (both real and hypothetical) portray negligence. I am less confident about each of these matters. I explore the distinction between recklessness and negligence by examining a type of case that has generated a good deal of critical discussion: those in which a defendant forgets that he has created a substantial and unjustifiable risk of har…Read more
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98The philosophy of criminal law: selected essaysOxford University Press. 2010.Does criminal liability require an act? -- Motive and criminal liability -- The costs to criminal theory of supposing that intentions are irrelevant to permissibility -- Transferred intent -- The nature and justifiability of nonconsummate offenses -- Strict liability, justice, and proportionality -- The sequential principle of relative culpability -- Willful ignorance, knowledge, and the equal culpability thesis : a study of the significance of the principle of legality -- Rapes without rapists …Read more
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27Review essay / philosophical analysis and the limits of the substantive criminal lawCriminal Justice Ethics 18 (2): 58-67. 1999.George P. Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Criminal Law New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, xi + 223 pp
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46Ignorance of Law: A Philosophical InquiryOxford University Press USA. 2016.This book argues that ignorance of law should usually be a complete excuse from criminal liability. It defends this conclusion by invoking two presumptions: first, the content of criminal law should conform to morality; second, mistakes of fact and mistakes of law should be treated symmetrically.
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6Donald VanDeVeer, Paternalistic Intervention: The Moral Bounds of Benevolence Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 7 (1): 36-39. 1987.
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5Criminal law theoryIn Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, Wiley-blackwell. 2004.This chapter contains section titled: The Need for a Theory of Criminalization The Nature of the Criminal Law Inadequate Theories of Criminalization A Better Approach to Criminalization References Further Reading.
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14Require an Act?In Antony Duff (ed.), Philosophy and the criminal law: principle and critique, Cambridge University Press. pp. 60. 1998.
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1A Framework for Punishment: What is the Insight of Hart's 'Prolegomenon'?In C. G. Pulman (ed.), Hart on Responsibility, Palgrave-macmillan. 2014.
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29On the Rights of Non-PersonsCanadian Journal of Philosophy 10 (4). 1980.Do non-persons have moral rights? I will suppose this question can best be answered by inquiring whether some animals and/or environmental objects have moral rights, for if any non-persons are possessors of rights, animals and/or environmental objects are the most plausible candidates. As so interpreted, this question has received an extraordinary amount of recent attention from philosophers. Arguments have been offered and defended; rebuttals have appeared in print. Yet, so far as I am aware, n…Read more
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31Benn on privacy and respect for personsAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 57 (4). 1979.This Article does not have an abstract
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Jon Elster, Strong Feelings: Emotion, Addiction, and Human Behavior (review)Philosophy in Review 20 19-21. 2000.
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103Intoxication and CulpabilityCriminal Law and Philosophy 6 (3): 363-379. 2012.I tackle the difficult problem of specifying how voluntary intoxication affects criminal culpability generally and recklessness in particular. I contend that the problem need not be conceptualized as an instance of actio libera in causa, namely the situation in which persons do something at t1 to culpably create the conditions of their own defense at t2. Instead, I argue that we need only consider intoxicated defendants at t2 in order to justify their punishment. In the course of defending my vi…Read more
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57Social Engineering as an Infringement of the Presumption of Innocence: The Case of Corporate Criminality (review)Criminal Law and Philosophy 8 (2): 353-369. 2014.I examine how deferred-prosecution agreements employed against suspected corporate criminality amount to a form of social engineering that infringes the presumption. I begin with a broad understanding of the presumption itself. Then I offer a brief description of how these agreements function. Finally I address some of the normative issues that must be confronted if legal philosophers who hold retributivist views on punishment and sentencing hope to assess this device. My judgment tends to be fa…Read more