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4"Rights, Goods, and Democracy" by Ramon M. Lemos (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (3): 541. 1989.
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64Killing, letting die and euthanasiaJournal of Medical Ethics 5 (4): 200-202. 1979.Medical ethicists debate whether or not the moral assessment of cases of euthanasia should depend on whether the patient is 'killed' or 'allowed to die'. The usual presupposition is that a clear distinction between killing and letting die can be drawn so that this substantive question is not begged. I contend that the categorisation of cases of instances of killing rather than as instances of letting die depends in part on a prior moral assessment of the case. Hence is it trivially rather than s…Read more
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73[Book review] drugs and rights (review)Criminal Justice Ethics 14 (1): 63-72. 1995.This important book was the first serious work of philosophy to address the question: Do adults have a moral right to use drugs for recreational purposes? Many critics of the 'war on drugs' denounce law enforcement as counterproductive and ineffective. Douglas Husak argues that the 'war on drugs' violates the moral rights of adults who want to use drugs for pleasure, and that criminal laws against such use are incompatible with moral rights. This is not a polemical tract but a scrupulously argue…Read more
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11Philosophical Analysis and the Limits of the Substantive Criminal LawCriminal Justice Ethics 18 (2): 58. 1999.George P. Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Criminal Law New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, xi + 223 pp.
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36Abetting a CrimeLaw and Philosophy 33 (1): 41-73. 2014.I focus on the set of problems that arise in identifying both the actus reus and (to an even greater extent) the mens rea needed by an abettor before she should be criminally liable for complicity in a crime. No consensus on these issues has emerged in positive law; commentators are enormously dissatisfied with the decisions courts have reached; and critics disagree radically about what reforms should be implemented to rectify this state of affairs. I explicitly deny that I will be able to solve…Read more
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34The Philosophy of Criminal Law: Extending the Debates (review)Criminal Law and Philosophy 7 (2): 351-365. 2013.Larry Alexander and Peter Westen each critically examine different topics from my recent collection of essays, The Philosophy of Criminal Law. Alexander focuses on my “Rapes Without Rapists,” “Mistake of Law and Culpability,” and “Already Punished Enough.” Westen offers a more extended commentary on my “Transferred Intent.” I briefly reply to each critic in turn and try to extend the debates in new directions
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78The Costs to Criminal Theory of Supposing that Intentions are Irrelevant to PermissibilityCriminal Law and Philosophy 3 (1): 51-70. 2009.I attempt to describe the several costs that criminal theory would be forced to pay by adopting the view (currently fashionable among moral philosophers) that the intentions of the agent are irrelevant to determinations of whether his actions are permissible (or criminal)
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76Is the Distinction between Positive Actions and Omissions Value-Neutral?Tulane Studies in Philosophy 33 83-92. 1985.
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71The Criminal Law as Last ResortOxford Journal of Legal Studies 24 (2): 207-235. 2004.In this article I examine one condition a minimalist theory of criminalization might contain: the criminal law should be used only as a last resort. I discuss how this principle should be interpreted and the reasons we have to accept it. I conclude that a theory of criminalization should probably include the (appropriately construed) last resort principle. But this conclusion will prove disappointing to those who hope to employ this principle to bring about fundamental reform in the substantive …Read more
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11Ronald Dworkin and the Right to LibertyTaking Rights SeriouslyRonald DworkinEthics 90 (1): 121-130. 1979.
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135Liberal Neutrality, Autonomy, and Drug ProhibitionsPhilosophy and Public Affairs 29 (1): 43-80. 2000.
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21Review of John Kleinig, Ethics and Criminal Justice: An Introduction (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (9). 2008.
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4Beyond the Justification/Excuse DichotomyIn Rowan Cruft, Matthew H. Kramer & Mark R. Reiff (eds.), Crime, Punishment, and Responsibility: The Jurisprudence of Antony Duff, Oxford University Press. 2011.
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267Paternalism and ConsentIn Thomas Schramme (ed.), New Perspectives on Paternalism and Health Care, Springer Verlag. 2015.