•  31
    Depending on how one looks at it, we have been enjoying or suffering a significant empirical turn in moral psychology during this first decade of the 21st century. While philosophers have, from time to time, considered empirical matters with respect to morality, those who took an interest in actual (rather than ideal) moral agents were primarily concerned with whether particular moral theories were ‘too demanding’ for creatures like us (Flanagan, 1991; Williams, 1976; Wolf, 1982). Faithful adher…Read more
  •  21
    Why care where moral intuitions come from?
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1): 14-15. 1994.
  •  74
    Moral Development and Moral Responsibility
    The Monist 86 (2): 181-199. 2003.
    At the end of Section III of “Freedom and Resentment,” just after he has drawn our attention to the reactive attitudes, P. F. Strawson remarks, “The object of these commonplaces is to try to keep before our minds something it is easy to forget when we are engaged in philosophy, especially in our cool, contemporary style, viz., what it is actually like to be involved in ordinary inter-personal relationships, ranging from the most intimate to the most casual.” It is striking, then, that the propon…Read more
  •  11
    Critical Notice (review)
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (4): 545-569. 1997.
  •  13
    Morality is so steeped in the quotidian details of praise and blame, of do’s and don’t’s, and of questions about the justifiability of certain practices it is no wonder that philosophers and psychologists have devoted relatively little effort to investigating what makes moral life possible in the first place. In making this claim, I neither ignore Kant and his intellectual descendants, nor the large literature in developmental moral psychology from Piaget on. My charge has to do with this fact: …Read more
  •  9
    What psychopaths can teach us
    The Philosophers' Magazine 9 32-33. 2000.
  •  113
    What psychopaths can teach us
    The Philosophers' Magazine 9 (9): 32-33. 2000.