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125Truth matters: normativity in thought and knowledgeTheoria 50 137-154. 2004.If language and thought are to be taken as objective, they must respond to how the world is. I propose to explain this responsiveness in terms of conditions of correction, more precisely, by taking thoughts and linguistic utterances to be assessible as true or false. Furthermore, the paper is committed to a form of quietism according to which the very same thing that can be (truly) thought or expressed is the case: ‘soft facts’ as opposed to hard, free-standing facts, independent of any possible…Read more
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480Sense and Sensibility Educated: A Note on Experience and (Minimal) EmpiricismInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (5): 741-747. 2012.McDowell’s minimal empiricism holds that experience, understood as providing conceptually articulated contents, plays a role in the justification of our beliefs. We question this idea by contrasting the role of perceptual experience in moral and non-moral judgments and conclude that experience per se is irrelevant in the former case and should also be so in the latter one: only with the help of adequate beliefs experience can provide a connection with the world. We conclude with some remarks con…Read more
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286Anomalous Monism: Oscillating between DogmasSynthese 148 (1). 2006.Davidson's anomalous monism, his argument for the identity between mental and physical event tokens, has been frequently attacked, usually demanding a higher degree of physicalist commitment. My objection runs in the opposite direction: the identities inferred by Davidson from mental causation, the nomological character of causality and the anomaly of the mental are philosophically problematic and, more dramatically, incompatible with his famous argument against the third dogma of empiricism, th…Read more
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518The only wrong cell is the dead one: On the enactive approach to normativityIn Heras-Escribano Manuel, Noble Jason & Pinedo García Manuel De (eds.), Pietro Liò et al. (eds.) Advances in Artificial Life (ECAL 2013), . pp. 665-670. 2013.In this paper we challenge the notion of ‘normativity’ used by some enactive approaches to cognition. We define some varieties of enactivism and their assumptions and make explicit the reasoning behind the co-emergence of individuality and normativity. Then we argue that appealing to dispositions for explaining some living processes can be more illuminating than claiming that all such processes are normative. For this purpose, we will present some considerations, inspired by Wittgenstein, regard…Read more
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1005Enactivism, action and normativity: a Wittgensteinian analysisAdaptive Behavior 23 (1): 20-33. 2015.In this paper, we offer a criticism, inspired by Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations, of the enactivist account of perception and action. We start by setting up a non-descriptivist naturalism regarding the mind and continue by defining enactivism and exploring its more attractive theoretical features. We then proceed to analyse its proposal to understand normativity non-socially. We argue that such a thesis is ultimately committed to the problematic idea that normative practices can be …Read more
Granada, AL, Spain
Areas of Specialization
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Epistemology |
Philosophy of Biology |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Action |
Metaphysics |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Biology |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |