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250Beliefs, buses and lotteries: Why rational belief can’t be stably high credencePhilosophical Studies 173 (7): 1721-1734. 2016.Until recently, it seemed like no theory about the relationship between rational credence and rational outright belief could reconcile three independently plausible assumptions: that our beliefs should be logically consistent, that our degrees of belief should be probabilistic, and that a rational agent believes something just in case she is sufficiently confident in it. Recently a new formal framework has been proposed that can accommodate these three assumptions, which is known as “the stabili…Read more
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89Measuring the overall incoherence of credence functionsSynthese 192 (5): 1467-1493. 2015.Many philosophers hold that the probability axioms constitute norms of rationality governing degrees of belief. This view, known as subjective Bayesianism, has been widely criticized for being too idealized. It is claimed that the norms on degrees of belief postulated by subjective Bayesianism cannot be followed by human agents, and hence have no normative force for beings like us. This problem is especially pressing since the standard framework of subjective Bayesianism only allows us to distin…Read more
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78Graded Incoherence for Accuracy-FirstersPhilosophy of Science 84 (2): 189-213. 2017.This paper investigates the relationship between two evaluative claims about agents’ de- grees of belief: (i) that it is better to have more, rather than less accurate degrees of belief, and (ii) that it is better to have less, rather than more probabilistically incoherent degrees of belief. We show that, for suitable combinations of inaccuracy measures and incoherence measures, both claims are compatible, although not equivalent; moreover, certain ways of becoming less incoherent always guarant…Read more
Boulder, Colorado, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Reasoning |
Formal Epistemology |
Philosophy of Probability |