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271Can there be reasoning with degrees of belief?Synthese 190 (16): 3535-3551. 2013.In this paper I am concerned with the question of whether degrees of belief can figure in reasoning processes that are executed by humans. It is generally accepted that outright beliefs and intentions can be part of reasoning processes, but the role of degrees of belief remains unclear. The literature on subjective Bayesianism, which seems to be the natural place to look for discussions of the role of degrees of belief in reasoning, does not address the question of whether degrees of belief play…Read more
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98Disagreement and Epistemic Utility-Based CompromiseJournal of Philosophical Logic 44 (3): 273-286. 2015.Epistemic utility theory seeks to establish epistemic norms by combining principles from decision theory and social choice theory with ways of determining the epistemic utility of agents’ attitudes. Recently, Moss, 1053–69, 2011) has applied this strategy to the problem of finding epistemic compromises between disagreeing agents. She shows that the norm “form compromises by maximizing average expected epistemic utility”, when applied to agents who share the same proper epistemic utility function…Read more
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248Beliefs, buses and lotteries: Why rational belief can’t be stably high credencePhilosophical Studies 173 (7): 1721-1734. 2016.Until recently, it seemed like no theory about the relationship between rational credence and rational outright belief could reconcile three independently plausible assumptions: that our beliefs should be logically consistent, that our degrees of belief should be probabilistic, and that a rational agent believes something just in case she is sufficiently confident in it. Recently a new formal framework has been proposed that can accommodate these three assumptions, which is known as “the stabili…Read more
Boulder, Colorado, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Reasoning |
Formal Epistemology |
Philosophy of Probability |