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72Two troublesome claims about qualities in Locke's essayPhilosophical Review 84 (3): 401-418. 1975.In book two, Chapter eight of the essay, Locke claims that primary qualities, Unlike secondary qualities, Are really in objects and are resemblances of our ideas. The idioms of containment and of resemblance are explained as formulations of what jonathan bennett calls the analytic thesis and the causal thesis. It is argued that locke was concerned to distinguish primary qualities from what he calls secondary qualities because he thought the latter were not really qualities at all but mere powers…Read more
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60Analysis and subsumption in the behaviorism of HullPhilosophy of Science 50 (March): 96-111. 1983.The background hypothesis of this essay is that psychological phenomena are typically explained, not by subsuming them under psychological laws, but by functional analysis. Causal subsumption is an appropriate strategy for explaining changes of state, but not for explaining capacities, and it is capacities that are the central explananda of psychology. The contrast between functional analysis and causal subsumption is illustrated, and the background hypothesis supported, by a critical reassessme…Read more
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511States, causes, and the law of inertiaPhilosophical Studies 29 (1). 1976.I argue that Galileo regarded unaccelerated motion as requiring cause to sustain in. In an inclined plane experiment, the cause ceases when the incline ceases. When the incline ceases, what ceases is acceleration, not motion. Hence, unaccelerated motion requires no cause to sustain it.
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54On an Argument for Truth-FunctionalityAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 9 (3). 1972.Quine argued that any context allowing substitution of logical equivalents and coextensive terms is truth functional. We argue that Quine's proof for this claim is flawed.
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477Inexplicit informationIn Myles Brand (ed.), The Representation Of Knowledge And Belief, Tucson: University of Arizona Press. 1986.A discussion of a number of ways that information can be present in a computer program without being explicitly represented.
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153Conceptual role semantics and the explanatory role of contentPhilosophical Studies 65 (1-2): 103-127. 1992.I've tried to argue that there is more to representational content than CRS can acknowledge. CRS is attractive, I think, because of its rejection of atomism, and because it is a plausible theory of targets. But those are philosopher's concerns. Someone interested in building a person needs to understand representation, because, as AI researchers have urged for some time, good representation is the secret of good performance. I have just gestured in the direction I think a viable theory of repres…Read more
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31Biological preparedness and evolutionary explanationCognition 73 (3). 1999.It is commonly supposed that evolutionary explanations of cognitive phenomena involve the assumption that the capacities to be explained are both innate and modular. This is understandable: independent selection of a trait requires that it be both heritable and largely decoupled from other ”nearby’ traits. Cognitive capacities realized as innate modules would certainly satisfy these contraints. A viable evolutionary cognitive psychology, however, requires neither extreme nativism nor modularity,…Read more
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2The role of mental meaning in psychological explanationIn Brian P. McLaughlin (ed.), Dretske and his critics, Blackwell. 1991.
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8Critical Notice: "Computational Theory: critical discussion of Pylyshyn, "Computation and Cognition".Criical Notice.Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18 (1): 147-162. 1988.
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175Epistemological strata and the rules of right reasonSynthese 141 (3). 2004.It has been commonplace in epistemology since its inception to idealize away from computational resource constraints, i.e., from the constraints of time and memory. One thought is that a kind of ideal rationality can be specified that ignores the constraints imposed by limited time and memory, and that actual cognitive performance can be seen as an interaction between the norms of ideal rationality and the practicalities of time and memory limitations. But a cornerstone of naturalistic epistemol…Read more
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51The World in the HeadOxford University Press. 2010.Robert Cummins presents a series of essays motivated by the following question: Is the mind a collection of beliefs and desires that respond to and condition our feeling and perceptual experiences, or is this just a natural way to talk about it? What sort of conceptual framework do we need to understand what is really going on in our brains?
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253Biological preparedness and evolutionary explanationCognition 73 (3). 1999.It is commonly supposed that evolutionary explanations of cognitive phenomena involve the assumption that the capacities to be explained are both innate and modular. This is understandable: independent selection of a trait requires that it be both heritable and largely decoupled from other `nearby' traits. Cognitive capacities realized as innate modules would certainly satisfy these contraints. A viable evolutionary cognitive psychology, however, requires neither extreme nativism nor modularity,…Read more
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The Mind of the Matter: Comments on Paul ChurchlandPSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1984 791-798. 1984.
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305Programs in the explanation of behaviorPhilosophy of Science 44 (June): 269-87. 1977.The purpose of this paper is to set forth a sense in which programs can and do explain behavior, and to distinguish from this a number of senses in which they do not. Once we are tolerably clear concerning the sort of explanatory strategy being employed, two rather interesting facts emerge; (1) though it is true that programs are "internally represented," this fact has no explanatory interest beyond the mere fact that the program is executed; (2) programs which are couched in information process…Read more
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1Inexplicit representationIn Myles Brand (ed.), The Representation Of Knowledge And Belief, Tucson: University of Arizona Press. 1986.
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84Intention, meaning and truth-conditionsPhilosophical Studies 35 (4). 1979.In this paper, I sketch a revision of jonathan bennett's "meaning-Nominalist strategy" for explaining the conventional meanings of utterance-Types. Bennett's strategy does not explain sentence-Meaning by appeal to sub-Sentential meanings, And hence cannot hope to yield a theory that assigns a meaning to every sentence. I revise the strategy to make it applicable to predication and identification. The meaning-Convention for a term can then be used to fix its satisfaction conditions. Adapting a fa…Read more
Davis, California, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Biology |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Areas of Interest
17th/18th Century Philosophy |