Reinaldo Elugardo

Vernacularism is the view that logical forms are fundamentally assigned to natural language expressions, and are only derivatively assigned to anything else, e.g., propositions, mental representations, expressions of symbolic logic, etc. In this paper, we argue that Vernacularism is not as plausible as it first appears because of non-sentential speech. More specifically, there are argument-premises, meant by speakers of non-sentences, for which no natural language paraphrase is readily available in the language used by the speaker and the hearer. The speaker can intend this proposition and the hearer can recover it (and its logical form). Since they cannot, by hypothesis, be doing this by using a sentence of their shared language, the proposition-meant has its logical form non-derivatively, which falsifies Vernacularism. We conclude the paper with a brief review of the debate on incomplete definite descriptions in which Vernacularism is assumed as a suppressed premise

Explaining Attitudes is an important contribution to the philosophy of mind. It is the latest installment in Lynne Rudder Baker’s work, which began with her equally important book, Saving Belief, to restore the attitudes to their proper place. In Explaining Attitudes, she undertakes two important projects. The first is a critique of recent attempts to either naturalize the mind or to cast folk psychology as a discredited theory. The second is the development of an alternative view of the mind, one that adheres with and illuminates our ordinary practices of psychological explanation and ascriptions.

In a well known paper, “Mind and Ideas in Berkeley” George Pitcher has argued that Berkeley's account of how minds are related to sensible ideas must be incoherent. Douglas Odegard has already criticized Pitcher's treatment of Berkeley, but the criticisms pertain to other questions. No one appears to have challenged Pitcher's most important argument. I hope to show that, while it is well worth analyzing, the argument fails to provide any effective reductio ad absurdum of Berkeley's real position.Pitcher's argument trades on two logically independent versions of the adverbial analysis of ideas. The first is what I shall call “the identity version”. Its proponent asserts that the ideas are identical with sensings, with mental acts or states of sensing which are adverbially describable. The philosopher who follows the second or “constitutive” version asserts that ideas are sensa and exist as constituents of sensing states. For him ideas are not mental states but are constituents of such states. A sponsor of either version will hold that sensings are qualities of the mind.