•  1876
    Why we may not find intentions in the brain
    with Sebo Uithol and Daniel C. Burnston
    Neuropsychologia 56 (5): 129-139. 2014.
    Intentions are commonly conceived of as discrete mental states that are the direct cause of actions. In the last several decades, neuroscientists have taken up the project of finding the neural implementation of intentions, and a number of areas have been posited as implementing these states. We argue, however, that the processes underlying action initiation and control are considerably more dynamic and context sensitive than the concept of intention can allow for. Therefore, adopting the notion…Read more
  •  410
    Representationalism vs. anti-representationalism: A debate for the sake of appearance
    with Andre´ de Groot and Hans van Rappard
    Philosophical Psychology 16 (1): 5-23. 2003.
    In recent years the cognitive science community has witnessed the rise of a new, dynamical approach to cognition. This approach entails a framework in which cognition and behavior are taken to result from complex dynamical interactions between brain, body, and environment. The advent of the dynamical approach is grounded in a dissatisfaction with the classical computational view of cognition. A particularly strong claim has been that cognitive systems do not rely on internal representations and …Read more